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



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JUNG, HEIDEGGER AND THE
SYMBOLISM OF AUTHENTICITY


JOHN J. BORONOW

1977



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JUNG, HEIDEGGER
AND THE
SYMBOLISM OF AUTHENTICITY

by

John J. Boronow

Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of Psychiatry
YALE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
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DOCTOR OF MEDICINE

1977



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PREFACE

It seems the least I can do to mollify ruffled opinions is to offer a word of explanation as to how a medical student comes to write an essay in philosophy for his medical school thesis. Without disclosing the argument that is to follow in the text, perhaps I can nevertheless prepare the way a bit by asking the question, "What should such an exercise as a thesis accomplish for the student?" My answer, and admittedly not the only possibility, was as follows: the thesis should provide an opportunity to return to certain fundamentals and explore a field at a depth which the student may not again enjoy for some time. Again and again my classmates and I were told, "Do not rush so fast to master the clinical; you have your whole lifetime to do that. Take advantage of your studenthood and immerse yourself in thinking. You may never again get such a golden chance!" And so I took my advisors at their word, returning for nearly a year "to the books." Only my books were not biochemistry, statistics, neurophysiology, or even psychometrics. For it seemed to me that if we indeed were to "return to the basic sciences," then a thoughtful analysis would reveal that philosophy was the proper basic science of psychoanalysis, my chosen medical specialty. My text will defend this point of view in detail; I offer it now without further comment by way of setting the tone. I merely wish to put on record that I see no radical

discontinuity between the educational aims of my thesis and a more traditionally conceived one. This project has afforded me the occasion to think deeply about things which I trust will influence the whole of my future professional career as a doctor, and I regard that as neither irrelevant to, nor avoiding the issues of, medical school. On the contrary, it is probably one of the most valuable things about the freedom at Yale, and for which I am greatly thankful.

I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude for the numerous friends and teachers who have helped me over the past year. To Dr. Theodore Lidz I owe much of my above-mentioned freedom, as he saw fit to give me a carte blanche with my time, trusting me to find my own way, even if bemusedly sceptical of the outcome. Professor Karsten Harries, who introduced me to philosophy eight years ago, helped to guide me through the interstices of Being and Time this year with his accustomed clarity and honesty. Many friends, especially Humphrey Morris, Flip Kursberg and Donna Avedisian, goaded me to clearer thinking in our frequent conversations. And Adrienne Kols and my parents did me the tremendous favor of editing and proofing. Finally, my deepest debt is owed to Professor Edward S. Casey, whose encouragement and interest were there from the very beginning, and whose broad reading and thoughtfulness were the perfect stone against which to sharpen my argument. To them all I say a thousand thanks, knowing that whatever shortcomings that are to be found within are not of their doing, but are mine alone.

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21 February, 1977

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INTRODUCTION

The concept of symbol lies at the very heart of C. G. Jung's system of Analytical Psychology. A fundamental understanding of the term as Jung uses it reveals the entire Gestalt of his work, and clarifies at once his divergence from Freud, Structuralism, and contemporary medical psychiatry. For many academic psychiatrists, however, the notion of Jung's symbol has remained all too obscure. In a period dominated by Freudian ego psychology, revolutionary breakthroughs in psychopharmacology, and a growing interest in clinical behaviorism, symbolism has seemed esoteric, remote, and capriciously arbitrary. Isolated from the mainstream of the American psychiatric community as it has been, the Jungian symbol is often regarded suspiciously by psychiatrists as a curious and confused aberration of Freud's earlier formally defined and accepted concept, unable to rise above mere idiosyncrasy, and lacking claim to an intellectual consensus.

The thesis of this essay is to prove that such is not the case. In the following pages we will demonstrate the extensive similarity and correspondence with Jung's concept of symbol that exists in much of 19th and 20th century European philosophical thought. The first part of our argument will consist of an extensive hermeneutical analysis of all the pertinent material which Jung wrote on the subject of symbolism.

In this section we will attempt to bring together various strands of Jung's thinking in such a way as to reveal the broader implications of this one concept. At the same time we shall endeavor to clarify some of the more persistent misconceptions which have hampered a properly dispassionate evaluation of Jung's thought.

In the second part we shall turn our attention to the intellectual antecedents of Jung's ideas on symbolism. Staying within the German metaphysical tradition, we will seek to trace the concept's heritage from Kant through Schopenhauer to Nietzsche, pausing to consider the contemporaneous work of Cassirer, and ending finally in the present-day thinking of Martin Heidegger. If it appears that this heritage leads more directly to Heidegger than to Jung, that is as it should be. For our claim in this second half of the essay will be that Heidegger is unquestionably the philosophic counterpart of Jungian psychoanalysis, Jung's and Binswanger's protestations to the contrary notwithstanding.

As a disclaimer by way of anticipation, let me hasten to add what this paper is not. Representing as it does an attempt to locate Jung's thought in the general intellectual dialectic of this century, it has little interest in defending his ideas by detailed comparisons with antithetical systems. Rather, I hope only to further clarify them by revealing their ancestry and searching out their kindred. Hence, I shall only passingly touch on Freud and Structuralism, to name but two alternatives. As Thomas Kuhn points out, the task of translating between scientific systems is thankless, and all the

the more so for pre-scientific ones:

Each group uses its own paradigm to argue that paradigm's defense. . . . The status of a circular argument is only that of persuasion. It cannot be made logically or even probabilistically compelling for those who refuse to step into the circle.¹

Moreover, were I to attempt a systematic analysis of the correspondences of two competing theory systems, I would probably lose what Michael Polanyi calls the comprehensive meaning of the system I was trying to elucidate. Hence, all that is asked of the reader is that he approach this topic through the eyes of the protagonists, that he indeed "step into their circle" and try to apprehend their Gestalt of the world so as to see reality in their terms. Would that he be surprised!

PART I:
A DISCOURSE ON SYMBOL

JUNG'S EARLY THOUGHTS ON SYMBOLS

At first glance, it might seem somewhat arbitrary to single out the notion of symbol as being distinctive of Jung's thought. After all, was it not Freud who first showed us the meaning that lay hidden in dreams? And is not Jung better known for archetypes, psychological typology, and the individuation process? Surely the question of symbolism is what Jung held in common with his psychoanalytical contemporaries.

And yet, that is only at first glance. For Jung in fact shared only the word's hollow shell, and instead went on to develop a meaning for symbol that rested on a unique epistemological foundation. This new meaning stemmed from his profoundly different visioning of the unconscious as ontologically prior, and it was that insight which led him to explore the instinctual roots of spiritual life. His concept of symbol, elaborated as early as 1912, was the seminal expression of such a re-visioning. Although it is common to hear the Freud/Jung break described as a disagreement over the libido theory, we shall show that what was fundamentally at issue was Jung's different conception of symbol, by which all of his later ideas were made possible. Viewed in this way, the libido controversy itself becomes symbolic of the deeper debate over symbol.

Jung first appeared on the European psychoanalytical scene in 1907, with the publication of his Psychology of

Dementia Praecox. This early work won the admiration of Freud immediately, for it marked one of the first attempts to demonstrate intentionality and meaning in the symptoms and speech of psychotics according to psychoanalytical principles. Jung was clearly under the sway of Freud's intellectual tutelage at this point, and the book argued for a direct application to psychosis of concepts developed by Freud for hysteria and neurosis. As a result, Jung paid little attention to symbolism in and for itself. Quoting Pelletier, he merely passed it off as "a very inferior form of thought" due to a "deficiency in the power of discrimination." A symbol stood for a thought, but was made of "indistinct, subsidiary associations" which "obscure rather than clarify it." In contrast, allegory was conceived as "an intentional interpretation of a thought, reinforced by images."¹

Ordinary dream symbols were also postulated to be the result of such a deficiency. Sleep was induced by a mechanism called "sleep-suggestion," which emptied the mind of the crowds of thoughts whose presence constitutes the state of being awake. This was accomplished by withdrawing attention and, as a consequence, depriving the thoughts of clarity. Since the thoughts themselves remained, however, they were still expressed, only now without benefit of attention -- hence symbolically and vaguely.² With this explanation, Jung had come up with a suitable alternative to Freud's censor (some youthful independence needing to be manifested, after all . . .), while still accepting an essentially impoverished notion of the symbol.

To this youthful formulation the later Jung might well have levelled the criticism he so freely directed at others, namely of succumbing to the fallacy of "nothing but." As William James put it in Pragmatism:

What is higher is explained by what is lower and treated forever as a case of 'nothing but' -- nothing but something else of a quite inferior sort.³

In Dementia Praecox Jung had failed to recognize that this phenomenon, the symbol, lacked intelligibility precisely because he, the observer, was not equal to it.

By the next year Jung was moving to correct this error. In "The Content of the Psychoses" (1908), Jung began to show his first inklings of just what the unconscious ultimately would imply to him about human existence. He no longer rested content with the facile explanation of the symbol as the mere withdrawal of attention. There was something special behind symbols which claimed being in its own right:

We healthy people, who stand with both feet in reality, see only the ruin of the patient in this world, but not the richness of that side of the psyche which is turned away from us. Unfortunately only too often no further knowledge reaches us of the things that are being played out on the dark side of the soul, because all the bridges have broken down which connect that side with this.⁴

Two crucial insights emerge from this passage. First, Jung now saw the unconscious as having an autonomous existence, albeit of a still fairly personal nature.⁵ He no longer defined it in terms of consciousness. The unconscious was "that" world, on equal footing with "this" one. It even took on a certain "richness." Both consciousness and the unconscious were subsumed under soul, whose two sides they formed.

But if the unconscious ceased to be defined perjora-

tively as "not consciousness," some explanation still had to be given for its apparent obscurity. And so Jung placed new emphasis on the expression of unconscious contents in consciousness, and the difficulties inherent in such expression. The obscurity became a question of knowledge and communication. There was an epistemological barrier, an obstacle to our conscious knowledge of "the things that are being played out" in the unconscious. The barrier seemed not^{to}/be insurmountable, however, for there existed "bridges" over it. These bridges were made by meaningful symbols.

The plight of the psychotic patient thus lay at least partly in the breakdown of a symbol system which would adequately bring unconscious material to consciousness. "The patient," said Jung, "can spare only a few mysterious symbols for the dim, dismal realm of reality; they need not be understood, for our understanding has long ceased to be necessary for her."⁶ But implicit in this failure was the assumption that symbols were supposed to be understood. To be successful, they had not only to bridge the gap to the unconscious, but to be expressed in imagery which transcended idiosyncrasy, and which was intelligible intersubjectively to others. Hence symbols were rooted, at the level of consciousness, in the phenomenal world which we all share and call reality. And the patient's incapacity to generate such intelligible symbols represented for Jung, at this stage of his thinking, a loss of the ego's mastery of this phenomenal world. For it was the intact ego, that function of the psyche so well adapted to manipulating the images of external reality, which accommodated the indi-

vidual to the demands of collective, social existence. The ego assumed the task of insuring that the psyche's communications were expressed understandably. Therefore, it was as significant that others failed to understand a psychotic's productions, as it was that her ego fragmented and withdrew from reality. The former was both symptomatic of, and further conducive to, the latter.

The next few years found Jung actively engrossed in trying to elucidate the meaning of his psychotic patients' symbols. In the course of this work, he came to a realization which led, with the publication of Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido (Symbols of Transformation), to his break with Freud in 1912-1913. Jung began to regard the unconscious as ontologically prior to consciousness. He acknowledged, of course, the phenomenological immediacy of consciousness which, on account of its continual perceptual input, appeared to be the ground of human existence. But Jung recognized this immediacy for what it really was: an illusion. Consciousness was not the ground of existence, but was itself grounded, and grounded in the unconscious at that. Jung expressed this philosophical metaphor of "groundedness" with a similar trope:

Individual consciousness is only the flower and the fruit of a season, sprung from the perennial rhizome beneath the earth; and it would find itself in better accord with the truth if it took the existence of the rhizome into its calculations. For the root matter is the mother of all things.⁷

But although Jung defended this concept of the ontological priority of the unconscious as empirical, and supported it with innumerable clinical examples, it was in fact a philosophical

interpretation, based on a particular metaphysical point of view.

Now metaphysics, Aristotle's "first philosophy," is the elucidation of the being of being.⁸ Heidegger expands this compact definition for us by calling metaphysics "the questioning beyond the things that are, in order to regain them as such and in the whole, for the purpose of comprehension."⁹ The ultimate task of this "questioning beyond" is allotted to that branch of metaphysics called ontology, which addresses the question, "How does it stand with being?"¹⁰ For Jung, this "beyond" -- that is, being, the very object of the ontological endeavor -- was the unconscious. Only in the unconscious was the whole, and not just the ephemeral part, to be found. It is for this reason that we characterize the unconscious as ontologically prior.

Jung's attitude toward the unconscious was further influenced by a second philosophical conclusion. For Jung's metaphysics precluded the possibility of ever attaining any knowledge of the unconscious, this ontologically prior ground of our being. Jung was a self-avowed Kantian -- "I am old-fashioned enough not to have got beyond Kant"¹¹ -- and strenuously objected to any suggestion that the Ding an sich might be known:

It is a thoroughly outmoded standpoint, and has been so ever since the time of Immanuel Kant, to think that it lies within the power of man to assert a metaphysical truth.¹²

The existence of a metaphysically conceived unconscious was not in doubt here. One had to assume a "non-conscious psychic sphere, even if only as a 'negative borderline concept,' like

Kant's Ding an sich," just on the face of Freud's overwhelming evidence alone. But epistemologically, one could "not pretend to know or assert anything about the state of psychic elements in the unconscious."¹³

The impact of these two metaphysical presuppositions had a profound effect on Jung's interpretation of clinical data. It was Jung's philosophy which denied even the possibility of sexuality as constituting the primary content of the unconscious. The unconscious was "mother of all things" and as such its being embraced all "the fundamental facts of [one's] own being."¹⁴ To explain human existence in terms of sexuality (or the will to power, for that matter) represented a double error therefore. Not only did it single out as pre-eminent a characteristic which was both variable and only one among many, but it aimed at a level which was simply too superficial. The ontological cannot be explained by the ontic. It is a category mistake to call any phenomenal reality "fundamental."

It behooves us to define here what is meant by fundamental. Heidegger again comes to our aid by reminding us that the fundamental is what is broad and deep, which is to say, it takes in the whole of being and pursues it to its source, its ground.¹⁵ Put in this way, we can pull forth the latent implications of Jung's thinking without, we believe, doing violence to his ultimate intent. Jung's metaphysics forced him to transcend the ontic level of individual phenomena. He sought the most originary structures of being, the a priori determinants of human existence.¹⁶ He was much less concerned at this stage with the way particular psyches actually con-

stellated themselves at the tangible level of external reality: some might express themselves through sexuality; others in the will to power; yet others in the creative drive. The possibilities were manifold, and no man could be reduced exclusively to any one trait. But these external characteristics were secondary. What Jung pursued was that which lay behind these phenomenal expressions, determined the ground of their existence, and was common to all men.

Now Jung himself certainly did not see his thinking process as covering this ontological territory. When Freud accused him of hiding behind a "religious-libidinal cloud,"¹⁷ Jung retorted by underscoring the objective and empirical methods by which he had arrived at his conclusions. At the end of Symbols of Transformation, a 450 page gloss on fifteen pages of a schizophrenic's fantasy, he defended his incredibly esoteric (but not on that account irrelevant) mythological researches as follows:

I have tried to understand her situation to the best of my ability and have set down the results of my efforts as an example of the nature and extent of the problems about which any doctor who wants to practise psychotherapy should have scientific knowledge. He needs a science of the psyche, not a theory about it. I do not regard the pursuit of science as a bickering about who is right, but as an endeavor to augment and deepen human knowledge.¹⁸

The key here lies with the words "nature and extent." The nature of the problem is deep: it plunges to the question of human existence. The tale that is told as Jung unravels Miss Miller's fantasies is the story of being itself, the meaning of her psychological existence. The extent of the problem is broad: it covers the whole realm of human experi-

ence, as expressed by the most varied mythologies from all times and all places. The nature and extent of these problems is indeed fundamental.

But despite our interpretation, it was as a scientist and not a philosopher that Jung proposed to expand the scope of his study so as to include the whole man. He remarked to Freud on this account, "As you know, I always have to proceed from the outside to the inside and from the whole to the part. I would find it too upsetting to let large tracts of human knowledge lie there neglected."¹⁹ By the outside he meant the phenomenal world, the world of appearances with which science deals. But note also the emphasis on the whole. All the phenomena were to be investigated, not just those which scientists were comfortable with or merely used to. Hence, any conclusions he arrived at were surely based upon a broad panoply of objective facts, and did not derive from any philosophical preconceptions, or so he insisted.

And yet, is this disclaimer entirely truthful? In his Theory of Psychoanalysis (1912), the theoretical counterpart to Symbols of Transformation, Jung reserved highest praise for Freud's empirical acumen, but distinguished between a subjective and objective element. Referring to Freud's theory of the sexually latent period in childhood, with which he took exception, Jung noted:

There has been no error of observation. On the contrary, the hypothesis of the latency period proves how exactly Freud observed the apparent recommencement of sexuality. The error lies in the conception.²⁰

So apparently the question of objective facts was not quite

so simple. It is one kind of fact to take note of a developmental pattern in children. But this first kind of fact is transformed into another sort as we proceed to interpret it and give it meaning. For to name this objective observation "latency" is to imbue it with a set of associations that immediately places the fact within the subjective framework of the observer. It becomes someone's conception, and to be appreciated, requires adopting that someone's point of view. Jung was adamant on this point, maintaining that "Freud was anything but a theorist. He is an empiricist as anyone must admit who is willing to go at all deeply into Freud's writings and to try and see his cases as he sees them."²¹ Thus Jung expressly recognized the subjective quality of scientific perception itself. Even to observe the sequence of development in children requires a certain point of view, as millenia of misperception bear witness to. But if Jung was acknowledging the inherent presuppositions of any observing consciousness, then this must apply to himself as well.

Jung argued that his psychology diverged from Freud because of his more inclusive data base, which permitted him to speak of the whole organism, man. But we see now that he himself admitted that truth is not merely a matter of breadth and depth, a question of fundamental facts. It is equally a matter of whose facts, and that is a function of insight, the capacity to perceive a fact. Freud's genius was to recognize in dreams and sexuality new facts which no one else had discerned. They were his facts. So too Jung, on this same perceptual level, perhaps even unknown to himself, transcended

the bounds of classical psychoanalysis by acquiring his own Gestalt and making a leap into a new world. That leap was not conditioned on amassing new data, however, though such data might later support the theory. Rather, those facts themselves which Jung chose to recognize as evidence could only have sprung into view after his insight into the ontological priority of the unconscious, which framed his whole vision.

Thus we have seen how the first part of Jung's metaphysics led to a new definition of the phenomena pertinent to the study of the psyche, with the consequent downplaying of sexuality. The second half carried with it even greater implications, however, since the epistemological inaccessibility of the unconscious threatened to leave psychology high and dry, relegated to puzzling out meaning from symptoms and the recollection of repressed material. Jung's broader conception of the unconscious, which went beyond contents that were once known but later repressed, wavered on becoming an empty hypothesis unless a way existed to bridge the chasm which separated totally unknown unconscious contents from consciousness. This bridge was the symbol.

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Let us recall how this conception of symbol differs from the bridge metaphor of 1908 cited earlier. At that point, Jung spoke of symbols as potentially clear channels of communication that offered to bring unconscious contents to consciousness. Now, however, he was returning to a gloomier notion of the symbol's intelligibility:

We call these actions, whose meaning and purpose are not immediately evident, symbolic actions, or symbols. On the basis of this reasoning we call a dream symbolic, because it is a psychological product whose origin, meaning, and purpose are obscure, and is therefore one of the purest products of unconscious constellation.²²

But this differs from the exasperated description of 1907 in one crucial respect, namely the source of this obscurity.

It was no longer a matter of the symbol being somehow a degenerate form of knowledge. On the contrary, the symbol was the clearest approximation of something that in itself was obscure. "Symbols are not allegories and not signs," Jung maintained. "They are images of contents which for the most part transcend consciousness."²³

This distinction of symbols from allegories and signs serves to clarify Jung's wider understanding of the unconscious as hinted at above. Speaking in Symbols of Transformation about phallic symbols (Tom Thumbs, Dactyls, Cabiri), Jung explained:

In [no] case should they be taken literally, for they are not to be understood semiotically, as signs for definite things, but as symbols. A symbol is an indefinite expression with many meanings, pointing to something not easily defined and therefore not fully known . . .²⁴

The symbol thus stands as mediator between two mutually exclusive realms of being. Just as the unconscious forms the ground of being, sufficient unto itself and indifferent to consciousness, so consciousness, as the light of awareness, illuminates the phenomenal world, heedless of its own existential foundations.

Since Jung evidently had already formulated his definition of symbols as opposed to signs in 1912, it will not dis-

tort the historical development of Jung's ideas if we quote from his more elaborate descriptions of these concepts found in Psychological Types (1921), in order to amplify this distinction.²⁵ Here, Jung posited three classes of metaphorical expression. Semiotic expression served as "an analogue or an abbreviated designation for a known thing."²⁶ Many of Freud's dream symbols would then be classified as semiotic. For example, the rising flood of water in the nanny's dream represents a situation which can be more accurately and fully expressed in other ways.²⁷ Allegoric expression was "an intentional paraphrase or transmogrification of a known thing." It, too, can be viewed as semiotic, inasmuch as its functional utility lies in the eventual cognizability of that for which it stands. Allegories differ from simple signs, however, in that they are meant to obscure rather than offer succinct encapsulations. But here it is a question of audience: allegories permit things to be said that would otherwise be forbidden, because only a select audience knows the code. Allegories are therefore only apparently obscure. One thinks of Gulliver's Travels or Freud's sexual symbols. In the latter, there is never any doubt as to establishing the meaning, hidden in order to escape the repression of the censor. It is only a question of breaking the code.

Finally, there are Jung's symbols. Symbols occupy a unique place in his epistemology and cannot be likened to signs. A symbolic expression is "the best possible formulation of a relatively unknown thing, which for that reason cannot be more clearly or characteristically represented."²⁸ Such

a statement is senseless unless we postulate an unconscious which contains more than just repressed contents, since the repressed has at one time been only too well known. Moreover, this definition suggests that there are unconscious contents which in a certain sense are seeking to be known. To envision symbols as "the best possible formulation" hardly paints the picture of strife and antagonism which we have accustomed ourselves to regarding as typical of the unconscious. On the contrary, they would appear to be a positively constructive effort at communication.

Jung goes on to note that symbols may either be living or dead. This distinction most assuredly resulted from his extended investigations into historical source material, which brought to light quite literally hundreds of examples of genuine symbols which today are quite meaningless. But let us be careful here. An ancient Mithraic symbol is dead, not on account of our ignorance before its hidden secrets, but precisely because we know too much about it. Living symbols are "pregnant with meaning": it is contained within them.²⁹ Dead symbols have brought forth their meaning: it is now before us for all to see. As a result, we know it and can more clearly articulate it in the lucidity of consciousness. The death of a symbol thus represents a further advance of consciousness. Just as the creation of a living symbol signals the arrival of a previously unknown content at a kind of accommodation with consciousness, so too its death culminates the process of that content becoming totally incorporated into consciousness. Such a view implies a particularly historical vision of psychology.³⁰

If left at this stage of development, the theory would have remained incomplete. After all, in order to mediate between consciousness and the unconscious, there had to be something that was mediated. And recalling the last word of the title Symbols of Transformation, whatever was mediated also underwent a transformation, rendering what was proper to one mode, appropriate now to the other. That something Jung called libido.

It suffices to say that libido was for Jung a sheerly heuristic concept. He posited only as the most empty of words, a kind of placeholder to denote the dynamic relationship between consciousness and the unconscious.³¹ It in no way was meant to explain why and how relationship was possible, only that it was possible. It was for this reason that Jung later moved on to the word [psychic] energy, taking a cue from physics which also begs ignorance before the question of what energy actually is.³²

First and foremost, libido powers the ego. This idea results from Jung's extensive work with psychotic patients at the Burghölzli. It fills a heuristic gap in the explanation of decathexis, i.e. the withdrawal of the psychotic ego's affective investment in external reality. As the energy which binds consciousness together into a unified experience, its absence causes fragmentation of consciousness and consequent maladaptive behavior toward reality. In this sense libido can be "measured" quantitatively, as a function of how well the psychotic patient is able to detach himself from fantasy and reintegrate his consciousness around a self-consistent and

unified experience of reality. No attempt is made here to describe ego functioning qualitatively in terms of libido.

Secondly, libido potentiates the instincts. It should not be confused with the instincts per se, which form the actual "substance" of the unconscious:

Experience shows that instinctual processes of whatever kind are often intensified to an extraordinary degree by an afflux of energy, no matter where it comes from . . . One instinct can temporarily be depotentiated in favor of another instinct, and this is true to psychic activities in general.³³

Libido, although conserved, waxes and wanes at any one particular site in the unconscious, and brings into play now this, now that unconscious content.

Libido therefore ranges throughout both consciousness and the unconscious, and supplies whatever it is that makes things work. As a concept it expresses more our explanatory needs than any reality. And while it is true that libido is also an unknown of sorts, this does not mean it should be likened to the unconscious contents themselves. It is crucial to distinguish here between two kinds of unknown. The unconscious contents, such as the instincts, are unknown because they are both incompatible with consciousness and hidden from view. Libido, on the other hand, is unknown because it describes a functional, quantitative relationship which has no substance.

This explication of Jung's libido-energy theory is necessary to clarify the particular role symbols were envisioned as playing in Symbols of Transformation. Let us recall that the ego's contents are solely composed of bits of perceived reality. To be sure, the ego organizes, judges, relates, and

distinguishes, but that upon which these operations are performed comes via the senses. The ego has no content itself. This is not an entirely sufficient description, however, because we know from the work in the psychology of perception that what we perceive is no simple matter of mere "objective" reality, impartially registered. The meaning given by human beings to their conscious experiences is reflected in the very way reality is perceived. That is, the ego does not just present us with a uniform field of sensations from which we then choose the things that matter to us; rather the very field we are aware of is biased ahead of time by those choices the ego makes regarding which perceptions to make consciously aware. And what determines just which meanings will structure the ego's choices is the libido. The libido may be said to emphasize particular perceptions by focusing a greater quantum of energy upon them. It directs the ego's ever present intentionality.³⁴

But as there are an infinite variety of meanings to be found in the world, even for a single individual, it might seem implausible that libido is this uniform, indifferent energy. That this is not so will be seen as soon as we remember that libido is relationship, and that which it relates can vary. On the unconscious side, libido can intensify or depotentiate any one of a number of unconscious contents. Depending on which instinctual nexus is activated, the libido will correspondingly relate it to the appropriate subliminal ego orientation. The ego is then said to be cathected in a particular way.

For example, one would be hard pressed to deny that a two year old is instinctively moved to explore his environment. From the point of view of the ego, his entire conscious activity is geared to making instructive observations of, and manipulations upon, the surrounding physical world. The ego perceives reality in the way which will best facilitate learning certain basic relationships. Likewise, a neurotic, caught in the grasp of a powerful sexual instinct, misperceives reality according to the logic of his ego's expression of libido. And though his behavior be called maladaptive, it is the appropriate ego counterpart to that particular instinct's potential.

Ego functioning on this level is subliminal. We choose this word carefully, because we are trying to distinguish between two levels of what is usually subsumed under the rubric of ego consciousness. Of course the ego operates as a field of conscious awareness -- that by definition alone. And on a certain level the child and the neurotic are both conscious, or at least aware, of what they are doing. But at a deeper level they are not. For insofar as their particular orientation to reality goes, the choice has in a sense already been made for them. Reality has been screened before it gets to consciousness, and that screening process we characterize as subliminal. The specific nature of a subliminal screen at any given moment (since it changes over time, as do the potentiated instincts) is the ego analogue of a specific unconscious instinct. They are related by libido.

The drawback of this subliminal relationship should be obvious enough. Not only does it deprive us of a certain

freedom which, however illusory, we deem our due, but from a practical point of view it also robs us of the fullest advantages of consciousness. After all, the ego seems best designed to select optimal relationships and yet, as far as its association with the unconscious goes, it seems doomed to relinquish any determining role.

Here is precisely where symbols intervene. Let us not forget the magnitude of the problem. We were faced on page six with a two-fold dilemma. The unconscious seemed to consist of more than repressed material; it was the source of all meaning and the very ground for our being. But along with this realization came the additional discovery that the unconscious contents were essentially barred to conscious experience. We then posited a mediating function, but were at pains to describe what was mediated. Perhaps now, after this foray into the theory of libido, we can specify more accurately why libido is a necessary hypothesis. For if, as Jung repeatedly insisted, consciousness and the unconscious were mutually exclusive, it would not be possible to argue that an instinct per se was somehow transformed into awareness. Consciousness and the unconscious must remain autonomous zones. They are so phenomenologically and are defined as such. And yet some relationship between the two must be possible, otherwise Freud would have been at a loss to make his discoveries. Jung expressed this relationship metaphorically as libido, or psychic energy. Just as electrical potential energy is described as the mathematical function of charges separated in space (i.e. as the spatial relationship of those charges),³² so libido is described as

a function of the separation of consciousness from the unconscious. In both cases no thing spans the gap between the two. In both a field effect is apparent. In the case of electrical energy, this field has a determining effect on the surrounding environment, as when iron filings assume a particular pattern when placed within range. And in the case of libido, the field structures our perceptual reality. So far the metaphor holds.

Jung also declared the psyche capable of an additional property, namely the transformation of this energy. If a light bulb is attached to the two sides of an electrical potential (e.g. a battery), it will transform electrical potential energy into light and heat.³⁶ Similarly, Jung proposed that symbols were "the psychological mechanisms that transform energy."³⁷ These transformers functioned to "convert libido from a 'lower' to a 'higher' form."³⁸ This form was deemed higher because it was conscious. To be sure, we are still unaware of the ultimate reality to which the symbol gives expression, but like that light bulb, it now manifests energy in a form that we can perceive. As a transformer, the symbol must stand with feet in both camps. It is "always grounded in the unconscious, but its manifest forms are moulded by the ideas acquired by the conscious mind."³⁹ While consciousness and the unconscious remain autonomous, antithetical realms related by a field of energy, that energy can be transformed by the dialectical interaction of the two. The resulting transformation is dependent upon both, and yet expresses its own truth. And while we cannot fully reconstruct the

the unconscious side, yet we now have at least a hint of what it might be, since we have in the symbol a conscious exemplar of something which it has helped to form. It remains for us to imagine what kind of unconscious meaning (antithesis) could have combined with the visual imagery of consciousness (thesis) to result in the symbol (synthesis). The final answer eludes us, but in our imaginings we have at least now gotten underway.

Jung fully grasped the impact that this conception of symbol would have on psychotherapy. First of all, one would have to deal with the patient as he presented himself to the therapist, an individual for the most part unaware of how the activation of basic instinctual dominants was expressing itself intentionally but subliminally in complexes of the ego. As noted above, the libido would here still be of a "lower" form. It is not "converted into effective work, [but instead] flows off unconsciously [i.e. subliminally] along old channels, that is, into archaic sexual fantasies and fantasy activities."⁴⁰ The damaging effect of these fantasies stems from their not being recognized as fantasies by the patient. He suffers from a kind of literalism. A neurotic, for example, might attribute his difficulties with women to external circumstances (including the women themselves), instead of recognizing those externals as "symbolic" of unconscious conflicts. By concretizing unconscious fantasies in a way that renders symbols into "an unsuitable form that offers libido too low a gradient,"⁴¹ he fails to become conscious. So the first part of analysis takes on a reductive quality. Its object is to lyse, to dissolve as it were, these unconscious

concretions turned into habit, and allow the libido to regress back to the unconscious, where a new, more conscious relationship between ego and instinct can be constellated. Here Jung gives Freud full credit for the psychology he had thus far developed.

With one exception, that is. For if we recall that Jung viewed the unconscious as totally unknowable, as wholly other, then the extent of regression would have to be total. Regression means a decathexis of the ego's object relations via a withdrawal of libido. For Freud, regression was intimately associated with fixation, and implied the reestablishment of cathexis at a lower, more infantile and unconscious level.⁴² But Jung found this unacceptable, insofar as it did not radically alter the problem of literalism. Where the libido freed itself from finding concrete expression in symptoms, the fixation theory would bind it up again in another phenomenal reality -- the patient's actual parents.

This simply did not go far enough. Again, if we postulate the priority of the unconscious and its fundamental inaccessibility, then to call regression to the real parents the end point would amount to falling prey to the same kind of subliminal projection that characterized the full-blown neurosis, albeit at a more primitive level.⁴³ To take Jung's vision of the unconscious seriously would necessitate the final withdrawal of libido from all the ego's phenomenal cathexes. The ego must see at last that its entire meaning structure is dependent on the unconscious instincts, as mediated via libido. Every single phenomenal image to which we attribute value

derives that value from the unconscious. It will not do to attribute any objective component to phenomenal reality per se, at least as far as its meaning is concerned. This is not to argue for some kind of 19th century German Romantic idealism, which would literally make phantoms of us all.⁴⁴ Of course reality is there, and operates lawfully. But what reality means to us is wholly a function of the unconscious. Jung expressed this to Freud metaphorically in a letter which dealt with their disagreement over the incest taboo:

The incest taboo does not correspond with the specific value of incest sensu strictiori any more than the sacredness of the totem corresponds with its biological value. . . . In my opinion the incest barrier can no more be explained by reduction to the possibility of real incest than the animal cult can be explained by reduction to real bestiality. The animal cult is explained by an infinitely long psychological development which is of paramount importance and not by primitive bestial tendencies -- these are nothing but the quarry that provides the material for building a temple. But the temple and its meaning have nothing whatever to do with the quality of the building stones. . . . Like the stones of a temple, the incest taboo is the symbol or vehicle of a far wider and special meaning.⁴⁵

Nothing in the phenomenal world, including the actual parents, has meaning by itself alone:

. . . Therapy must support the regression, and continue to do so until the 'pre-natal' stage is reached. It must be remembered that the 'mother' is really an imago, a psychic image merely. . . . Hence regression leads back only apparently to the mother; in reality she is the gateway to the unconscious, into the 'realm of the Mothers.'⁴⁶

The message is clear. Jung took Kant seriously and called all psychological reality phenomenal. Hence everything with meaning was "symbolic," i.e. acquired its meaning from the cathected libido. It simply was inconsistent to symbolize everything except the penis, vulva, breasts, etc. They, too,

were phenomena like everything else:

Thus a phallic symbol does not denote the sexual organ, but the libido, and however clearly it appears as such, it does not mean itself, but is always a symbol of the libido. . . . The tertium comparationis for all these symbols is the libido, and the unity of meaning lies in the fact that they all are analogies of the same thing. In this realm the fixed meaning of things comes to an end.⁴⁷

And finally, even this very theory itself becomes symbolic:

We have formulated symbolical concepts in a manner analogous to our formulation of conscious concepts, and this terminology has proven its value in practice.⁴⁸

Thus Jung proclaimed a radical relativism. Objective truth was to be found in the unconscious, a realm forever closed to us. If we were even to talk about the unconscious, it would have to be metaphorically. And any judgment of the validity of our metaphors would have to be based on their empirical usefulness. Here is where Jung's "scientific" attitude took on significance. Only in the acid test of therapy could he evaluate the accuracy of his metaphors. If a metaphor helped a patient to understand himself, then it was real. For as Jung so often put it, echoing William James, "Wirklich aber ist, was wirkt."⁴⁹

We reach here a critical juncture. The reductive analysis, if successful, leaves us with an unstable situation. If all the old subliminal libidinal cathexes have been withdrawn, then judging from what was said before about the libido powering the ego, one might suppose that the ego would disintegrate at this point. That this does not happen in neurotics is patently obvious.⁵⁰ But equally obvious is the tremendous increase in fantasy production that occurs with regression. As energy is withdrawn from phenomenal literalisms, it is trans-

formed into symbols with the active participation of a higher level of ego consciousness. Libido is therefore not withdrawn from the ego in toto, but rechanneled into a more purposeful level whose object (if one may speak teleologically here at all) is communication. Such symbols bring to consciousness, insofar as is possible, the meanings of the unconscious. The ego no longer labors under the illusion of freedom, all the while determined by the unconscious. Now it collaborates with the unconscious and seeks to aid the expression of the symbol with its wealth of phenomenal imagery. We embark here on the synthetic phase of analysis.

But let us pause to reflect on where this line of reasoning has brought us. Surely it is far from the hysterical attacks, phobias, and repetition compulsions which first attracted Freud's attention. The mood has changed. We sense a certain quickening, an infusion of energy which begins to pervade consciousness, finding meaning where there was none before. And in fact, as Freud implied in his comment about the "religious-libidinal cloud," Jung recognized that "this synthetic treatment of symbols brings [one] to the religious question."⁵¹ We ought therefore to consider this appearance of religious imagery before plunging into Jung's later metapsychological theories, which more fully developed the concept of synthetic symbols.

THE RELIGIOUS QUESTION

In trying to puzzle out the peculiar twist in Jung's thinking which was to lead him so far afield from Freud's carefully blazed trail, one returns again and again to Symbols of Transformation. This remarkable book stands as Jung's equivalent to The Interpretation of Dreams, and on the weight of its evidence and arguments hinges the validity of the better part of Jung's early psychological insights. Like The Interpretation of Dreams it is an awesomely erudite work, a masterpiece of the scholarly historical humanism which flourished in Germanic cultures at the fin de siècle. Also like The Interpretation of Dreams, it is an exciting and suspense filled adventure. In both there is an air of mystery that is marvelously counterbalanced by the persistent probings of the thinker's reason and knowledge. Finally, the book shares with The Interpretation of Dreams a kind of passion. One senses immediately that these are men who have joined the hunt: they are on to something.

Verturing to risk a personal opinion, however, I have found one crucial difference which distinguishes Symbols of Transformation from The Interpretation of Dreams. It is a qualitative difference, really, and one so intangible and indefinable as to be better stated as a matter of taste. And yet from this difference springs the subject matter of this

section, the question of religion.

The Interpretation of Dreams, with all its innovation and original insights, plays a curious trick on the reader, who is literally being initiated into a whole new and unexpected world. He comes with questions and suspicions and counterexamples, but gradually the relentless logic and countless examples which Freud propounds dissolve his hesitations. And then the reader, too, begins to see this new world as Freud did. But soon the pendulum of the reader's enthusiasm starts to swing the other way. As the examples continue to pour forth, the explanations become ^{more} and more inclusive, the exceptions fall one by one -- so that the reader's world begins to shrink, until at last he is left all alone with only a heavy book in his hands. That exciting world has closed up. At some point Freud has managed to explain it all away. Everything of importance about it is now catalogued and cross-referenced. The project was to make the unknown known in the present. And yet having done so, the known slips away into the past. For to know all about a world means to have lived through it already. Such a world will never again be open to us because it is over and done with. But this is not all. Even the future now closes before us. As Freud reminds us at the close of the book:

By picturing our wishes as fulfilled, dreams are after all leading us into the future. But this future, which the dreamer pictures as the present, has been moulded by his indestructible wish into a perfect likeness of the past.₁

The lights are turned on. It is time to get up again and face the old world, reality.

Symbols of Transformation takes us on a different journey. By way of archaic, atavistic fantasies, we are led straightaway into the past, and here, too, we encounter a new world. It, too, is a complex world whose meaning and relevance we at first doubt. But what convinces us here? Is it the force of Jung's argument? This surely helps to guide us through the myriad of unheard of mythologies and foreign imagery. But his logic is not what persuades us. It is the power emanating from the very symbols themselves that takes hold of us and draws us into their realm. We are held captive by the fasci-nosum that permeates this world.

And why is that? Paul Ricoeur would have us believe that it is simply a matter of the interpretation which we bring to the symbols. For him it is a question of attitude:

For the philosophy of religion, symbols are the manifestation in the sensible -- in imagination, gestures, and feelings -- of a further reality, the expression of a depth which both shows and hides itself. What psychoanalysis encounters primarily as the distortion of elementary meanings connected with wishes or desires, the phenomenology of religion encounters primarily as the manifestation of a depth or, to use the word immediately . . . the revelation of the sacred.²

And there is certainly some truth to this opinion. As we shall see below, Jung was acutely alive to the problem of attitude. The subjective element should never be minimized in our analysis.

Nevertheless, Ricoeur's account is insufficient insofar as it fails to address the specific nature of religious symbols. At least as important as the subjective element is the objective difference in religious symbols. There is something about them that resists reductive analysis and flaunts

their impenetrability. We are never through with them; we cannot leave them in the smug self-satisfaction of having explained them away. They attract us like a magnet, and we are forever struggling for the secret of their meaning.

But if they are always with us, then they are in the present, and cannot fade into the past. And moreover, in this struggle to penetrate the symbol, we are in turn led into the future. This world of past, ancient images continues to open up as men try with each new generation to bring fresh insights of interpretation. The end of Symbols of Transformation is a beginning.

In order to substantiate our claim that religious symbols are somehow objectively unique, we must recall the different sort of unconscious material with which Jung worked as compared to Freud. This is not to restate the tired cliché about the Freud/Jung variance mirroring the distinction between psychosis and neurosis. After all, what little psychotic fantasy there is in Symbols of Transformation is hidden away in an appendix at the rear. Rather, we are speaking of the unconscious material of myth and religious imagery, which makes up the myriad historical examples in the text. Jung's patients merely set him in the right direction.³ His real accomplishment was to thoroughly trace out the similarities between the infinitely less well articulated psychotic fantasies and the profoundly complex religious symbols of antiquity. Jung was fascinated not so much by the schizophrenic's symbols, which may well have lent themselves to a reductive interpretation. These were only signposts on the way toward another,

very different kind of symbol, which was able to move people
and influence entire cultures.

Nevertheless, Jung found himself struck by the odd identity of many psychotic and religious symbols. Why, after all, should the study of patients whose libido had regressed all the way back to the infantile mother lead him to the highest cultural achievements of the ancient world? There must surely be some connection between the psychotic ego's decathexis, with its subsequent invasion by unconscious contents, and the formation of these great collective symbols.⁴ Jung postulated that these symbols accomplished in an orderly, articulated, intentional, and successful way what in psychosis was chaotic, vague, compelled, and failed, namely the transformation of excess libido⁵ which had regressed into the unconscious:

The concrete reality of religious figures assists the canalization of libido into the equivalent symbols, provided that the worship of them does not get stuck in the outward object.⁶

Implicit in this conception lies a deep-rooted sense of historical progress and teleology. Symbols, and the religious phenomenon in general, provide the most influential cultural impetus toward raising consciousness:

Here religion is of a great help, because, by the bridge of the symbol, it leads his [everyman's] libido away from the infantile objects (parents) towards the symbolic representatives of the past, i.e. the gods . . .⁷

It thus functions to lyse the literal, concretized quality of the ego's relationship with the unconscious that was described in the first section.

To this extent, therefore, religion frees the ego to be relatively more adaptive. And this is true even if the

religious symbols themselves are in turn hardened into idols. For when the libido gets stuck in a literalized religious figure, the "outward object" as it were,

it at least remains bound to the representative human figure and loses its original primitive form, even though it does not attain the desired symbolic form.⁸

One need only think here of the difference between the Judeo-Christian and the "primitive" worlds. The former is a fairly neutral field, by and large, from which all the projections have been withdrawn and spiritualized, leaving a fair semblance of objective reality which the ego can manipulate unhindered and mould into culture.⁹ Even if, as has been the case, the symbols of our tradition have long since frozen into solid form, the freeing effect remains. The primitive, on the other hand, condemned to contend not only with the obstacles of reality, but with the fears and obligations which he projects onto reality, can truly be regarded as operating at a lower level of adaptation. This is why Jung proposes that symbols are "purposeful":

It is these inherent possibilities of 'spiritual' or 'symbolic' life and of progress which form the ultimate, though unconscious, goal of regression. By serving as a means of expression, as bridges and pointers, symbols help to prevent the libido from getting stuck in the material corporeality of the mother.¹⁰

It is only one short step from recognizing this purposeful quality in religious symbols, to translating it into modern psychotherapy. For within the analytic situation, the patient is cautiously allowed or encouraged to regress, and as a result to form a genuine symbol around the figure of the analyst. This is the transference. But the key to this method's effect-

iveness lies in then demonstrating to the patient the symbolic nature of this projection, that is, in bringing the symbol to full awareness and letting him participate consciously in it. Oddly enough, it is through this symbolic fantasy that the patient gets back to reality. "The transference to the analyst," said Jung, "builds a bridge across which the patient can get away from his family into reality."¹¹ The transference, however, is not a demythologizing. It is the first opportunity to consciously and effectively remythologize. And from this insight derives the second, synthetic phase of analysis.

Jung was not the only psychoanalyst of this period to admit the need for a constructive analysis. James Putnam, the eminent Harvard neurologist who was so instrumental in introducing Freud and psychoanalysis to this country, also wondered about the "second half." Originally, of course he, too, shared the prevailing view that it sufficed for psychoanalysis to deconstruct and lyse complexes, but that

it was not our business to instruct the patient, to supply the positive side of the re-education which he needed to undergo, but only to place him in a better position to obtain his education elsewhere.¹²

However, over the course of time, the ultimate implications of psychoanalysis became clear to him. One could hardly justify delving into the very depths of a patient's mind, only to then back out and say to him, "I am sorry, but no one knows what it all means." Instead, Putnam insisted that to explore the unconscious meant a commitment to searching out that meaning:

The logical end of a psychoanalytic treatment is the recovery of a full sense of one's highest destiny and

origin and of the bearings and meanings of one's life.¹³ For this it was appropriate and even necessary that analysis continue beyond the reductive phase.

Putnam differed from Jung in one crucial area, however, and this led to radically dissimilar conceptions of this second half of analysis. Immersed as he was in the "moral philosophy" that was then in vogue in the United States, Putnam found it reprehensible to allow a patient to escape the benefit of his, Putnam's, own personal moral vision. Whereas psychoanalysis was adequate to the task of disentangling "the numerous partial motives" of the unconscious, Putnam saw the ethical issues raised by reconstruction as "only thoroughly studied by philosophy."¹⁴ So it was that Putnam argued for imposing his externally derived meanings and values on the patient.¹⁵ In the end the patient would not tell, but be told, his story. And however much it might aid the patient on a superficial level, perhaps even easing his way through life, the story would no longer belong to him.

We need only think of today's infinitely more refined way of modifying behavior to suit society's whims in order to cringe at the potential for abuse with which this attitude was fraught. One can only admire the polite but cautious stance adopted by Freud toward such suggestions. As he tactfully put it,

it seemed more prudent to wait, and to discover whether a particular attitude towards life might be forced upon us with all the weight of necessity by the analytical investigation itself.¹⁶

But this was precisely Jung's discovery, and it is what distinguishes him from Putnam. Jung did not leave the

bounds of the analytical setting to bring in extraneous values. He did not need to: they were all there before him in the patient's dreams and fantasies. And not only that. They were the patient's own values. Out of his unconscious came the authentic judgments about life:

Escape from the state of reduction lies in evolving a religion of an individual character. One's true individuality then emerges from behind the veil of the collective personality. . . . To do this he must first return to the fundamental facts of his own being, irrespective of all authority and tradition, and allow himself to become conscious of his distinctiveness.¹⁷

Freud was right to criticize Putnam so long as he insisted upon any one "particular attitude." And to that degree of wisdom Jung never aspired. But Jung did claim to be able to help each individual get on the track of meaning in his own life. Where it would lead, and whether the patient would follow -- that he could not say. True to his radical relativism, he left that for the patient to find out for himself.

This attitude toward the patient's future offers yet another explanation of Jung's turn to religious issues in Symbols of Transformation. For indeed, if we are truly to seek the fundamental facts of our own being, then surely we must address ourselves to that which has traditionally and preontologically responded to the question of Being. So it was hardly an accident, or a mere function of his patient population, that Jung took up the problem of spirit and God at this juncture. On the contrary, it was the logical development of Jung's whole metaphysical Weltanschauung.

Yet we must finally wonder to what extent the religious question came up as a natural consequence of Jung's personality

as well. We have hinted already of the enthusiasm that permeates both The Interpretation of Dreams and Symbols of Transformation. Was it simply that, in Jung's case, his enthusiasm was of a more originary kind, a true en theos, a being in God? One certainly feels something of this sort in Jung's more personal declarations. Writing to Freud in 1911, when well into the work on Symbols of Transformation, he observed:

I, too, have the feeling that this is a time full of marvels, and, if the auguries do not deceive us, it may well be that, thanks to your discoveries, we are on the threshold of something really sensational, which I scarcely know how to describe except with the Gnostic concept of sophia, an Alexandrian term particularly suited to the reincarnation of ancient wisdom in the shape of psychoanalysis.¹⁸

Jung sought after wisdom. So we might say he was seeker of truth -- of that which lies revealed before us. Heidegger would therefore call him a thinker. But the question we have posed ourselves is, "Why was he a thinker?" Because, Heidegger would say, he was called. Called by what, you ask? And indeed, that is the question. We shall answer one question by another. Jung was called to ask the question, "What is it that calls on us to think?"¹⁹ Further we cannot go.

METAPSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY

Up to now we have tried to present a coherent commentary on the development of Jung's early thought. This extended through the period of his break with Freud, which may be broadly defined as lasting until 1921, with the publication of Psychological Types.¹ The explication may well have been hampered by our intentional forbearance in the use of more refined concepts which Jung later developed. If this has been so, it was only in the interests of aiding the reader to visualize the actual thinking process that went into the creation of Jung's ideas. Nevertheless, since we now are broaching the second half of Jung's career, it is readily apparent that we can no longer ignore the wider scope of his psychological theories. If we are to understand the ultimate ramification of symbol, we shall perforce have to touch upon such concepts as the collective unconscious, the archetypes, and the Self.

Perhaps the weakest part of the theoretical system as elaborated thus far lies in the notion of instinct. The term strikes us today as quaint, a throwback to the days of social Darwinism, the Will to Power, and élan vital. We somehow regard ourselves as having moved beyond this issue which was so hotly debated in the past. Ethology has begun to explain, behavior modification to control, and psychopharmaco-

logy to alter that which once gave lie to man's illusion of power over himself. Why should we return to an uncomfortable reminder of our frailty when a brave new world is just about to dawn? But return we must, if only out of historical curiosity. For the instinct theory lies at the very heart of psychoanalysis. As Freud remarked, his aim was to show men that they not only had spirit, but instinct as well.²

Freud's position on the matter of instincts is well known. He distinguished instinct from external stimulus "by the fact that it arises from sources of stimulation within the body, that it operates as a constant force and that the subject cannot avoid it by flight."³ Instinct had a source, an object and an aim:

Its source is a state of excitation in the body, its aim is the removal of that excitation; on its path from its source to its aim the instinct becomes operative psychically.

Freud pictured instinct as "a certain quota of energy which presses in a particular direction." After an initial formulation of sexual and ego instincts, the latter was dropped since "this distinction itself lost its foundation" in the light of further research. But because Freud still felt obliged to explain what he called "a contrariety in instinctual life," he replaced ego instincts with "the aggressive instincts." And this is how the famous dichotomy of Eros and Thanatos is still framed today:

The instincts that we believe in divide themselves into two groups -- the erotic instincts, which seek to combine more and more living substance into ever greater unities, and the death instincts, which oppose this effort and lead what is living back into an inorganic state. From the concurrent and opposing action of these two proceed the phenomena of life which are brought to an end by death.

Although he speaks in the plural ("erotic instincts"), it would seem that little attempt was made to differentiate within these classes. Rather, all other instincts could be reduced to these two: "Every instinctual impulse that we can examine consists of similar fusions or alloys of the two classes of instinct."

A different point of view was expressed by another of Jung's contemporaries, William James, who deeply influenced Jung.⁴ James defined instinct as

the faculty of acting in such a way as to produce certain ends, without foresight of the ends, and without previous education in the performance.⁵

Such a view obviously stemmed from a more biological orientation than Freud's. Working within the framework of traditional 19th century science, James ignored the realm of the unconscious by choice. In his definition he explicitly avoided the unknown quality of instincts except to characterize it as such, preferring not to hypothesize about that which he could not observe. This was in contradistinction to Freud, who sought to explain this unknown in the manner of a 20th century psychoanalyst, that is by way of the unconscious. Secondly, James stressed the behavioral aspect of instinct. Not feeling himself competent to theorize about mechanisms, he focused only on repeated patterns of phenomenal events. Finally, he also suggested that instincts have an innate content. They contained specific patterns of behavior which were not learned. From this starting point, James was able to make the bold proclamation that men, far from being impoverished of instincts as compared to lower animals, "possess all the impulses that

they have, and a great many more besides."⁶ He then went on to elaborate about infant reflex impulses, imitation, emulation, pugnacity, sympathy, the hunting instinct, fear, acquisitiveness, love, etc., etc. Where Freud simplified complexity, James compounded it.

It is fair to say that Jung was influenced by elements of both these theories. In his essay "Instinct and the Unconscious" (1919) Jung called instincts

typical modes of action, and wherever we meet with uniform and regularly occurring modes of action and reaction, we are dealing with instinct, no matter whether it is associated with a conscious motive or not. 7

We immediately recognize the effect of James here. Instinct again is regarded as action, indeed predictable action, that does not require consciousness for its expression. Moreover, Jung, too, chose to emphasize the numerous, distinctive phenomenal manifestations rather than the unified, generalized concept of Freud: "The instincts are not vague and indefinite by nature, but are specifically formed motive forces which, . . . pursue their inherent goals."⁸ It follows that there are as many instincts as goals.

This characterization still lacks clarity, however, because it fails to account for just how this most biological of behavioral phenomena translates itself into the world of meaning that we know as consciousness. The yucca moth, for example, knows exactly when and how to ovulate within the yucca plant without ever having seen this done before. It must therefore have some internal "image" which allows it to recognize the flower, the pellet it is going to form, the pistil,

and the opening it makes in the pistil.⁹ By image we do not mean to impute a developed occipital cortex to the moth! But as Karl Pribram has noted, the actual performance of refined motor activity seems to require a certain kind of "pre-conception" of just what is coming next. He uses the term "Image-of-Achievement" to describe a mechanism which is "composed of learned anticipations of the force and changes in force required to perform a task."¹⁰ It projects a neural "mold" or "cast" of the next piece of complex movement in a sequence. Motion, then, becomes not only a matter of going from one position, but also of slipping into another. There is no question here of literal images: after all, blind people can move about, too.

Jung recognized the need for just such a mechanism within the wider field of behavior in general. Something had to mediate between pure intention, "goals," and external reality. This mechanism he called the archetype. The archetypes are:

the unconscious images of the instincts themselves, in other words, . . . they are patterns of instinctual behavior.¹¹

Let us at once take note as to precisely how the word image is used here. Jung, no more than Pribram, means to imply a literal image:

The archetypal representations (images and ideas) mediated to us by the unconscious should not be confused with the archetypes as such.¹²

Archetypes, like the Image-of-Achievement, are rather better thought of as patterns of organization which translate pure intention into plastic form: images and patterns of behavior,

in the case of archetypes; bodily position in that of Image-of-Achievement. In and of themselves we have no knowledge of them. Only through their phenomenal expression,¹³ can we guess of their existence:

Archetypes, so far as we can observe and experience them at all, manifest themselves only through their ability to organize images and ideas, and this is always an unconscious process which cannot be detected until afterwards.¹⁴

This point is crucial, and at the risk of redundancy, we shall quote at length one of Jung's most eloquent statements of it:

Again and again I encounter the mistaken notion that an archetype is determined in regard to its content, in other words that it is a kind of unconscious idea (if such an expression be admissible.) It is necessary to point out once more that archetypes are not determined as regards their content, but only as regards their form and then only to limited degree. A primordial image is determined as to its content only when it has become conscious and is therefore filled out with the material of conscious experience. Its form, however, as I have explained elsewhere, might perhaps be compared to the axial system of a crystal, which, as it were, preforms the crystalline structure in the mother liquid, although it has no material existence of its own. This first appears according to the specific way in which the ions and molecules aggregate. The archetype in itself is empty and purely formal, nothing but a facultas praeformandi, a possibility of representation which is given a priori.¹⁵

A biological analogy presents itself in the case of Konrad Lorenz and his ducklings. By now every schoolchild has seen the wonderful photograph of the grey head emerging from the water with a brood of ducklings trailing behind it. Lorenz' head, exposed to the ducklings at a critical period in the development of their central nervous systems, serves as a visual image around which an instinctual pattern of behavior crystallizes. The instinct lies latent in the ducklings at birth, but at the proper moment it is expressed by

organizing itself around the particular perceptual field surrounding the duckling. What we call patterns of behavior result from the specific way that this perceptual organization effects the attainment of instinctual goals.¹⁶ The fact that within limits, any percept, including the figure of a human head, can crystalize the behavior proves the accidental quality of the phenomenal world. But that regardless of this the ducklings still exhibit the same pattern of behavior is prima facie evidence of its intrinsic formal structure. This process, called imprinting, is a well documented datum of ethological science. The concept of the archetype is essentially no more mysterious than this.

What distinguishes human being from ducks however is the further evolution of instinct in man. For what Jung calls "spirit" is not some additional construct to further complicate his theory of instincts, but a natural outgrowth of instinct itself, and of like nature. Spirit, the numinosum before which we bow down,¹⁷ the highest aspirations of men -- in short, the gods -- these, too, derive from the brutish, stereotyped and unconscious constellations of the original animal instincts. So we may say with justification that it is as much a part of human nature to love as to copulate, to govern as to live in packs, and to worship as to paddle after a head bobbing in the water. And here, strangely enough, is where Jung finds himself in agreement with Freud. That Freud so accurately noted the "contrariety of instinctual life" demonstrates once again his keen powers of perception, to which the whole of psychoanalysis owes its existence. The unconscious

is indeed the cauldron of "concurrent and opposing action" from which the phenomenon of life proceeds. But is it just conceivable that Freud stopped too soon in limiting this opposition to just one dyad? For everywhere one looks in the unconscious one finds contradiction. It will not do to try and reduce every opposition to Eros and Thanatos. There is meaning in each opposition as it stands, in and for itself. Of course, this repetition of the same structure implies a certain kind of formal unity beneath the variegated phenomena. So far the structuralists are correct.¹⁸ However, this by no means leads to the conclusion that the meaning is to be found at this structural level. Every protein follows the same pattern of peptide bonding between amino acids. But life evolved because it makes a difference which amino acids find themselves in the structure. One could almost say that Jung did nothing more than to accept the archetypes at face value, as they presented themselves to him. In an era bent on reducing the world to "first principles," that was a revolutionary accomplishment.

We have posited a multiplicity of primary polar structures, each of which extends along a continuum from the lowest instinctual pole to the highest spiritual one. They function by determining the behavioral goals, objectives and intentions of men. They are translated into patterns of concrete behavior and visual images by archetypes, which serve to organize these intentions around phenomenal realities. (Nota bene: These two ideas, the instinct/spirit continuum and the archetype are very close, as Jung points out, and

they are so carefully differentiated here only in order to demonstrate a theoretical point. In common usage one finds that the word archetype refers to both the continuum of goals and the translating mechanism. This is because phenomenologically they are the same. We shall do likewise, noting only when necessary the theoretical differentiation between them by the terms "instinct/spirit continuum" and "archetype in itself.") Within the unconscious itself there reigns perpetual contradiction and opposition as psychic energy flows now to one end of these continua, now to the other.¹⁹ Jung called this area of primary oppositions the Pleroma, a Gnostic term meaning the sphere of paradoxical existence. It is also known as the collective unconscious.

We now find ourselves better prepared to elaborate upon the various levels of the unconscious alluded to earlier in the essay. When Jung says something is unconscious, he intends three possible modes. First, it can mean "an originally conscious content that became subliminal because it was repressed on account of its incompatible nature."²⁰ This is the personal unconscious and accounts for a good deal of the material brought up in the reductive phase of analysis. Second, the unconscious can refer to a

process that never entered into consciousness at all because no possibilities exist there for apperceiving it. That is to say, ego-consciousness cannot accept it for lack of understanding. . . . [These are] contents that are not yet conscious.

But this implies that they need not remain unconscious and can be mediated through symbols. We shall return to this point momentarily.

Thirdly, there are unconscious elements which are ipso facto incapable of consciousness. It is not a matter of inattention on the ego's behalf; it is simply that ego consciousness cannot conceive of them directly. These elements Jung called psychoid. They include, by his account, the instinctual pole, the spiritual pole, and the "archetypes in themselves."²¹ Such a view is not unique to Jung. Freud postulated a similar level of unconsciousness in the essay on "The Unconscious" (1923):

An instinct can never become an object of consciousness -- only the idea that represents the instinct can. Even in the unconscious, moreover, an instinct cannot be represented otherwise than by an idea.²²

But this leaves us dangling in midair: who, then, we may ask has this idea in the unconscious? For Jung there could be no doubt. It was the Self.

The Self may be viewed as the first and fundamental polar continuum from which all others derive. It is represented in images through symbols of unity and centeredness. Its two poles have been called metaphorically God and the Devil, and between them the whole of psychological being is encompassed. The special significance of the Self derives from its primary position. As the prima causa it is the source of direction in life. We have mentioned before that psychic energy moves over the instinct/spirit continuum, sliding not only from one pole to other, but jumping from one continuum to another. It is the Self which determines just where the psychic energy will go. The Self orchestrates and articulates the various archetypes in that characteristic way which renders every individual unique. Only the Self can select and

emphasize which archetypes will predominate and how, for in themselves archetypes are equivalent and ambivalent, each containing a whole range of contradictory possibilities.²³

We can now round out this description of Jung's most mature metapsychology by returning to the second level of unconsciousness mentioned above. Here we recover our central theme, the symbol. It was in his essay "On the Nature of the Psyche" (1946) that Jung first pictured pairs of opposites as standing as the extreme poles of a continuum. At first glance the reader might find Jung's designation of the two poles as "psychoid," i.e. totally unknowable, to be capricious and contradictory. Why then call it a continuum if the two extremes have such a radically different nature? But once again Jung's talent for the apt metaphor comes to the rescue. For as with the electromagnetic spectrum, it is not the continuum which differs, but we, the conscious perceivers.²⁴

In moving from ultraviolet into the visible spectrum, and from the visible spectrum into infrared, we encounter no discontinuity on the part of the energy. Only the phenomena change, and indeed, apparently vanish at the two poles. What makes them poles, therefore, is really the limitations of our senses, and for all the electromagnetic spectrum cares, what we call the infrared "pole" may be right square in the middle of its possibilities. So it is that we are unable to say anything about what lies beyond our consciousness, and indeed, must presume what we perceive to be totally relative to the limitations that define what we can know. This means, in the example of the spectrum, that the two poles are really an

illusion produced by consciousness. There is no contrariety in the realm of the spectrum per se. We impose such polarity upon it.

These limitations on our knowledge are not necessarily cause for despair, however, since there remains at least that part of the spectrum which does reveal itself to us. It matters little just how tiny a fraction of the range of total possibilities it represents. From the point of view of consciousness, that is the whole world, and it opens up to us an infinite variety by its infinite divisibility. It would seem Xeno's paradox can at long last redeem itself. Within the limited realm to which we are confined, there still is left more than we can ever hope to exhaust.

In addition, by paying close attention to that fraction which does reveal itself to us, by caring for it instead of turning our backs to it and taking it for granted, we may yet be able to at least guess at the possibilities that lie beyond the boundaries of our senses. To extend the metaphor, a scientist, by studying the wave properties of the visible spectrum, will surely reach a point where he can not only predict the existence of infrared and ultraviolet, but their respective qualities as well. So inherent in the visible light which we do see are the secrets to a much wider world. It then becomes more a question of whether we choose to look deeply or not.

How does this all relate to the symbol? The symbol emerges from this middle ground of the continuum. In this zone of the "visible spectrum" things are at the second level

of unconsciousness. At first they are unknown because we have our backs to them. But if we turn around and cooperate in the effort of communication, we will see them. And this visible light, arising from the middle of the continuum, translated via the archetype in itself, and perceived by ego consciousness in terms of the phenomenal world -- that is a symbol. As Jung put it as early as 1929,

the reflection and formation of the Pleroma [the sphere of paradoxical existence] in the individual consciousness produce an image of it (of like nature in a certain sense), and that is the symbol.²⁵

It becomes clear now why all symbols must by definition contain within them the potential for a conflict of opposites. For as each one symbol stands to communicate the visible part of the spectrum, the two poles, with their contradiction, are implied. But at the same time, stemming from the middle of the continuum as it does, the symbol also unites the opposites.

Now what happens if the ego fails to turn around, and instead chooses to ignore the symbol? There are two possibilities. First, the symbol may simply remain latent, expressing itself, for example, subliminally, through projections. A young woman's difficulty in relating to older men might be a case in point. She has failed to examine what these men mean to her, and the symbol goes unrecognized. Secondly, and far worse, the symbol may vanish. For to a certain extent the centering of the psychic energy on the middle of the continuum depends not only on the Self, but requires the efforts of the ego as well. When the latter fails to participate, the energy tends to drift to one end

of the spectrum or the other. When that happens, and it reaches the psychoid poles of instinct or spirit, it no longer has the potential of being communicated to consciousness. But this does not mean it will not affect us! On the contrary, we are now totally under its thumb, as it were. Just because it is psychoid we no longer have any say in the matter. Such a state of affairs Jung called symptomatic. One need only think of the compulsiveness of a phobia, or the fanaticism of a saint, to appreciate the behavioral extremes to which instinct and spirit can lead respectively.²⁶

In summation, then, we can establish a two stage hierarchy for both consciousness and the unconscious. At the lower, simpler level, we find consciousness merely to be the function of awareness, that marvelously adaptive capacity which bends external reality to our wishes. Its counterpart in the unconscious is likewise mere unawareness. It is nothing. Only we must not make the error of presuming that nothing means no thing. It is just that we cannot know it: it is nothing to us. To itself it is something, namely the thing in itself, Kant's Ding an sich.

But Jung saw another, higher level. Consciousness has an ethical aspect as well. For millennia this has been projected out into the world, but in fact, the calling is to turn around, to face inward and confront the unconscious with awareness. This, on the other hand, requires something more of the unconscious than sheer nothingness. It requires a kind of moral intentionality on behalf of the unconscious, a capacity to reveal itself to us in a way that changes attitudes

and generates creativity. In short, it requires the transcendent function of the Self.

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We have been so insistent upon the figure of speech "turning around" that the reader may well wonder whether we have something quite specific in mind. We do. What we should like to consider now is the function of soul. This is a word fraught with hazard: at every turn it threatens to mislead us, to trick us into falling prey to some anachronistic conundrum. This need not happen, however. We have set out slowly, patiently, through the course of this paper, to make a clearing where the word can once more be understood in its proper, that is, its own relations.

By soul Jung means:

an organ of perception [which] apprehends the contents of the unconscious, and, as the creative function, gives birth to its dynamis in the form of a symbol.²⁷

How is this? An organ of perception? We must follow James Hillman and explore just what it is we mean by perception. It is no longer enough to call it a faculty by which we "represent" reality. A great deal more is implied by perception. An etymological, but speculative, analysis in German may help us here.

To perceive means to have images or ideas (Vorstellungen) of reality. The German verb for this function, sich vorstellen, means literally, "to place oneself before oneself."²⁸ Thus, for example, the sentence "Der Mensch stellt sich die Welt vor" (Man imagines or perceives the world) might be more freely translated as "Man places himself before himself [and thereby

out into] the world."

This very translation, by attributing to consciousness an outside or "before," implies that there must be another side to perception. And indeed there is: the in-side. This aspect of perception, described by the German verb sich einstellen, does not actively represent, but passively allows things to "appear," to "come," or to "be there" ("da sein"). A literal rendering of this verb would be "to place itself within oneself." Note that our use of the double reflexive has changed here. The sich always refers to the subject of the verb. The prefix vor or ein always refers to the observing consciousness which the verb implies. In the case of sich vorstellen, these are the same. But in the case of sich einstellen, the observing consciousness cannot be the subject: it experiences the verb passively. So, for example, we might say, "Die Wirkungen der Psychotherapie stellen sich allmählich ein." (The effects of psychotherapy take place or appear gradually.) Again, an interpretive translation might run, "The effects of psychotherapy [are only perceived when these effects] place themselves within ourselves gradually." The effects "appear in us," but we have nothing to do with it. They place themselves there.

The one exception to this interpretation of sich einstellen proves the rule. For suppose we say, "Der Arzt stellt sich auf den Patient ein, um ihn zu verstehen." (The doctor puts himself in the patient's place in order to understand him.) This can also be translated, "The doctor places himself within himself, but he is no longer at himself, he is

at his patient." The emphasis has shifted now to the movement to another consciousness. Nevertheless, the active role is finished as soon as the doctor has moved. The insight which he hopes to gain, however, is yet to come. The doctor completely lacks control over what he will see after he has moved, because whatever appears or is revealed to him will come from beyond his consciousness, namely from the patient's consciousness. The intent of the verb, therefore, the perception of meaning, remains passive: meaning will come to the doctor after he has moved over to stand in the patient's place.

It is of interest that in English this kind of psychological perception is expressed in a similar, more readily intelligible metaphor. When a psychiatrist wishes to understand a patient, he does not concern himself overly with the patient's external appearance. Rather, he says colloquially, that he "wants to get inside" the patient's head.

We may conclude, then, that these two words, Vorstellung and Einstellung tell us a great deal about perception. When we actively meet external reality with our senses and form an idea of it (sich eine Vorstellung davon machen), we say we have consciousness of it. Likewise, when we turn inward to meet the unconscious, we assume a particular kind of passive stance which allows things to come to consciousness. We say we have a certain attitude toward the unconscious (eine Einstellung auf das Unbewusstes haben). Then we have soul.

This notion of attitude (Einstellung) is fundamental to Jung's whole psychology. By means of it we can at once clarify one particular difference between Freud and Jung.

Freud, in Chapter II of The Interpretation of Dreams, acknowledged the possibility of "symbolic" dream interpretation, where one "considers the content of the dream as a whole."²⁹ But he felt this was by and large an unhelpful method, because "it invariably breaks down when faced by dreams which are not merely unintelligible but also confused." And as one gleans from the repetitious insistence on the illogical nature of dreams in Freud's 1901 essay "On Dreams," Freud found confusion to be a central feature of all dreams.

Now it seems obvious that this problem of confusion is inextricably linked to the attitude of the interpreter. Freud's argument is really inconsistent. He states that symbolic interpretation uses a different method, namely a holistic one, not dependent on logical sequences. But then he switches criteria, and judges dreams by how confused they are, i.e. how suitable they are for a non-symbolic, logical analysis by the ego. How "confused" a dream -- or a child's story, for that matter -- is, depends on the attitude we take toward it.

To drive home this point, let us recall Freud's opinions concerning the nature of the manifest content. Surely his rejection of the apparent meaning of the dream is in no small way dependent upon his above-mentioned dismissal of the manifest content as "confused." Nevertheless, he acknowledges that some manifest contents are more readily intelligible than others, and he attributes this to the greater effects of secondary revision, mediated by the preconscious. This is entirely compatible with a Jungian point of view, for

as we have tried to make clear, a genuine symbol for Jung always involves the collaboration of the ego with the unconscious. The only difference is once again a question of attitude. Where Freud sees secondary revision as basically a variation on defense, a means of making the dream-work acceptable to the ego, Jung would attribute a positive aspect to such collaboration. For Jung, the proper attitude facilitates communication between the ego and the unconscious. And it is this conviction which allows him to dwell on the manifest content of the dream, treating it as Freud himself admits, "symbolically."

Jung had already explicitly formulated this concept of attitude by 1921:

To have an attitude means to be ready for something definite, even though this something is unconscious; for having an attitude is synonymous with an a priori orientation to a definite thing, no matter whether this be represented in consciousness or not.³⁰

To have an attitude "signifies expectation" (bedeutet Erwartung) and expectation means waiting for something (warten auf etwas).³¹

For what are we waiting? Heidegger has already told us: we are waiting for that which calls us, that which wants to be thought about.³² And why are we waiting for it? Why is it not already here? Because we have turned our backs on it and have failed to reach out for it. We have not taken the proper attitude. But moreover, we are waiting for it because it has turned way from us.³³ From the very beginning, it withdrew from man. What calls Jung and Heidegger does not allow itself to be known.

This does not mean that we should give up, though.

For we can hardly expect to refind that which calls us if we do not even try to meet it, and rest instead on the assumption that we know everything about the world from its Vorstellungen. We must reach out toward that which is withdrawing within us. And where will that leave us? Underway, that is, "inter vias, between different ways."³⁴ And this is really no more than a border zone; better yet, an interface, which exists only by defining the relation between two distinct realms. But no more is also no less: it is somewhere. It is soul. As Jung puts it psychologically,

soul never loses its intermediate position. It must therefore be regarded as a function of relation between the subject and the inaccessible depths of the unconscious. . . . It creates symbols and images and is itself only an image.³⁵

To have soul means to take the proper attitude, that is, the symbolic attitude, which is

a definite view of the world which assigns meanings to events, whether great or small, and attaches to this meaning a greater value than bare facts.³⁶

Heidegger states the same thing philosophically, when he says that "soul is not the principle of life, but that in which the spirit has its being."³⁷ It is memoria, not simple memory, but the place where that which has meaning for us, i.e. that which is food for thought, is kept and reflected back for us to see. Relating/Keeping and Imaging/Reflecting: these are the properties of the soul.

It may be objected, however, that we go too far here. What is all this nonsense about "calling," "food for thought," and "keeping?" Are we trying to explain something or create a mythology? The answer is, we are trying to understand.

"My soul," says James Hillman,

is not the result of objective facts that require explanation; rather, it reflects subjective experiences that that require understanding. . . . To understand anything at all, we must envision it as having an independent subjective interior existence, capable of experience, obliged to a history, motivated by purposes and intentions. We must always think anthropomorphically, even personally.³⁸

The soul does not perceive in the same way that our ego perceives external reality. The ego can quantify, order, and make abstractions. The soul, as Jung so often pointed out, can do none of this. It can only speak in images. Metaphor is the language of the soul.

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If that is so, then let us conclude this section by exploring a metaphor. Let us see what insights can be had simply for the imagining. Thus far we have heard the boundary between consciousness and the unconscious described as a kind of chasm, which required a bridge in order to be crossed.³⁹ This implies, however, that the gap can be closed, that the two can be united as a whole. A better metaphor is the image of horizon. It goes under a variety of names. Nietzsche knew it as the "negative border"; William James called it "the fringe of consciousness" or the "transmarginal field"; Jung and Heidegger, by way of Husserl, used the word horizon.⁴⁰

May I presume to ask the reader, when was the last time he saw a horizon? If he shares my misfortune of living in a city, it may have been quite a while indeed. All those buildings get in the way. Of course, my friends who live in the forest, they, too, (or so they tell me) seldom gaze upon a horizon. After considering this, I began to feel a bit

better about a fact which had irked me since the day I first heard the expression "horizon" used in this way. That fact was that I could not easily visualize "horizon" and could not at first envision the relationship implied by the metaphor. Was I suffering from a poverty of imagination? Or was it simply that I had forgotten what a horizon looks like because I did not live in the right place? This is no small point, for it tells us that this phenomenon of soul cannot be conjured up just anywhere. When we are preoccupied with what is close at hand, the buildings, the people, the highways, we cannot look up to see the horizon. Our view is obstructed. This is no less true for those in the forest who surround themselves with nature. To see the horizon, one must be in a flat, open space -- that is, a clearing. Or by the sea. Or on top of a mountain. To see the horizon, then, we must situate ourselves within a grander scale.

So what then is a horizon? Where the sky meets the earth or the sea. But what is that? It is nothing, it is a pure relation. Of course, it is not quite that empty, for it seems to be constantly taking things. We often say we "lost him at the horizon," meaning he disappeared. The horizon is also as far as we can see. But that does not mean there is no farther, no beyond. One other property. A horizon always moves with us. We can travel for 100 miles on the Kansas plains and our horizon never leaves us. We cannot escape it, except perhaps by returning to the city.

There is one instance, however, where we do seem to be moving in on our horizon, making some progress towards it.

That is when there are mountains on our horizon. What do mountains do but define the horizon, fix it fast to the earth so that it cannot escape us. And not just for us. For anyone, on any side of the mountain. Mountains are a landmark, a real, not illusory boundary. Hence, when we feel excitement upon approaching mountains, must we accept the standard explanation that it is because of their sheer size? Might it not just be because here we at last have grabbed hold of our horizon, and can soon, any minute now as we scurry to the top, peer over and discover what is on the other side?

And yet, what do we find upon reaching the summit? Another horizon. Consciousness cannot escape its limitations.

Still, mountains are a special place. For although we cannot see all the way into the other side, our vision now extends a much greater distance than before. And we see two things here that cannot be seen down below. We see an unbroken horizon that encircles us completely. It gives us an illusion of wholeness. Also, we see the mountain peaks themselves, emerging from the clouds below. Truly, the mountains are soul. They herald the horizon from afar, they remind us of it. And when we take the trouble to scale their peaks, they reveal new horizons to us. Here the gods, the archetypes dwell. From mountainous heights, one can appreciate what Hillman calls depth. To be sure, they are dangerous: one can fall from such heights. Nevertheless, it is here that Hölderlin, the poet of both Heidegger and Jung, mountain dwellers themselves, sought to return:

Nah ist
Und schwer zu fassen der Gott.

Wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst
Das Rettende auch.
Im Finstern wohnen
Die Adler, und furchtlos gehen
Die Söhne der Alpen über den Abgrund weg
Auf leichtgebaueten Brücken.
Drum, da gehäuft sind rings
Die Gipfel der Zeit, und die Liebsten
Nah wohnen, ermattend auf
Getrenntesten Bergen,
So gib unschuldig Wasser,
O Fittiche gib uns, treuesten Sinns
Hinüberzugehen und wiederzukehren.⁴¹

So much for a metaphor, a single word. I have not interpreted it; I have merely dwelled in it and experienced it. I could never hope to categorize, organize, analyze or systematize the soul and its contents. Nor would I want to. And that brings us to the final section of this first part. For what is the business of psychoanalysis if not the interpretation of dreams?

THE ROLE OF INTERPRETATION

We are treading on thin ice here. The reader, be he psychoanalyst or not, is perhaps starting to get a little tense. Where will this lead? And if he is anxious, it is because this is new territory for him. But it is not really accurate to say that it is we who are anxious. After all, our dreams and fantasies belong to us, too. Rather, it is someone within us. It is Apollo, our consciousness. It is he who would bring bright lights to bear upon the darkling field of images. It is Apollo who would find illusory comfort when, the visions having fled like the timid animals in a forest from discovery by his blinding light, he announces for all to hear, "There was really nothing there at all, nothing but . . ." We know better, however. Psychoanalysis has taught us this much in the last seventy-five years: Apollo is anxious for a reason. There is something there and he knows that it is there. But he also knows that he cannot know it, for by his very nature he cannot see it. And so he trembles:

With what astonishment must the Apollonian Greek have beheld him! With an astonishment that was all the greater the more it was mingled with the shuddering suspicion that all this was actually not so very alien to him after all, in fact that it was only his Apollonian consciousness which, like a veil, hid this Dionysian world from his vision.¹

If we are anxious, then, it is not without cause. But might we not choose a different response? To be sure, there are

good reasons for heaving a sigh of relief upon hearing Apollo's pronouncement. If there is nothing there, if we have interpreted everything and assigned it a reason, then we can go back to work. And that is useful. But if this anxiety keeps nagging at us, keeps insisting upon its presence, what then? Might we not try to get to know this other? Let us repeat, it, too, belongs to us. We have identified with Apollo and mistaken his anxiety for ours. Might we not identify with the other?

We should not fool ourselves, though. There is a price to pay. We must sacrifice Apollo's intense light so that we may see more, if not better. In this dimness, we cannot expect to understand with rational precision. To be admitted to this realm, one must humbly leave his torch at the gate, as Aeneas did his golden bough. As Jung put it in 1915:

Understanding [i.e. rational analysis] is a fearfully binding power, at times a veritable murder of the soul as it flattens out important differences. The core of the individual is a mystery of life, which is snuffed out when it is "grasped." That is why symbols want to be mysterious; they are not so merely because what is at bottom of them cannot be clearly apprehended . . . There should truly be no understanding in this regard . . . True understanding seems to be one which does not understand, yet lives and works . . . We should be connivers at our own mysteries, but veil our eyes chastely before the mystery of the other, so far as, being unable to understand himself, he does not need 'understanding' of others.²

Again we must distinguish between phases of analysis. The solvent power of rational understanding has its indispensable uses in the reductive part of an analysis. Behaviors that are symptomatic, that is, subliminal, beneath our awareness, meaningless, habitual -- these must be exposed to a

clear light so that we can at last see them for what they really are. Understanding here would then serve as a much needed corrosive to strip away the tarnish we assumed to be the natural color of things.³

But what Jung is describing above is something quite different. It is a sacrifice of clarity which soul demands of us if we are to change our attitude and turn around to meet that which calls us. No matter that it withdraws and eludes us. That is its privilege. We can find meaning enough in the images that it vouchsafes to us.

This implies something quite extraordinary about those images. They can communicate meaning to us without a laborious hermeneutic, provided we adopt the proper attitude. Jung described this process at work in the creative efforts of patient in art therapy:

A dark impulse is the ultimate arbiter of the pattern [of the painting], an unconscious a priori precipitates itself into plastic form, and one has no inkling that another person's consciousness is being guided by these same principles at the very point where one feels utterly exposed to the boundless subjective vagaries of chance. Over the whole procedure there seems to reign a dim foreknowledge not only of pattern, but of its meaning. Image and meaning are identical; and as the first takes shape, so the latter becomes clear. Actually, the pattern needs no interpretation: it portrays its own meaning.⁴

There is clearly something very special about this, however. We are speaking here of purely generated authentic symbols. By calling them authentic, we are making an explicit synthesis of Heidegger and Jung which we will fully elaborate in Part II. Suffice it for now to say that we intend by authentic symbol that aesthetic union of the collective unconscious with an actively participating consciousness which expresses the Self.

It derives its authenticity from its origin, from that which calls: the Self. Authentic symbol formation is accomplished by the transcendent function. To live a life in the transcendent function, to thus be a dialogue between reality and the Self, that would mean living symbolically. As Heidegger puts it, "poetically man dwells." Being in this mode is as though

We are a sign that is not read.
We feel no pain, we almost have
Lost our tongue in foreign lands.⁵

Like a sign, we point toward the meaning and need not speak aloud.

Such moments are rare, however, and should not be misconstrued as life's sole value. Heidegger reminds us that the state of fallenness is an inescapable fact of the human condition, and claims its own validity. And it is this state of fallenness which is the defining characteristic of inauthenticity, and if we may extrapolate, of inauthentic symbols as well:

'Inauthenticity' does not mean anything like Being-no-longer-in-the-world, but amounts rather to a quite distinctive kind of Being-in-the-world -- the kind which is completely fascinated by the 'world' and by the Dasein-with of Others in the 'they.'⁶

Here, in this state of fallenness, we refind the usefulness of interpretation. For it is precisely in that state which is so fascinated by the world, so totally given over to it, that the tool which was explicitly designed to explain that world -- rational interpretation -- can serve us best.

Take dreams, for example. These usually lack the transparency and authenticity of the transcendent function.

Like all inferior forms of unconscious production, they are contaminated with personal contents, i.e. our inauthentic but nonetheless very real, "worldly" concerns. Moreover, they reflect a lower degree of participation by consciousness as compared with the transcendent function, which requires that a deliberate attitude be taken.⁷ As a consequence, dreams often demonstrate a certain chaotic and capricious quality. The somnolence of dream consciousness -- or of any pharmacologically altered state of consciousness for that matter -- does not provide adequate guidance nor the necessary control to give the best expression to unconscious contents. Thus the ego must complete in waking life, derivatively, what it failed to do while asleep, directly: it must interpret the whole and finish the story that was begun the night before. Following the analogy we set forth on page 57, one might say that conscious, symbolic dream interpretation is the waking version of Freud's secondary revision. It is rational: it follows certain rules, is fairly orderly and thorough, and relies on principles of similarity, both to subjective associations and objective mythologies. And although synthetic in the sense of "filling in" the story, it is also analytic insofar as it intentionally seeks to interpret the meaning behind images as well. Of course, we all know from firsthand experience that there are different kinds of dreams, "big dreams and little dreams" as Jung's African natives put it. And by and large big dreams fulfill our criteria for authentic symbols: the ego remembers them, and feels that it has been touched by them. Such dreams require

much less interpretation, if any. But the everyday dream, inauthentic as it is, lacking that crystalline clarity which only a rare joining of the conscious and unconscious can accomplish, needs that further effort of consciousness making which only interpretation affords. Jung repeatedly urged that these everyday dream symbols must, "if they are to be effective, be 'understood' by the conscious mind; they must be assimilated and integrated. A dream that is not understood remains a mere occurrence; understood, it becomes a living experience."⁸ There is no question as to the need for analytic interpretation here.

It may be objected that it is all well and good to hypothesize the existence of interpretation-free symbols which we are calling here authentic, but where is the evidence? Foregoing the personal testimony of analysands themselves as perhaps biased, we nevertheless find this hypothesis creeping into much of the current literature on visual perception. Most of the corroborating opinions derive either directly or indirectly from the Gestalt school of psychology, whose impact on 20th century thought has yet to be fully exhausted.

Rudolf Arnheim, for example, lays the groundwork for a radical critique of traditionally accepted "truths" about conscious thought. In his book Visual Thinking (1969), he sets out to examine systematically the belief that thought is a form of consciousness limited to words and "pure" concepts. Beginning with a demonstration of the rudiments of organization implicit in every instance of visual perception (but seldom manifested explicitly as such without specially designed

experiments), he soon moves to higher, more abstract levels. He shows how actual thinking can take place visually, thinking being defined by conceptualization, relation, sequencing, hierarchy formation, or whatever other rational criteria one might desire. He goes even further, however. Using an abstract painting by one of his students, he argues cogently for the intellectual processes at work in making such a creation. He "interprets" the painting to the reader as a thoughtful commentary on the girl's life at the time it was painted. But he insists that his interpretation is a secondary phenomenon and that in itself "the constellation of the picture is also the solution of a thought problem, although there may be no words to tell about the finding."⁹

Arnheim realizes the implications of his thesis and does not shun to treat them. Ultimately, visual creations are expressions of a person's inner being within the limitations of our phenomenal reality. To be effective, they must represent an accommodation between the demands of the unconscious contents and the rigors of meaningful, intelligible imagery. Only the discipline of the latter can treat the unconscious thoughtfully. When this happens, however, we have great art. Paul Klee has said, "I create pour ne pas pleurer; that is the first and last reason." Arnheim takes this to mean that creation works "only by clarifying for him what there was to weep about and how one could live with and in spite of, this state of affairs."¹⁰ Art, then, takes on a profoundly psychological significance. To live symbolically or dwell poetically is an aesthetic mode of being.

We hear this same theme echoed by Thomas Kuhn in his influential book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Also taking his cue from Gestalt psychology, Kuhn demonstrates the fundamentally perceptual nature of scientific theory construction. He notes that scientists can resort to words and explanations in defense of their hypotheses only after a certain ground, which he calls a paradigm, has been agreed upon. What that ground is, is never explicitly articulated and indeed cannot be, for it is, as Michael Polanyi explains, "tacit knowledge."¹¹ But it is no less knowledge for its silence. Anyone who would seriously entertain that doubt would also have to disbelieve the manifest presence of a technology which is solidly rooted in such intangibles as paradigms. For it matters which paradigm is chosen, and as Kuhn amply shows, there have been innumerable bad paradigms in the history of science. These are not mere fantasies. Indeed, this initial image or Gestalt, this perceptual point of view, remains the irreplaceable first step, upon which all further elaborations of consciousness depend.

Based on this concept of paradigm, Kuhn draws a distinction between perception and interpretation. In the famous example of the rabbit-duck (see figure 1), we see, that is, we perceive, either the rabbit or the duck, never both simultaneously. Now of course we can step back, and reflecting upon this curious state of affairs, return to the picture and carefully dissect it, picking out features which lead toward one or the other images. But this interpretive effort only comes after our initial perception. Not only that, but even

2 Rabbit or duck?




Figure 1

when we have completely analyzed the picture, if we then return to gaze at it as a whole, we again confront either a rabbit or a duck. The interpretive process, being essentially different from perception, has no impact on the image's perceptual effect on us. Perception, the spontaneous and immediate recognition of meaning in a visual stimulus, cannot be reduced to merely an unconscious version of interpretation.¹² It has its own validity.

As Kuhn has dared to apply this perceptual paradigm to the history of science, so may we, too, avail ourselves of its insights by putting it to use in psychiatry. We are suggesting here that the process of visual perception is a high order discriminator of meaning which modulates a continuous and tenuous interaction between unconscious processes and phenomenal reality. As such, it is primary, and prior to such further manipulations upon the world as the ego may choose to exert. First we "recognize" reality by assigning it meanings, then we take it apart to see how it works. As concerns

the symbolic process, what we have described in the section on metapsychology becomes nothing more than the inside of this perception. It faces the unconscious, but it is still perception. Only here it operates in the reverse direction. Instead of recognizing reality by projecting meaning onto forms, it recognizes the unconscious by providing forms for meaning. In both instances this transpires in the silence of the soul.

We must now consider a final counterargument from Lawrence Kubie. He notes the simple empirical fact that "art therapy," as clinically practiced in hospitals or as legitimate art, does not "work" very well. His explanation for this is complex, but we can isolate three basic points. First, he queries, "Why, if we cannot dream our way to health, should we expect to write or paint or compose or invent or discover our way to health?"¹³ Coupled to this question is the observation that "creative people in every field are often highly neurotic." Second, after disclaiming the utility of the "metaphor" of the word "sublimation," he points out that the "social value" of expressed behavior has absolutely no influence upon the unconscious "id" forces. Art, in other words, despite the esteem in which it is held by society, cannot reach down to its own unconscious sources. Hence it offers no solution. And as a concluding point, Kubie implies that the whole project for understanding artistic creativity, and indeed unconscious processes in general, is untenable as things stand at the present, because it rests upon mere metaphors like "sublimation, discharge, and abreaction."

He maintains that "concepts that are metaphorical analogies can never be used as explanatory principles." Kubie is suggesting that insofar as psychoanalysis is metaphorical and therefore like art therapy, it, too, will be doomed to failure. What began as an analysis of art therapy has ended with a re-evaluation of the whole psychotherapeutic enterprise.

It should be apparent just how widely such a view differs from our position. In the first place, we question just what goals Kubie sets for the artist. Even without resorting to a critique of his dichotomizing the world into the healthy and the sick (a nefarious practice in our view),¹⁴ we can still object to his expectations that art should somehow bring about resounding cures in order to justify itself psychologically. That Van Gogh or Nijinsky "did not get well" in no way impugns the meaningfulness of their creativity, nor does it inauthenticate its truly symbolic nature. We made no claim that the transcendent function leads us to perfection; only that it best expresses our fate. And a man's fate may be tragic.

Moreover, Kubie clearly takes a different view of the significance of artistic activity when he speaks of its "social value." We would agree that society's reaction to artistic creations has little impact on the artist's unconscious, but that is precisely because the "purpose" of art has nothing whatsoever to do with "sublimating" the unconscious to the appropriate "social values." The meaningfulness of art comes not from what society thinks of it, but what it means to the artist. It is only at this most personal level that we claim

an impact for the effects of artistic images and symbols upon unconscious processes.

Finally, Kubie betrays his fundamental objection to art therapy by his discomfort with "metaphorical analogies." We will not tire the reader with a recapitulation of our thoughts on this topic. Suffice it to mention here the elegant distinctions that are currently being made within the philosophy of science with regard to this problem. Stefan Körner, for example, has urged that we must separate out matters of prediction from those of explanation in our analyses.¹⁵ They represent two independent categories, and operate with different strategies. It would seem what Kubie is really asking for as he rankles over "mere metaphor" is a more "scientific" vocabulary. He wants precision, logic, quantitation, proof, reproducibility; in short, he wants what all science aspires to -- a mathematical model. And this is a worthy objective, to be sure. But such models, if Körner is right, serve only to guide our manipulations of reality. They help us to predict reality, which is the ultimate accomplishment of Freud's foremost "institution of the ego," reality testing. A predictive, model, however, does not explain anything. For that, we do indeed need metaphors. And that is because, in this post-Kantian era, we no longer aspire to some illusory "ultimate explanation." We have learned to accept the fact that we are dealing with something which will remain inexplicable. And with that in mind, we would sooner have metaphors -- as deeply and as broadly extended as possible, with all the finesse of articulation that aesthetics provides us -- than nothing at all.

If I have made any point in this chapter, it is this: Psychiatry deals not with the mind alone, nor the bodily instincts, although these are its principle objects of investigation today. We must again follow James Hillman, whose thinking in this area has proven so rich and thought-provoking. Psychiatry (and more properly speaking, psychology) is, as Jung observed in 1908, "the art of healing the soul."¹⁶ It thus finds itself between mind and body. But perhaps even Jung remained too much bound to Apollo the Physician in this pronouncement. For psychotherapy does not cure souls. You can sometimes cure the body, and sometimes educate the mind. The soul, however, you can only care for, as indeed the original meaning of cure as cura suggests. And the word psychotherapy implies just that.¹⁷ To sit by and wait patiently, to watch its fragile images, however imperfect and however painful, in silence: that is our task. In it, we find our guidance, and encouragement, through symbols.

INTERLUDE

A WORD ON METHOD,
AND A MEDITATION ON A WORD

Before proceeding on with the argument, let me take a brief pause and step back from the urgency of my concerns. The earnest tone of the first half of this essay -- not to be undone by the second -- tells the reader how seriously I take my thoughts. Thought acquires the force of conviction, and the prosaic but rhetorical exposition molds the conviction into a claim. And clearly, the claim is for truth. Of course, to conceive a thesis and defend its truth with a coherent sequence of logical assertions, that is the object of the exercise.

Unfortunately, I myself am not so convinced about the generalized "truth" of my claim: I see no reason why it should carry conviction for anyone who has not shared my thoughts, which leaves me with my truth, important to me alone. Why then should I take up any more of the reader's time?

Thus I disclose a lack, and it is to this lack that the second half of this essay will respond. Now there are two ways of filling in this void which threatens to leave my argument so precariously ungrounded. One could set about to amass "data" in an attempt to prove by method of innumerable examples -- appropriately interpreted to be sure! -- the self-evident nature of my truth. But Jung and others have already collected volumes of clinical and mythological instances which

demonstrate this truth, and the power of their evidence and reasoning speaks for itself (assuming one reads it). The other way to handle such a void is to pass over the end-product of the argument, those crystalized and formulaic truths, and return to their source, to thinking. If one tries to insinuate oneself into the mind of another, and feels confident enough to let oneself be swept along by another's thought, there opens the possibility of arriving at the necessary conviction of a thought's truth from within.

This is what I propose to do. By "locating" Jung's thought on symbols within the context of 19th and 20th century metaphysical thinking, I do not presume to prove anything. Least of all do I want to intimate some proof-by-similarity (or by contagion, if you prefer), whereby the truth of one man's thought rests upon its resemblances to another's. What I have in mind is rather a kind of amplification. In asking the reader to think with me the thoughts of a few thoughtful men, I hope to entice him to think the thought of symbol as Jung did. I ask the reader to step into a discussion which may well be foreign to him. The intention is to urge him to reflect genuinely upon the thoughts of the first half of this essay, by exposing him to the dialogue from which those thoughts emerged. I confess that such a method of filling the void of truth is an insidious shirking of my responsibility, because it leaves the ultimate task of thinking to the reader. I trust he enjoys working.

As an initial instance of this method, then, let us conclude our interlude with a discussion of the etymology of

the word "symbol." It pays at times to consider the history of words, especially ones which we use so frequently and yet diversely. This is an old practice in the psychoanalytic literature. Freud himself was intrigued by the "antithetical meaning of primal words,"¹ and Jung frequently resorted to elucidating etymologies, contending that "it often happens that a word's history throws a surprising light on the nature of the psychic fact underlying it."² Such inclinations perhaps reflect the ever present need to seek out the roots of things, so intrinsic to the psychoanalyst's -- and philosopher's -- mind, a need which Freud dubbed "the predilection for the prehistoric."

Ernest Jones was the first of many to research the etymology of "symbol" in part of his 1916 essay on symbolism.³ Although seeking to connect the old meaning of the word with current Freudian concepts, he was forced to admit that he could not establish a valid correspondence. In fact, he specifically noted that the Greek sumballon did not carry the present Freudian interpretation of sign. In order to salvage his efforts, therefore, Jones had to go even farther back than ancient Greek, and identify the root similarity between archaic and modern concepts in the Indogermanic stem bal, which derives from the even older Sanskrit gal, meaning "a flowing together of water." This imagery of streams converging on a river he interpreted as suggesting the multiplicity of significations which most dream symbols have.

This explication is entirely tenable, especially since the verb sumballein was used precisely in that sense of rivers

flowing together in ancient Greek as well.⁴ However, the depths of this remarkable word are hardly fathomed by this account alone. Sumballon is composed of two parts: sum (or sun), meaning together, common, simultaneous, with or according to; and ballon, meaning that which has been thrown (from the verb ballein, to throw.) Now this word, taken as a whole, has an extraordinary number of meanings. They can be divided into four classes, which are far from being unrelated thematically:⁵

1) Literally, sumballein means "to throw or dash together." Taken personally, it connotes "a meeting of the eyes," and generalizing from that we get "a coming together or meeting of men," and finally "a joining or uniting in abstracto." The ultimate implications of this concept were not lost on the Greeks, who took it one step farther: to meet suggests speech, words, and so sumballein logous means "to converse."

2) Never ones to ignore the darker side of things, the Greeks knew that meeting means originally to meet the unknown, and that is always unpredictable. So in the spirit of Odysseus, wandering alone in a hostile world, sumballein could also mean "to come upon [someone] by chance," and fearing the worst, "to join in fighting," "to bring men together in hostilities." Thus we also have sunbole, meaning "a juncture" or "encounter," and "an engagement" as in battle.

3) In another context, sumballein could mean "to put together," and this was understood in the sense of "to correspond," "to tally." From this we get the word sumbolon, meaning "tally," which as Leopold Stein explains in his fascinating

article is

two halves of corresponding pieces of bone, coin, or other objects which two strangers or any other two partners broke between them in order to have proof of the identity of the presenter of the other part.⁶

In a similar vein sumballein meant more generally "to compare one's own opinion with facts" and thereby "to conclude, make out, understand, infer, conjecture, or interpret." Hence the word sumbolos, meaning "augury" or "omen."

4) Finally, sumballein could be used in a commercial sense, meaning "to agree upon [a price]," "to fix [a price]," or "to settle [a transaction]." In this way we arrive at the peculiar meaning of sumbolon as "a covenant" between two states for the protection of commerce. Note how here again we have characterized an ambivalent relationship. Commerce, the flowering of a meeting between strangers who have something to share, always threatens to degenerate into brigandage and theft, so little do men trust one another. The sumbolon, as tally or covenant, is precisely what permits discourse at a meeting of two strangers, at the confrontation of the known with the unknown. It alone points the way toward some as yet unclarified, but binding, relationship between known and unknown. It is this relationship which is at the core of this cluster of meanings. And lest it be judged that we have extrapolated too far here, let me complete my list with Jung's observation that sumbolon also came to mean the creed in the Greek Orthodox Church, and as such represented the ultimate covenant between man and the unknown.

If we muse upon this notion of the tally, we find a striking conceit for our theory of symbol. Imagine, if you will,

a dream about dreaming. There is the ego, a solitary figure walking through the dark forest, prey to the weather, the beasts, other men, and his own fears and frailties. Suddenly there appears a stranger, a man like him. He is the dream image, anthropomorphic as always. Why should our traveller trust him? What reason does the ego have for taking dream images as anything but a threat? Indeed, if our traveller knows himself as Odysseus did, he immediately suspects the other of the same unbridled egoism and selfishness which characterizes himself. What could possibly bring these two together? And then the stranger produces his sumbolon, he reveals, makes visible

something perceptible that is the result of an activity which throws together such things as have something in common, and in such a way that one thing somehow accords with another not presented to the senses, and is synchronous with it.⁸

That is, our traveller recognizes the visible sumbolon as the counterpart to his, and that implies a hidden relationship between the two:

The symbol, the broken-off part, is not a separate element but carries with it, and points to, wherever it goes, the whole in which it participated as well as the situation in which it was broken in half.⁹

And so we again come by way of fanciful dream interpretation to a notion of the symbol as that which is thrown across the abyss separating consciousness and the unconscious, requiring the participation of both sides to make a whole.

That this interpretation of the two "sides" is correct may be judged by the further consideration of the related word diaballo, from which we get the words diabolic and devil. Here "the other side" is seen quite distinctly as violent and

unfriendly, and the invasion by the unconscious, as in "possession," is onesided. One thinks of Dostoevsky's The Possessed, which translates more literally as The Devils. It is when consciousness lacks the symbol and therewith the possibility of communication, just then do we succumb to devils, who throw symptoms across at us and disrupt our lives. The other side then remains dark and forbidding, and the potential for a creative relationship with it, as in a "trade agreement," requires the proper attitude of trust, as intimated by the clue of the symbol.

Once again I will ask, "What right do I have in claiming etymology as proof?" And again I must confess, "None." But if my intention is to seduce the reader into thinking in a certain way, then all I claim to be doing is introducing him to the thinking of a people, the ancient Greeks. Such thinking is of course unself-conscious. Who can say how a language develops or who "intended" it? But if we credit this pre-reflective thinking which manifests itself in a word's history, we are doing no more than recognizing the power of intuition, something which ought not to be so foreign to psychiatrists. The mere fact that such pre-ontological thinking, as Heidegger calls it, is not yet formally expressed, hardly invalidates it. I will grant, though, that it appeals to us on another level, and one from which we cannot too boldly draw conclusions. It is a dizzy business, listening for a voice in a word's history, and as Heidegger himself is quick to point out:

in citing such evidence we must avoid uninhibited word-mysticism. Nevertheless, the ultimate business of philosophy is to preserve the force of the most elemental words in which Dasein expresses itself, and to keep the common understanding from leveling them off to that unintelligibility which functions in turn as a source of pseudo problems.¹⁰

So it is probably going too far to suppose, as Stein does, that words "carry with them archaic meanings that survive in the unconscious."¹¹ Such a claim really does require proof. We, on the other hand, merely want to suggest that for the Greeks, word families were thought about, and such thinking, as practiced by such as Heraclitus, often led to insight.¹² And yet the similarity of their thought with Jung's is for us, truly, food for thought.

PART II:

THE PHILOSOPHICAL HERITAGE

PREDECESSORS

The history of Germanic philosophy in the 19th century dramatizes a fundamental conflict within the European cultural psyche which only finally erupted into articulate consciousness with the work of Freud, Jung, and Heidegger. The conflict varied from thinker to thinker, but one side was always the same: reason was doing battle. Depending on the point of view, one can cite various examples to demonstrate what reason was struggling with. Freudians can point to the one-sided elevation of reason in Kant and especially Hegel as evidence of the repression of instinctual life. Jungians see in Zarathustra's visions and dreams the confrontation of reason with the archetypal unconscious. And Heideggerians refer us to Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer to emphasize the impact that the "discovery" of Death had upon the reasonable man of that era. In all cases, reason encountered experiences that it did not understand, that were unfathomable in principle, and that threatened it ominously. We propose to take as our guiding theme this conflict of reason with the unknowable. Following it from Kant through Schopenhauer to Nietzsche, all of whom Jung had read deeply,¹ we will try to unpack some of the key issues and assumptions behind the arguments and thereby arrive at the debate as it presented itself to Jung at the end of the century.

Kant

The Enlightenment produced the man who defined it, Immanuel Kant (1742-1804), and for him reason stood pre-eminently as the foundation of man's humanity. His best known work, The Critique of Pure Reason (1781) represented the most thoroughgoing attempt in the history of philosophy to determine the scope and power afforded to reason. Specifically, he set out to investigate human "understanding" by establishing the limits of "our faculty of knowledge." How much was human cognition bound to phenomenal reality, Becoming, and to what extent was it possible for reason to transcend experience and thereby attain Being? "That all knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt," conceded Kant.² "But it by no means follows that all [knowledge] arises out of experience."³ Kant wondered whether there might be "a knowledge altogether independent of experience, and even of all sensuous impressions." Such would be knowledge a priori, and "knowledge a priori is absolutely independent of all experience, not just of this or that kind of experience." The answer to this question marked a turning point in Western philosophy, and much of 19th century philosophy proved to be a commentary on it. Kant concluded that:

our faculty of cognition is unable to transcend the limits of possible experience; and yet this is precisely the most essential object of this science [metaphysics]. The estimate of our rational cognition a priori at which we arrive is that it has only to do with the phenomena, and that things themselves, while possessing a real existence, lie beyond its sphere.⁴

Here we have in its essence the epistemological abyss to which we alluded earlier in the paper. Such a pronouncement lays

the groundwork for the possibility of a conception of man in which human existence is deeply alienated from its Being-in-the-world. As Heidegger points out cogently, far from being a creative turn away from Descartes, Kant's ontology not only rested on the same basic assumptions about subject and object, but cleared the way for Descartes' vision, held up as it had been by the trappings of Christian metaphysics, to find its ultimate logical expression in Western technological science.⁵

And yet it is common knowledge that Kant himself did not see such dehumanizing consequences stemming from his work. Far from it. As Peter Gay observes, Kant was a humanist in the tradition of Rousseau.⁶ This naïveté vis-à-vis his ontology was by no means a failure of insight, however. Rather, it derived from his wider conception of the human mind. For The Critique of Pure Reason could in no way be construed as his final word on the human condition, even if today it would appear as such, given our current relativization of morality (contra The Critique of Practical Reason) and our belief, with Hegel, that art is now a thing of the past (contra The Critique of Judgment). In these later works, Kant elaborated other structures which he thought would bridge over the chasm which he had revealed in his first Critique. And perhaps here we may find a clue pointing toward our theme.

If The Critique of Pure Reason dealt with the limits of human "understanding," we must be quick to point out that this "understanding" was conceived in a very particular manner that is not to be equated with "reason." This is not to deny the utter rationality of "understanding." But reason remained

for Kant a precisely defined word embracing two general faculties. Theoretical reason, the topic of the first Critique, dealt with the rational faculty of cognition. Practical reason, on the other hand, denoted that structure, also rational, which expressed the faculty of desire.

Thus the second Critique, The Critique of Practical Reason, was "concerned with the grounds of determination of the will" -- in short, with freedom. The first Critique had grappled with the problem of demonstrating by means of pure theoretical reason the a priori cognizability of God, freedom, and immortality, only to fail.⁷ The second Critique began with the explicit acknowledgement of this ungroundedness, and thus merely attempted to define the scope of human freedom, postulating God and immortality along the way. This theoretical ungroundedness did not undermine Kant's certainty about his arguments, however. By means of the Categorical Imperative, the details of which need not concern us here, he thought he was still able to formulate a system of ethical absolutes which would escape any rational refutation. Nevertheless, from a contemporary standpoint we find little in this second Critique that speaks to our present-day problem of ethical rootlessness, which seems to scoff at any futile attempts to ground ethics in reason alone.

There remains a third structure, however, which appears more promising. Kant acknowledged a curious middle ground between the faculties of cognition and desire, which he called "the feeling of pleasure and displeasure." The principle of judgment, standing between understanding and reason, expressed

this middle realm. It is here in The Critique of Judgment that we find a hint of how it might be possible to jump across the epistemological abyss of the first Critique, albeit in a very special context. In the discussion of art and genius (sec. 43-54), Kant introduces us to the irrational realm of the imagination, which constitutes a counterbalance to the understanding. In this realm of imagination we find, in an aesthetic sense, nothing less than that "spirit" (Geist) which is the very "animating principle in the mind." And this spirit is equated to "the faculty of presenting aesthetic ideas." With the aesthetic idea, Kant gives content to the imaginal and thereby offers a concrete structure to complement the concepts of understanding. Of a radically different nature by definition, this structure eludes understanding:

By an aesthetic idea I mean that representation of the imagination which induces much thought, yet without the possibility of any definite thought whatever, i.e. concept, being adequate to it, and which language consequently, can never get quite on level terms with or render completely intelligible.⁸

Artistic genius consists in the power to unify "in a certain relation" the two realms of aesthetic ideas (imagination) and concepts (understanding): "Genius properly consists in the happy relation, . . . enabling one to find out ideas for a given concept."⁹ This unifying is not merely a barren correspondence, but a synthetic event which gives birth to the expression of these aesthetic ideas, an "expression by means

of which the subjective mental condition induced by the ideas as the concomitant of a concept may be communicated to others. The latter talent is properly that which is called spirit.

True to his colors, Kant seemed determined to leave

at the very least a token priority to the understanding, insofar as the aesthetic idea comes as a response to the concept. But we see in his discussion of poetry, which "holds the first rank among all arts," just how much he was willing to valorize this irrational and un-understandable realm of imagination.

Poetry, Kant tells us,

expands the mind by giving freedom to the imagination and by offering, from among the boundless multiplicity of possible forms accordant with a given concept, to whose bounds it is restricted, that one which couples with the presentation of the concept a wealth of thought to which no verbal expression is completely adequate, and by thus rising aesthetically to ideas.

Poetry reveals a transcendent world to us by

regarding and estimating nature as phenomenon in the light of aspects which nature of itself does not afford us in experience, either for sense or understanding, and of employing it accordingly in behalf of, and as a sort of schema for, the supersensible.¹⁰

Poetry and the aesthetic idea from which it springs is, in short, disciplined intuition.

Now we make no claim that Kant was any less the rationalist for this view. Above all, we do not mean to suggest that this interpretation of the aesthetic should be expanded to include all aspects of Kant's epistemology. Nevertheless, it is no accident that Kant located this aesthetic function in the middle ground of judgment, which he conceived as "a means of connecting the two parts of philosophy in a whole."¹¹ But it would be up to later philosophers, especially Nietzsche, to give a "strong reading" to Kant's doctrine on poetry, and thereby emphasize the primacy of the aesthetic in a more general interpretation of epistemology.

Schopenhauer

To Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) fell the task of bringing Kant's philosophy into line with the prevailing spirit of post-Romantic Europe. To be sure, the powerful reduction of nature à la Kant to space, time and causality had become the predominant leitmotiv of 19th century technology, so successfully blossoming in the industrial revolution. But at the same time the heirs of Napoleonic Europe were also beginning to come to terms with the weightiness of their being as animals: as animals with corruptible bodies (witness the rise of modern medicine from the 19th century foundations of histology and pathology); as animals with unruly, instinctual passions (witness the failure of reason in the demises of 1830 and 1848, with the subsequent political cynicism); and as animals belonging to a species (witness Darwin's Origin of Species in 1860 and Mendel's Experiments in Plant Hybridization in 1866). Schopenhauer was the most eloquent philosophical spokesman for this new consciousness. In describing man as the animal metaphysicum,¹² Schopenhauer laid equal stress on animal, and we must remember this if we are to see what was new in his thinking, and how it was so in keeping with the spirit of his era.

For Schopenhauer, Kant's metaphysics, with its overvaluation of reason, was no longer commensurate to the experiences and problems of the 19th century. Reason supplied men with forms and patterns, but Schopenhauer took strong exception to Kant's insistence in the Critique of Practical Reason that it supplied content, in the shape of human values, as well.

On the contrary, at the level of specific content, that is, of knowledge per se, Schopenhauer regarded reason as "feminine in nature; it can give only after it has received:

To know means generally to have within the power of the mind, ready to reproduce at will, such judgements as have their sufficient ground of knowledge in something outside them, in other words, such judgements as are true.¹³

True judgments were not to be located in the realm of reason, however. Where Kant offered us a rational alternative to the abyss of the first Critique, Schopenhauer now dismissed such solace as reason misunderstanding itself. Instead, he offered a new solution. Schopenhauer's creative contribution to Western philosophy lay in his re-introduction of the body as the source of human truth. The transcendental and alienating Kantian abyss was not actually bridged, but made narrower, by giving renewed value to the experience of man's Being-in-the-world.

True, the abyss remained. The thing in itself continued to escape man's metaphysical questing, which Schopenhauer practically accepted by definition:

By metaphysics I understand all so-called knowledge that goes beyond the possibility of experience, and so beyond nature or the given phenomenal appearance of things, in order to give information about that . . . which is hidden behind nature, and renders nature possible.¹⁴

But Schopenhauer attributed the apparent elusiveness of such knowledge to the effects of sterile reasoning, which he regarded as emptying out the content of human life by means of reduction and abstraction. To this reasoning he objected:

Does it not seem positively wrong-headed that in order to solve the riddle of experience, in other words, of the world which alone lies before us, that we should close our eyes to it, and ignore its contents? . . . It is true that the task of metaphysics is not the observation of particular experiences; but yet it is the correct explanation of experience as a whole. Its foundation, therefore, must certainly be of an empirical nature.¹⁵

Essence, the thing in itself, "remains unknowable, at least to the intellect."¹⁶ But this opacity of the world in the face of human reason could in no way be construed as a cause for nihilism, which alternative seems so much more plausible to us today. For Schopenhauer, it required the barest of efforts at regarding the world in its everydayness -- and we have the origins of phenomenology here -- to realize that meanings and values were immediately available to man as a Being-in-the-world:

Therefore this thing-in-itself must express its inner nature and character in the world of experience; consequently it must be possible to interpret these from it, and indeed from the material, not the mere form, of experience. Accordingly, philosophy is nothing more but the correct and universal understanding of experience itself, the interpretation of meaning and content. ¹⁷

Note the words "correct understanding" and "interpretation." We must now give some content to his hermeneutical apparatus. Schopenhauer did so by turning to feelings as that bodily faculty in which the truth of our perceptions was grounded. He was acutely aware that from the point of view of reason, "feeling has only a negative content."¹⁸ But Schopenhauer found reason to be rather perspectival and one-sided, "strange as it may sound," and guilty of a pride which fostered crude ignorance,

since it classifies under the one concept of feeling every modification of consciousness which does not belong directly to its own method of representation, in other words, which is not abstract concept.¹⁹

The fact of the matter for Schopenhauer was that feeling constituted the ground "of all knowledge, of all truth, of which we are at first conscious only intuitively, but which we have not yet formulated into abstract concepts."²⁰ He rejected as

pedantry any theoretical maxims, rationally constructed and removed from the reality of daily living, which presumed to guide human conduct with absolute values (Kant's Categories being a case in point.) Ethical behavior, maintained Schopenhauer, as opposed to rigid and sterile dogma,

happens in accordance with feelings, that is to say, not precisely according to concepts, but to ethical worth and quality. . . . Conduct in the end pursues its own course independently of [dogmas], usually in accordance not with abstract, but with unspoken maxims, the expression of which is precisely the whole man himself.²¹

This insistence on feelings and the whole man, of course, returns us foursquare to the body, the instincts, and the Will. With this move, Kantian metaphysics was regrounded, to extend the metaphor, in "earth."

To take a concrete example of what Schopenhauer has in mind with this dichotomizing of reason and experience, we shall examine his categories of concept and Idea. This reminds us at once of the distinction Kant drew with his aesthetic idea, but it becomes clear that Schopenhauer broadened its base. "The concept," he tell us,

is abstract, discursive, wholly undetermined within its sphere, determined only by its limits, attainable and intelligible only to him who has the faculty of reason, communicable by words without further assistance, entirely exhausted by its definition.²²

The concept is "dead," "barren," incapable of producing new knowledge, a mere, though not on that account unhelpful, "receptacle."

On the other hand the Idea,

definable perhaps as the adequate representative of the concept, is absolutely perceptive, and although representing an infinite number of individual things, is yet thoroughly definite.²³

By insisting on the perceptive nature of Ideas, Schopenhauer grounds them in experience and hence in the body, Will and earth. It is only because Ideas derive from this fertile matrix that Schopenhauer can claim that an Idea "is like a living organism, developing itself and endowed with generative force, which brings forth that which was not previously put into it."²⁴ Ideas can be the source of such creativity only because any phenomenal reality which we might constitute is only one possible combination of relations. But Ideas are the set of all possible relations. As the "permanent, unchangeable forms," Ideas make up "the sum of all relations of an object.

The Idea is the root point of all these relations, and thus the complete and perfect phenomenon, the adequate objectivity of the will at this stage of its phenomenal appearance.²⁵

It should be understood, however, that for Schopenhauer Ideas were out of space and time, and in no wise could be envisioned as a tangible image of things. In this sense, they are very far from the Platonic Ideas to which Schopenhauer ostensibly attributed them. Ideas are rather something purer, closer to the reality of the thing in itself. Examples include force, gravity and causality. Such entities are totally divorced from the particular because they include the possibility of all particulars. As Wittgenstein later observed, "the law of causality is not a law, but the form of a law,"²⁶ which is then filled out by the particulars of Newtonian physics. Nevertheless, Ideas do not go so far in the opposite direction as to "reveal the being-in-itself of things, but only their objective character, and thus always the phenomenon."²⁷ The

notion of Idea thus stands between the imagery of Platonic Forms and the ineffability of the thing in itself. One might even say that Schopenhauer's Ideas are analogous to archetypes.²⁸

Let us recall how careful we were to specify archetypes as "patterns of organization which translate pure intention into plastic form." (supra, p. 44) The archetype, like the Schopenhauerian Idea, organizes and gives form to, just as the law of causality helps to structure our world. What is organized, namely the pure intention or instinct, is just as ineffable for Jung as the thing in itself was for Schopenhauer. And neither the archetype nor the Idea are in themselves concrete images. Both must be filled out with a specific content. To paraphrase Wittgenstein, the archetype of the child is not a psychology, but the form of a psychology, to be filled out by the particulars of Freudian theory. And neither Newtonian physics nor Freudian theory exhaust these fundamental forms which they embrace.

By calling Ideas universalialia ante rem (as opposed to concepts, which were universalialia post rem), and thereby grounding truth in the possibility of bodily experience, Schopenhauer accomplished a revolution in European philosophical thinking about the locus of truth. In what Karsten Harries calls Schopenhauer's "inversion" of the Platonic cosmos, the categories of experience and truth were kept, but were now turned upside down.²⁹ For the first time in the modern era, metaphysics entertained the possibility that truth might not reside in the higher, ethereal realm of the disembodied spirit, but below, in the dank morass of an instinctual body.

What is especially remarkable about this move is that once again the philosopher found himself turning to art to best illustrate his claims. This time, however, art was not seen as a unique realm, to which the special status of idea was confined, as with Kant. Schopenhauer simply regarded art as most demonstrative of a basic relationship which governed all human knowledge. For the artist was merely that man who immersed himself most fully in experience.

This immersion, this opening up to the world, revealed a certain truth. But such artistic truth remained suspect from reason's point of view, because it was somehow "virtual" and "implicit," or worst of all, unspoken:

Just because the Idea is and remains perceptive, the artist is not conscious in abstracto of the intention and aim of his work. [Nor for that matter is the viewer!] Not a concept but an Idea is present in his mind; hence he cannot give an account of his actions. He works, as people say, from mere feelings and unconsciously, indeed instinctively.³¹

So we see that the artist, as unwitting interpreter of Ideas, stands in a privileged relation to his audience, the common-sense world of reason. He translates, as it were, artistic truth by giving form to Ideas. By rendering material expression to Ideas, he serves to remind us of our sources. It is the artist's genius to transcend his own personal point of view and allow himself to be guided by a deeper truth. And insofar as that truth escapes us in the very mystery of our own body and instincts, of our own being, thus does it suggest a key step on the way to Jung's symbolic/archetypal truth.

Nietzsche

In 1872, a twenty-eight year old professor of philosophy at the University of Basel, who had never even written his dissertation, published a little book on Greek drama. His name was Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), his book was entitled The Birth of Tragedy, and despite its youthful exuberance and brevity, it launched him forthwith into the intellectual scene as European culture's most formidable critic. Unlike Kant or Schopenhauer before him, to whom he was admittedly indebted,³² Nietzsche forewent a rigorous and elaborate metaphysical superstructure in which to couch his ideas. Instead, faithful to the theme of art which dominated his book, he relied from the start upon metaphor, specifically mythic imagery, to carry the weight of his arguments and speak with Authority. And what aspect of contemporary Western civilization was he criticizing? Fourteen years later he explained that the problem with which the book dealt was "the problem of science itself."³³ How odd, in a book on Greek drama!

To see how Nietzsche arrived at such a position, let us consider for a moment the book's characters and plot. We are introduced straightaway to Apollo and Dionysus, clearly intended to represent metaphysical categories. Apollo, god of reason and ^{the} principium individuationis, is moreover god of (artistic) form. It is he that governs the world of imagery, of illusion (Schein), of dreams. He is the soothsaying god, and sees the truth by means of his "sunlike" eyes. His element is light; his affect, joy.

Opposed to Apollo is Dionysus, god of chaos, drink,

and the dissolution of the individual. He is the god of matter, matter which resists ever yielding its ultimate secrets to form and transparency. He is a dumb god whose truths are unspoken. He conceals; his time is the night. His art form is music, escaping all images. His affect is either terror or "blissful ecstasy."

Nietzsche's thesis, if we may make so bold as to simplify and psychologize it, is that something very special happened in the history of Western culture when Attic tragedy flourished. The Greek dramatists succeeded for the first time in uniting the instinctual, meaningful, unconscious side of human life with the necessary symbolic and artistic articulation of ego consciousness. Heretofore these two realms had been unequally related, the unconscious having literally to force itself upon the forms of ego consciousness and thus robbing consciousness of its potential autonomy.³⁴ The marvel of the Greek experience was the birth of the Apollonian ego, which no longer satisfied itself with the mere molding and manipulating of external reality by waking consciousness. Exercising a new found dream consciousness, the Apollonian ego now dared to approach the Dionysian realm as well, and actively participate in it. Such an Apollonian ego, coupled intimately with its own bodily Dionysian roots, constitutes the third character in Nietzsche's story: the new artist. In such a man,

Through Apollonian dream-inspiration, his own state, i.e. his own oneness with the inmost ground of the world [Dionysus], is revealed to him in a symbolical dream image.³⁵

What makes this new artist so unique is that he creates symbols consciously. Greek drama surpasses the earlier Dionysian rituals from which it derives just here on the touchstone of consciousness. For Greek drama is not a mindless ecstasy nor a mythology lacking an interpretation. Rather, it represents the triumph of consciousness in taking that first step toward joining with the unconscious collaboratively. Apollo, the dream-interpreter, makes possible the illusion (Schein), the symbolic representation, of a content which is otherwise incompatible with, and therefore unavailable to, consciousness. That Dionysus

appears at all, with such epic precision and clarity is the work of the dream interpreter, Apollo, who through this symbolic appearance interprets to the chorus its Dionysian state.³⁶

Nevertheless, the Dionysian, the unspeakable, ultimately escapes our direct perception. To "perceive" the Dionysian directly would be to lose oneself and one's consciousness in it. It is in this sense that Nietzsche can maintain that "the symbolic image of the myth saves us from the immediate perception of the highest world-idea."³⁷ For example, we as spectators are saved from the very horror that we witness as Pentheus and his mother lose themselves in the immediacy of the unconscious and the power of Dionysus. The symbol is that "glorious Apollonian illusion [which] makes it appear as if. . ."³⁸ Symbolic truth is "as if" we were returning to the source of all creativity without in fact regressing to the dissolution of the ego in the primary process.

In order to appreciate fully the task which the symbol accomplishes, we must say something more about this Dionysian

realm besides characterizing it as dangerous, obscure, but creative. To begin with, it surely includes Freud's instincts (Triebe), if we hold the Dionysian to be the reality in which the Apollonian illusion is grounded. In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche admonishes us about the true nature of reality:

Let us assume that nothing is 'given' as real except our world of desires and passions, that we cannot step down or step up to any kind of 'reality' except the reality of our drives (Triebe) -- for thinking is nothing but the interrelation and interaction of our drives.³⁹

But this cannot be all there is to the Dionysian, for such an account fails to explain the tremendum, the speechless awe, the reverent silence, which is demanded before Dionysus. It also leaves unclarified that strange requirement that Dionysus only be experienced as illusion. What is so awesome and mysterious about mere drives, after all? Have we not succeeded today in physiologizing them to the limbic system, mere circuits to be controlled at will? Surely they can still compel us, but do we not now truly see through them?

We take as our clue here another passage in Beyond Good and Evil, in which Nietzsche describes the body as "nothing but a social structure of many souls."⁴⁰ This is not a mere metaphorical repetition of what he said about drives. Something new has been added here. The metaphor reminds us of Jung and suggests a radical personification of the instinctual complexes into daimones. As is clear from the dream-visions of Zarathustra, as well as from his personal biography, Nietzsche constellated for himself a symbolic world of gods in which his ego, as ideal tragic artist, succeeded in confronting cooperatively and creatively the power of his drives (Triebe). Much

of Zarathustra in particular is reminiscent of active fantasy, in Jung's specific sense. And as James Hillman stresses,⁴¹ what makes such a confrontation of consciousness with the unconscious possible is just this move to the personified, to regarding complexes first as "souls," to use Nietzsche's term, then as souls in a community alien to the ego, next as souls in a community which includes the ego, and finally as gods, which in that peculiarly Greek manner, have discourse with men.

Yet there remains an enigma. Despite the images, we know that something remains hidden. Indeed, as we learn from the theme of Metamorphoses, the gods are forever changing form and disguising themselves. This seems essential to them, as Nietzsche intimates when he observes that "everything deep loves masks; the deepest things have a veritable hatred of image and likeness."⁴² It is almost as though the bright light of Apollonian consciousness, which makes images possible, at the same time blots out some crucial truth. Nietzsche expresses this metaphorically:

There are countless dark bodies which must be inferred to lie near the sun; we shall never be able to see them. Among ourselves, that is a parable: a moral psychologist reads the whole language of the stars as only an allegorical and symbolic language. Many things can be kept dark with it.⁴³

In Zarathustra Nietzsche again tantalizes us with another, similar trope. Addressing the sky, he once more speaks of how the stars are lost with the onset of the dawn's light:

The [god's own] beauty veils the god: thus do you [the sky] hide your stars.⁴⁴

What does it mean that god's beauty should veil him? Why should personifying a power and thus masking it be necessary?

Is it not precisely because we, as human beings capable of love, are fascinated by the other? And in such fascination fall prey to the other's power? The genius of the god is not so much the fact that he hides behind the mask, as that we are compelled to look into it, seeking ourselves and thus losing ourselves like Narcissus before his reflection.⁴⁵ Only with masks can the gods, far from fleeing us, first come catch the attention and interest of consciousness. This is the import of Nietzsche's description of Dionysus as never "looking a look in which there is not some hind-sight,

some complexity of allure, whose craftsmanship includes knowing how to be an illusion -- not an illusion of what he is, but of what constitutes one more compulsion upon his followers to follow him ever more intimately and thoroughly.⁴⁶

And yet once again we ask, given this need to disguise, what could it be that would exert such a claim on man? Surely the concept of instinct, which exerts its will heedless of consciousness, is not enough here. Only man's very being itself could, and needs to, compel man's consciousness so totally. To quote Heidegger, only man (Dasein) is that being for whom being is an issue. Only man is compelled to fundamental ontology, which is the essence of metaphysics. And Nietzsche, too, gives us this answer. Even in The Birth of Tragedy he singles out the Dionysian dream image as belonging to "that mysterious ground of our being of which we are the phenomenon."⁴⁷ This remarkable passage substantiates our interpretation: the god's claim on man rests most profoundly on the mystery of being.

But further, Nietzsche makes an astonishing reversal

of the familiar mirror metaphor, where consciousness is usually depicted as seeking itself in the god's mask, as though the mask were a mirror. The deeper truth is that consciousness is but a reflection of Being: "we are the phenomenon." Psychologically, this is what is meant when Jung says that the ego (consciousness) is really that complex which allows the Self to contemplate itself. The ego, Jung writes,

Is a relatively constant personification of [the totality of] the unconscious itself. . . the Schopenhauerian mirror in which the unconscious becomes aware of its own face.⁴⁸

This echoes a similar interpretation by Nietzsche. Immediately after the passage in Beyond Good and Evil in which he describes the ego's desire for the illusion as a way of discovering its reflection, Nietzsche abruptly reverses the polarity of the dynamic. With the introduction of the "genius of the heart," he reconceives the ego, no longer as the active source of the image, but as the passive mirror in which the essence of being can be reflected. The image itself, the natural illusion, now becomes the source, to be reflected in the mirror of consciousness. This is "the genius of the heart,

which renders dumb all that is loud and complaisant, teaching it how to listen, which smoothes rough souls and creates a taste in them for a new desire: to lie still like a mirror so that the deep sky might be reflected in them.⁴⁹

Here we find at last an appropriate explanation for the long misunderstood nature of Dionysus. Truly he is mysterious and unfathomable, unspeakable, hiding behind images. But this is not to be accounted for by facile analogies to the

Gordian knot of the mind-body problem, or to the over-valuation by infantile love. The mystery of Being, "of which we are the phenomenon," cannot be dismissed so easily by adults. The fact is that we exist as Dasein. We are aware that we exist and are forever caught up in the co-mirroring of Dasein in Being and Being in Dasein. This is the unspeakable, "das Unausprechbare," before which even a god blushes with modesty: the shame and modesty before the other, "die Sham zu zweien."⁵⁰

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As a contrapuntal harmony to underscore our theme, let us return to the plot of The Birth of Tragedy where we left it. We had introduced Apollo, Dionysus, and the Tragic Artist, and had followed their triumphant synthesis through Nietzsche's later works. But why did we need to use Nietzsche as the exemplar? He lived 2300 years after the origin of Greek tragedy. If his thesis is correct, should there not have been a great deal of tragedy written in the ensuing ages? To explain this enormous hiatus, we must now take note of the last character's arrival on our stage: Socrates. For it is Socrates whom Nietzsche accuses of having cut short this portentous flowering of Greek art. The greatest spirit of the West, the creator of the scientific attitude, is calumniated mercilessly by Nietzsche as the murderer of the tragic artists' special soul. Though the scion of Apollo, Socrates did not understand him. He mistook Apollo's light for the truth, and was therefore blinded by it. Socrates succumbed to the hubris of consciousness, and proclaimed that "to be good,

everything must be conscious."⁵¹ Far from admiring the synthesis of the ego and the unconscious achieved by the Tragic Artist's soul, he derided him for practicing his craft "only by instinct." So long as poets relied on instinct, there remained a mystery and a threat to consciousness. But Socrates would have none of this. His hubris rested on his "faith in the explicability of nature and in nature as a panacea." Such pride was nonetheless a flight into fantasy, no matter how much it stressed consciousness, because it covered up the tenuousness which is the lot of ego consciousness. It covered up the anxiety of Dasein before Death with "the delusion of being able . . . to heal the eternal wound of existence (Dasein).⁵²

How Nietzsche raged against Socrates! How he raged against modern scientism, Socrates' heir! And how he would have raged against any current psychology which dares presume to fill in the mystery of human existence with predictive formulae, chemicals, or even literalistic and concretized "symbols." All such attempts can only lead to a fundamental inversion of the natural order of things, an inversion which Nietzsche saw had indeed already come about in his time. Note his succinct description of a 20th century neurosis:

While in all productive men it is instinct that is the creative-affirmative force, and consciousness acts critically and dissuasively, in Socrates it is instinct that becomes the critic, and consciousness that becomes the creator -- truly a monstrosity per defectum.⁵³

And what indeed does happen as "instinct becomes the critic" if not the development of the symptom as Freud first identified it? The symptom, that remorseless if not humorous commentator

on our daily lives, gives lie to the illusion of omniscience and omnipotence of our ego consciousness.

Nietzsche felt that in the long run Socrates, no more than any other man, could not escape death, and so would be forced to acknowledge the inauthenticity of his claim for the world's transparency. In his groping attempts to learn to play a musical instrument, Nietzsche saw in the doomed Socrates a last minute turning toward the unconscious. He began to express a dim insight into the richness which he had dismissed with such hauteur. "Perhaps," says Socrates,

what is not intelligible to me is not necessarily unintelligent: Perhaps there is a realm of wisdom from which the logician is exiled? Perhaps art is even a necessary correlative of, and supplement for, science?⁵⁴

And yet in the end, what guarantee does Socrates have? Can it not be objected that all that is proved by this fable is the crushing power of death that turns even the greatest of men into children? What basis do we really have for believing that the unconscious, the myth, the illusion are finally anything more than a thin gruel and sop to solace men in their despair? Can we not say with the disenchanted Faust,

Welch Schauspiel! Aber ach! ein Schauspiel nur! (I, 1. 454)

This charge of mere aestheticism constitutes perhaps the most trenchant attack on Nietzsche's Tragic Artist, and on Jung's doctrine of symbolism as well. Nietzsche was acutely sensitive to the problem of aestheticism from the very beginning. In the first pages of The Birth of Tragedy he observed:

But even when this dream reality is most intense, we still have, glimmering through it, the sensation that it is mere appearance (nur Schein).⁵⁵

We shall refrain from dealing with this problem until after we take up the work of Heidegger. But we can only conclude this section by agreeing that thus far, in Kant, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche, the aesthetic realm has served to ground all the objections and alternatives to the rationality of consciousness. Heidegger's poeticizing will only add fuel to the fire. It remains to be seen how we will ground "mere illusion" in what Karsten Harries calls the authentic "natural illusion."

A CONTEMPORARY: ERNST CASSIRER

The early 20th century may some day come to be known as "The Great Return to Myth." The disappointment and dissatisfaction of modern man with the opulently hollow life passed on to him as the last century's heritage were irretrievably compounded by the sheer horror of the two World Wars. Finding no comfort in the few remaining voices calling for yet more of the same, thinkers sought out their forgotten roots in the distant past. Freud returned to the myth of the child; Jung, to the myth of ancient gods; and Heidegger, to the most originary of all myths, the myth of beginnings: "Der Anfang ist noch."¹ Common to all was a fascination with myth, and perhaps an unwitting tendency to indulge in myth-making as well.

There was nothing capricious, fanciful, or self-indulgent in their return, however, if by that one intends to impugn these men with some infantile flight from reality. Rather, their return represented the completion of efforts begun in the last century to rediscover (and it might be stressed, scientifically) the secrets of history in Greek antiquity, folklore, and classical philology. But although culminating this project, yet at the same time their work marked a profound transformation of the original program as outlined in the Enlightenment. For these new thinkers no longer suffered "the myopia of proximity": they did not seek explicit solutions

from the past. The change so characteristic of the 20th century was a step back to a new, broader self-awareness, a recognition that mythologized history was not to be taken literally. Instead, the new consciousness perceived the core truth of myth not in the work itself, but in the very fact that man took that work so seriously; not in the perceived object, but in the motivated perceiver.

We find an appropriate example of this transformation in the Neo-Kantian philosophy of Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945). In his famous opus, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, he devoted an entire volume to the question of mythology. A prodigious scholar of the past century's historical, philological, and anthropological investigations, he set out to reinterpret its findings in the self-conscious spirit of the new age. And although it may be unfair to saddle him with the assuredly unwanted epithet of "psychologist," I nevertheless hope to show how, in his attempt to understand myth "from the inside" as symbol, Cassirer essentially recapitulated the psychological move of Jung. A contemporary of Jung's, Cassirer stands out as the clearest philosophical parallel to Jung, operating with a more or less identical ontology. In his writing we find insights analogous to Jung's, only slightly altered by way of vocabulary and source material. It is this unspoken kinship of ideas which best illustrates the idea of Zeitgeist which we have been pursuing.

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Cassirer began by stating the challenge posed by myth:

Myth became a problem for philosophy insofar as it expresses an original direction of the human spirit, an independent configuration of man's consciousness.²

To conceive of myth as an "independent configuration" immediately calls our attention to something unique in Cassirer's point of view. He takes exception with all interpretations that would reduce myth to primitive science (Max Mueller), social euhemerism (Graves), or the reflection of a particular collectivity (Durkheim). On the other hand, he does not relegate myth to the status of fiction, devoid of all reality:

The philosophical understanding of myth begins with the insight that it does not move in a purely invented or made-up world, but has its own mode of necessity and therefore in accordance with the idealist concept of the object, its own mode of reality.³

Such a point of view leads to two alternative approaches to the material. Either one can disengage from this "mode of reality" and try to place it in a wider context, or one can enter into it and experience it for itself. The first alternative leads, among other things, to structuralism.⁴ The second leads first to a mystical participation in the myth, and then subsequently, with greater self-awareness, to psychology. It is this second move which will interest us here.

Cassirer used the German Romantic philosopher Friedrich Schelling (1775-1854) to exemplify the preliminary stage of direct engagement in the myth. Schelling defined myth in a most thought-provoking way when he said that "mythology is recognized in its truth."⁵ He approached the myth by way of tautegorical interpretation, looking

upon mythical figures as autonomous configurations of the human spirit, which one must understand from within by knowing the way in which they take on meaning and form.⁶

The truth of a myth did not depend upon a rational translation of a meaning, bringing forth a dark secret into the light of day. On the contrary, the truth of myth was experienced immediately, in its own terms:

The [mythological] process consists not merely of represented potencies, but of those very potencies which create consciousness . . . and are actual powers.⁷

As Cassirer explains,

The phenomenon which is here to be considered is not the mythical content as such, but the significance it possesses for human consciousness and the power it exerts on consciousness. The problem is not the material content of mythology, but the intensity with which it is experienced, with which it is believed -- as only something endowed with objective reality can have . . . It is a real force that seizes upon consciousness in myth, i.e. a force that is not within its control.⁸

We see here at once just how far such a vision differs from the structuralist alternative. First, there is the fundamental question of attitude as we have developed it earlier in this essay. Just as on the one hand Lévi-Strauss seeks relentlessly to divest himself of the last shreds of tenacious meaning that might still cling to his perspective, so Schelling on the other hand plunges into the morass of personalizations, intuitions and insights which bind him inextricably to the immediacy of the myth. Second, there arises the issue of "the ego alien." Where Lévi-Strauss demonstrates the inexorable subordination of human and natural reality to the logical power of the human mind (translated here as ego), Schelling freely submits himself to the higher irrationality which compels man without his understanding it. Lastly, we confront the problem of affect. The world of Lévi-Strauss manages to reduce reality to the cold abstraction of dialectical thought, while Schelling con-

cedes that to be real and to be emotionally effective amount to the same thing.⁹ Lévi-Strauss fails to account for why myths should matter so much, and this is precisely what Schelling's "proto-Dionysian" explanation is concerned with.

As suggested above, the difficulty inherent in Schelling's understanding of mythical phenomena derives from his all too ready willingness to collapse myth and reality into a literal unity. His argument for the value of myth rests on the contention that "myth is a form of life," and life for Schelling "is neither subjective nor objective, but stands on the exact borderline between the two; it is a realm of indifference between subjective and objective."¹⁰ Life is an objectification, a necessary development of, the absolute:

The mythic process is a theogonic process: one in which God himself becomes, by creating himself step by step as the true God.¹¹

With this move, Schelling threatens to abandon his status as critic for the more engaging role of mystic.

This is of course not to denigrate mysticism per se, which is a perfectly valid form of thought. However, one cannot help but feel that Schelling strands his readers in a compromised position. Although promising in his role as philosopher to clarify, he in fact fails to take consciousness far enough, and instead sinks back into unconsciousness, or more precisely, the unself-consciousness which is the participation mystique of the "savage mind." Genuine mythical consciousness leaves no room for reflection, for understanding, because the ego has dispersed itself in the world such that, as Cassirer puts it, "it is bound by its mere facticity."¹²

The mythic world is so exceptionlessly concrete "because in it the two factors, thing and signification, are undifferentiated."¹³ Schelling recognized the essence of the borderline concept, but neglected to lay emphasis on the indispensable contribution of an actively collaborating self-consciousness. It was a fault of Romantics generally, and one for which the Apollonian side of Nietzsche justly took them to task.¹⁴

Cassirer's own refinement of Schelling's groundbreaking work focused on this thorny issue of consciousness. Cassirer, too, regarded the history of mythology as the gradual unfolding and self-expression of human spirit. But he saw as its telos, not the mystical submersion of man into the oneness of the world, but the progressive differentiation and heightening of human consciousness, as befits a Neo-Kantian:

Thus, although myth, language, and art interpenetrate one another in their concrete historical manifestations, the relation between them reveals a definite systematic gradation, an ideal progression toward a point where the spirit not only is and lives in its own creations, its self-created symbols, but also knows them for what they are.¹⁵

A crucial move in Cassirer's interpretation was his insight that the very motivation for this differentiation toward consciousness lay with the mythic image itself. It was the power of the symbol which called ego consciousness to itself and its own true task, that of self-reflection:

The mythical image seems not solely to designate already existing differences, but also to fixate them for consciousness, to make them visible as such: it does not merely reproduce existing distinctions, but in the strict sense evokes distinctions.¹⁶

So Cassirer, too, came out in favor of the priority of the unconscious, even while granting full credit to the higher goal of consciousness. Moreover, Cassirer, like Jung, inden-

tified the locus of this transformation out of the unconsciousness of the mythic world in religion:

Religion takes the decisive step that is essentially alien to myth: in its use of sensuous images and signs it recognizes them as such -- a means of expression which, though they reveal a determinate meaning, must necessarily remain inadequate to it, which point to this meaning but never wholly exhaust it.¹⁷

The function of symbols is consciousness making, understood with the proviso that, to quote Heidegger, all revealing at the same time conceals. Cassirer clearly articulates this paradoxical function when he quotes from a contemporary of Hölderlin's, Friedrich H. Jacobi (1801):

Always there is something between us and the true essence: feeling, image, and word. Everywhere we see only something that is hidden; but that hidden thing we see and sense. For what is seen and surmised, we set the word, the living word, as a sign. There lies the dignity of the word. It does not itself reveal, but it shows revelation, consolidates it, and helps to disseminate it.¹⁸

The profound insight of this passage must not be lost to the reader. We have here an extremely condensed but complete expression of a whole metapsychology. As with Freud, Jacobi identifies affects and words as principal representatives of the unknown.¹⁹ As with Jung, he also stresses the priority of the image, since we see first, and only afterwards set into words. A paraphrase might run as follows:

Consciousness is indifferent to the world except insofar as it is affected by it, as when instinct or external reality intrude upon it.²⁰ Such intrusion "first of all and most of the time" takes the form of visual imagery, either real or fantasy. Only as the last and highest achievement of consciousness does the word come to fix such meaning-laden images in a referential context which makes it generally available to others.²¹

Cassirer prepares the way in his own thinking for such a formulation when he identifies the specifically human quality of consciousness as its capacity to be affected and moved by what is new. In his discussion of consciousness he explains the phenomena of mana and taboo, those two pre-eminently emotive structures of primitive life, as "a primary interjection of the mythical consciousness," a "cry of mythical emotion" originating from the discovery of something new, extraordinary, unusual or uncommon. The making conscious of what was previously unknown and unconscious is first of all a felt experience. To be sure, in lower biological systems, based on the reflex arc model, such experience is usually negative. The new is what interferes with equilibrium and is therefore unpleasant. And thus far we are in keeping with Freud. But for Cassirer, what distinguishes the uniquely human quality of such an encounter is the possibility for a positive relation to the new, as opposed to simply repressing or otherwise avoiding it:

When mere bestial terror becomes an astonishment moving in a two-fold direction, composed of opposite emotions -- fear and hope, awe and admiration -- when sensory agitation thus seeks for the first time an issue and an expression, man stands on the threshold of a new spirituality. It is this characteristic spirituality which is in a sense reflected in the idea of the sacred.²²

Cassirer then goes on to elaborate how next imagery and then verbalization follow in turn upon this initial, affective, coming into consciousness. We can now begin to appreciate the deeper rationale for Cassirer's above-mentioned emphasis on religion. There seems to be something "wonder"-ful that devolves upon this coming into consciousness, something that

cannot be taken for granted, and it is in the context of religious symbols that the first explicit self-consciousness of this event finds expression.

Cassirer takes great pains to give concrete examples of this symbolizing trend in religion. He notes that many, if not all, great religions began with a pointed and self-conscious rejection of the "natural," i.e. mythical, religions from which they sprang. Thus we find that the familiar insistence on destroying images in early Jewish, Persian-Iranian, Hindu and Buddhist doctrine, can be interpreted as an attempt to de-literalize mythological consciousness. (And as we have noted in Part I, the Freudian emphasis on the word, at the expense of the dream-, obsessional-, or fantasy-image per se, also serves this same purpose of lysing frozen and misunderstood representations, thereby making that which they stand for psychologically more accessible.) Cassirer notes that Christianity, especially in the form of medieval Catholicism, attempted an even more daring experiment in consciousness raising, for instead of banishing its pagan roots, it celebrated them in the most glorious of artistic, architectural, and even liturgical forms. In so doing, it risked possible misinterpretation by illiterate peasants, whose mythological consciousness would continue to take Christian symbols literally. Thus it happened for example that a powerful anima symbol in the form of the Virgin degenerated into an unconscious pagan cult rooted in the Demeter myth of antiquity. Still, the risk was well worth it, because for those few who could transcend mythological consciousness, the rich and pregnant imagery of the Church

served as the nidus around which to spin genuine symbols. Dante's vision culminated this episode of Christian symbolic consciousness-making, and is the most striking example of what Cassirer means by religious self-consciousness.

Finally, again echoing Jung, Cassirer speculates that the function of myth and therefore of symbol might be intimately connected to the very essence of human being. It is in the nature of man to be fundamentally hidden from himself. Cassirer envisions human existence (Dasein) as a profoundly meaningful event in the history of Being, but one which is forever threatening to cut itself off from itself. Thus can he suggest that "the I," and here we might instead read Jung's "Self,"

creates for itself a kind of opposite in its own products which seem to it wholly objective. And it can contemplate itself only in this kind of projection. . . . Man can apprehend and know his own being only insofar as he can make it visible in the image of his gods. . . . He draws from his spiritual creations -- language, myth, and art -- the objective standards by which to measure himself as an independent cosmos with its peculiar structural flaws.²³

With this statement, Cassirer transcends the literalism of Schelling and moves into the domain of psychology, or philosophical anthropology, if you prefer (as Heidegger does.)²⁴

And so to conclude, we recognize a familiar theme in Cassirer's arguments. He, too, refuses to dismiss the fascination with myth in the 20th century as mere atavism or cowardice. Cassirer valorizes mythology and religion as fundamental steps on the road to consciousness, and with Jung, never severs their vital link with the unconscious. And thinking these thoughts, he becomes another member in our growing family of thinkers.

HEIDEGGER AND THE NEW ONTOLOGY

In arriving at the figure of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) we come to the synthesis of this essay. The long discourse on the unknowable, the perplexing reservations about interpretation, the historical account of antecedent philosophers -- all this should now be reconsidered in the light of our discussion of Heidegger's work. It will become apparent that in many respects Heidegger's thinking shares enough in common with Jung's that the two men must be classed in the same intellectual milieu. I hope to reveal the remarkable confluence of their Weltanschauungen, as well as of the metaphors upon which they rely, in spite of their disparate backgrounds and methodologies.

Interestingly, Heidegger has experienced a fate similar to Jung (and to a lesser extent, Freud) in the collective judgment of our time, enjoying initial acclaim, followed by a measure of disenchantment. Making his debut in 1927 with the publication of Being and Time, Heidegger at once rose to prominence as a critic of modern European culture, describing with detached reserve the profound misconception of human nature and of man's experience in the world which had made possible the technological nightmare of World War I. Writing in post-war Germany, Heidegger could not fail to have appreciated the deep-seated alienation of a people whose only apparent recourse

in the face of disaster was to rebuild once again upon the very principles which had set the stage for tragedy in the first place. Like Jung, he announced a return to the "true" self, and proposed a solution to the dilemma of a dehumanized society by recalling men to what it is to be authentically in the world. He received immediate recognition from Continental philosophers, notably the young Sartre, who in Being and Nothingness, a take-off on Being and Time, went on to found the school of existential philosophy. Similarly did Ludwig Binswanger reconceive a portion of Heidegger's work in his Being-in-the-World and thereby begin the school of existential psychoanalysis.

But wherever post-empiricist, analytical philosophy has flourished, especially in the United States, Heidegger has been regarded in most academic circles as anything from an anachronism, a quaint holdover from 19th century transcendental philosophy, to a raving mystic, whose presumption to speak about what Wittgenstein definitively outlawed as non-discussable relegates him to the status of an illogical, word-mongering, fuzzy thinker. (One also hears Jung cast in this same mold all too often.) There has been a tendency to purge current American philosophy of this dangerous Heideggerian element, which threatens to corrupt innocent students. Analytic philosophy -- truly a philosophy of inauthenticity in the descriptive sense -- continues to assure us that not only can we no longer do metaphysics in the modern era, but that we do not need to and thus should not want to. It asserts that all relevant problems can be solved by a careful inspection of how we use everyday words, and if anyone is left dissatisfied, he

will surely, as the malcontent in Nietzsche's "Last Man," take himself voluntarily to the madhouse. For naturally, he, too, will see how unreasonable his dissatisfaction is . . .

Likewise is Jung's psychology of the depths dispensed with by contemporary psychiatry. Even Freud's depth psychology has suffered from a certain "refinement." After an initial flurry of excitement created by the early Freud's discovery of the unconscious, psychiatry slowly but relentlessly moved away from its roots in the unconscious, to find refuge in a safer, cleaner, more everyday psychology of the ego.¹ The unique and personal, in the form of dreams and fantasy imagery, ceased to interest a new school whose efforts were directed at bolstering the patient's defenses and restoring him to the strength of the everyday collectivity. And yet today, even that everydayness, which at least gave pretense to granting a certain basic humanity to the patient, is quickly being replaced by a philosophy of the present-at-hand: people are now systems, exhibiting modifiable behavior, to be manipulated by rewards, environment, drugs and surgery. Dreams have been debased to a mere electroencephalographic datum which clinicians are warned not to disturb with REM-blocking drugs. But as to their meaning? Today, the very structure which alone can remove man from his fascination with the world of television and machine, which can throw him back upon his authentic possibility-for-Being-in-the-world -- namely, anxiety -- has begun to crumble before the onslaught of a drug which has come to be the most prescribed compound in the world. Again we hear the echoes of the Last Man:

A little poison now and then: that makes
for pleasant dreams. And a lot of poison at the end,
for a pleasant death.²

Who needs Jung and all his irrelevancies? "Show me the data!"
is the new battle cry, and of course data by definition, as
Heidegger has shown, requires that we continue to think of
people as present-at-hand.³

One could argue that Jung and Heidegger are most
valuable in their critique of 20th century culture, and render
the much needed service of tempering the pretensions of sci-
entific excess. But that will not do, and implies a superficial
reading of both thinkers. For it is not just that some iso-
lated instances of depersonalization and inhumanity occur,
as it were, by accident. Again to quote Nietzsche:

The time is over, when accidents might still
happen to me; and what is it that could still happen
to me now, that would not already by my own?⁴

We must take responsibility for these accidents and admit
that they derive logically and unavoidably from the most fun-
damental of our presuppositions about man and his life. And
such an admission can only lead -- in the honest man -- to a
re-evaluation of those presuppositions. Such a re-evaluation
is reflected in Heidegger's return to "origins" and in Freud's
and Jung's return to the forgotten, repressed, "archaic" uncon-
scious. As we shall try to show, what is more remarkable than
the similarity of Heidegger and Jung in their critique, are
the points in common which their solutions share.

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Heidegger's doctrine of truth remains one of the more controversial ideas in contemporary philosophical debate. Like Jung's positing of an absolutely unknowable unconscious, it confronts rationalists with a brazen challenge to the omnipotence of their method, and considerably shrinks their horizon. To begin with, Heidegger maintained that human consciousness (Dasein), insofar as "it is in such a way as to be its 'there',"⁵ and hence aware of itself as Being-in-the-world, was best described by the metaphorical imagery of light. Although this has its roots in medieval ontology and the lumen naturale, Heidegger made the crucial move of collapsing the traditionally separated light of consciousness and seat of consciousness into one phenomenon:

To say that [Dasein] is 'illuminated' [erleuchtet] means that as Being-in-the-world it is cleared [gelichtet] in itself, not through any other entity, but in such a way that it is itself the clearing. Only for such an entity . . . does that which is present-at-hand become accessible in the light or hidden in the dark. . . . Dasein is its disclosedness.⁶

It follows from this that the very possibility of truth itself is grounded upon Dasein, which "as constituted by disclosedness, is essentially in the truth."⁷ Truth is therefore primarily tied to Dasein's uncovering and not to some absolute state of affairs that exists independently of man's knowledge. Newton's laws, according to Heidegger, were before Newton, but "through Newton the laws became true."⁸

It is interesting to note here just how close Jung comes in paraphrasing this Heideggerian conception of truth. Jung, too, speaks of human existence (Dasein) as the kindling "of a light in the darkness of mere being."⁹ Moreover, he ties the phenomenon of the world to the unique nature of Dasein's

Being-in-the-world:

The self embodies both the aspect of intrinsic being and the aspect of its being known, without which no world exists. . . . If a man succeeded in extinguishing this light [of consciousness], the world would sink into nothingness.¹⁰

Jung, like Heidegger, therefore envisioned a truth for man.

Heidegger offers as "evidence" for this conception of truth an etymological exploration of the early Greek use of the word alethia, which defines the Being-true of logos as "taking entities out of their hiddenness and letting them be seen in their unhiddenness (their uncoveredness)."¹¹ What is important about this definition for our purposes is the stress it lays on the phenomenological, the very visual, roots of our everyday experience of the world. For it underscores the fact that the whole process of judgment which passes for the correspondence theory of truth nowadays -- the logical assertion of an agreeing subject and predicate -- must first and foremost be for consciousness in order for the question of correct or incorrect agreement to be an issue at all. If, for example, we do not see the sexual conflicts of an hysteric, Freud's "primary" truth, we can in no wise judge the "secondary" truth of his assertions about such conflicts. Likewise, and in a more comprehensive sense, it echoes the Gestaltist arguments of Kuhn in maintaining that the most fundamental characteristic of scientific truth is not the whole chain of logical assertions which ties a system together, but the paradigm, which, modeled explicitly after visual phenomena,¹² reveals the object of study in a new way.

This uncovering of truth is not simply a matter of

bringing light to darkness, however. It involves a thoroughgoing transformation of the object before our very eyes, an uncovering of something we always thought we understood. To ponder the surprise of someone who after years of seeing a rabbit in our rabbit-duck example, now suddenly sees a duck, will amplify our meaning here -- providing, that is, that one is open to the wonder of the event.¹³

It may be objected here that the foregoing is obvious (if not too obvious?), but that all that really matters for the correspondence theory of truth is the logical agreement of terms in the assertion, once we are "underway." Heidegger blocks this mode of retreat, however, by posing the question, "What is agreement?":

Every agreement, and therefore 'truth' as well, is a relation. But not every relation is an agreement. A sign points at what is indicated. Such indicating is a relation, but not an agreement of the sign with what is indicated.¹⁴

One cannot escape the problematics of ontology. Agreement (between artificial structures of consciousness and nature, as in scientific laws, for example) presupposes the more fundamental relation of Dasein and World. And that relation is precisely Being-in [-the-world].

Now this relation of Being-in is rather peculiar, for have we not already claimed that Being-in as conceived by Heidegger involves the collapse of the subject and object of consciousness into one another? If Dasein is uncovering, how can we speak of relation?

To account for this we must now recall that Heidegger makes covering-up equiprimordial (gleichursprünglich) with

uncovering. Because "to Dasein's state of Being belongs falling . . . its state of Being is such that it is in untruth."¹⁵ Hence logos becomes "that way of being in which Dasein can either uncover or cover up. This double possibility is what is distinctive in the Being-true of the logos."¹⁶

There are two ways of interpreting this statement. First of all it implies the unavoidable degeneration of authenticity into inauthenticity as characterized by the structure of falling. The magic of the moment when even so trivial a truth as the "appearance" of the duck is revealed to us can never be grasped and kept. Immediately the new perception becomes one among many, associates with other experiences and is located in a referential net which binds it to the everyday. Soon it becomes the way to see the figure, and as such now serves in turn to cover-up whatever other possibilities lie potentially within that collection of lines.

Secondly, and harkening back to Nietzsche, one comes to regard truth as a perspective, as a sign pointing toward what is indicated. As the innumerable (and contradictory!) truths of historical Dasein prove only too well, the being-uncovering of Dasein at any particular time and place in history has never amounted to more than a partial uncovering. Truth is always relative to the perspective of a particular Dasein. Newton's physics is no less true for Heidegger than Aristotle's or Einstein's. Each one accounts for some aspect of reality at the expense of an equally valid experience of the world.

Uncovering as an event primarily presupposes "the hidden"

as most primordial and therefore never totally uncoverable. This is not to minimize the truth of a particular uncovering in any way. But it does insist on the relative nature of that truth. And it is in this context that we return to the fundamental relation of Dasein's Being-in as uncovering. Dasein's Being-in, is Being-in-truth, but that is so only as long as one also admits to Being-in-untruth. Being-uncovering is inherently perspectival, and in no way can transcend the very hiddenness which its perspective creates: Dasein conceals as it reveals.

Thus the relation which we have been speaking of is one of truth to untruth, of uncovering to covering up -- and if I may be permitted to make the leap -- of consciousness to the unconscious. Fundamental to Dasein and consciousness is this continuous relating of revealed to concealed, of known to unknown. The primordial experience of knowledge does not come from the recognition of logical agreements, but from the more basic confrontation of consciousness with the opacity of nature, an opacity which gives itself to our persistent inquiries only by simultaneously reminding us ever so forcefully of just how much it still withholds.

It is obvious that the concept of "thinking as relation" follows from this account, and that logic, natural science, and structuralism deal with the ontic relationships of known entities. And equally obvious is the observation that by staying on the known, ontic level, there ceases to be a problem of epistemology. But to confine oneself to such a level constitutes a radical (although at times useful and even

necessary) evasion of the ground of Dasein's creativity, the source of its aims and purpose, all of which are only first constellated in the uncertainty of man's original encounter with the world. Let us not be mistaken here: to elect the ontic and avoid the inherent opacity of existence does not "free" man from anything. It by no means dissolves the problem of ontology, as Wittgenstein initially had hoped it would. The choice of covering over man's Being-uncovering is in response to this most primordial uncertainty, and is therefore an explicit recognition of such uncertainty, albeit a negative one. Even by fleeing the ontological into inauthenticity, one succumbs to it in that way, and thereby guarantees its primordially.

So we see that Heidegger arrives at a similar epistemological roadblock to that described by Kant and Jung. But note that this is a similarity of net result only. Although both accounts leave man cut off from the absolute knowability of the unknown, the explanations differ as to how this comes about. For whereas Kant continues the subject-object split which tends to alienate man from Being, and so perpetuates the scientific "truth" of a transcendental logic grounded in the subject's reason, Heidegger gives us a measure of truth which is grounded in the world. By defining Dasein as uncovering, Heidegger gives substance to truth in a way that all logical absolutes cannot: he connects uncovering -- Dasein -- to the truth of the world itself. To be sure, it is not all the truth, but it is a partial one, and as such a totally genuine revelation and self-disclosure of one piece of the world.

Heidegger is a phenomenologist in the only way that really matters: he establishes a ground for man's being in his relation to the world. Granted that this ground is limited, uncertain, even mysterious, nevertheless man's experience of the world not only cannot be denied to him, but serves as the only measure of himself which is appropriate to his existence: it is man's truth.

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From Heidegger's doctrine of truth, let us turn to a second of his themes, the 'between,' das Zwischen. By now this concept should have a familiar air about it for the reader. It has proved to be one of the most characteristic metaphors for the family of thinkers we have been following. For Heidegger, too, this intermediate realm exerted a continual fascination over the years. Fortunately for us, he did not simplify the idea to a formulaic banality, but developed and expanded it over the course of his thinking to include a wide variety of differing applications and readings.

It is perhaps to be expected that a phenomenologist, especially if concerned with the phenomenology of spatiality, would sooner or later be forced to take up the problem of the 'between.' And sure enough, it is in this context of Dasein's experience of "here and there" that Heidegger first announces the notion of the 'between.' He begins by stating the scientific understanding of 'between,' which requires that Dasein (here) and the object (there) both be thought of as something present-at-hand. From this perspective we derive the commonsense view

of distance as objectively measured space. Regarded in this way, "Dasein can subsequently traverse the 'between' of this distance. . ."¹⁷ But this "normal" understanding does not do full justice to the actual experience of space. For in fact it is an illusion to imagine that Dasein itself ever traverses the 'between': a body can close the spatial gap on the object, but Dasein may be "closer to" what is far away (the horizon it is viewing) than to what is "near" (e.g. its eyeglasses). To traverse an objective distance hardly overcomes the 'between,' but only now brings clearly into focus the fact that "the distance itself becomes one which has been desevered*" and is therefore "something that Dasein can never cross over."

Heidegger then offers an alternative explanation of the 'between' in the next chapter, when he analyzes Being-in as such. Again starting from the scientific understanding of subject and object, he asks:

What else is presented with this phenomenon [Being-in] than the commercium which is present-at-hand between a subject present-at-hand and an object present-at-hand? Such an interpretation would come closer to the phenomenal content if we were to say Dasein is the Being of this 'between.'¹

But even this Heidegger presents only as a bad metaphor, dependent on sloppy ontology. He offers it to the reader who is too caught up in the traditional subject-object split to grasp Heidegger's deeper meaning. "What is decisive for ontology," Heidegger goes on to say, "is to prevent the splitting of the phenomenon."¹⁹ For our purposes, however, what is important to note is not whether he succeeds in this ontological task, but how he harps on the metaphor of the 'between,' when he operates within the traditional subject-object context.

If this initial formulation of the 'between' is spatial, Heidegger's reconception of it at a later point in Being and Time is temporal. Heidegger's concern in the second half of this book is to ensure "the possibility of bringing Dasein into view as a whole,"²⁰ upon which depends the whole project of authenticity. But he is now confronted with the problem that his method up to this point, founded upon the phenomenological bedrock of "the everyday," the zunächst und zumeist, seems in itself to bar him from attaining the whole which he seeks. For "everydayness is precisely that Being which is 'between' birth and death,"²¹ and thus does not include the two ends, without which there cannot be a whole.

Heidegger rescues the 'between' by re-evaluating the temporality of Dasein. Noting his emphasis in Part I on Being-towards-death, with its consequent stress on future and possibility, he finds such "facing forward" deficient:

Not only has Being-towards-the-beginning remained unnoticed; but so too, and above all, has the way in which Dasein stretches along between birth and death. The 'connectedness of life,' in which Dasein somehow maintains itself constantly, is precisely what we have overlooked in our analysis of Being-a-whole.²²

This re-visioning of the 'between' as "stretching along" (erstrecken) re-instates the 'between' as a fundamental structure in Heidegger's system. Ontologically, the possibility of Dasein stretching along in such a way implies that "its own Being is constituted in advance as a stretching along: "the 'between' which relates to birth and death already lies in the Being of Dasein."²³ As human beings, birth and death have no meaning for us as mere points in time, a then and a when. Rather,

"factual Dasein exists as born; and as born, it is already dying, in the sense of Being-towards-death." But this is only possible given the analysis in Part I of Dasein as care:

As long as Dasein factually exists, both the 'ends' and their 'between' are, and they are in the only way which is possible on the basis of Dasein's Being as care . . . As care, Dasein is 'the between.'

In this manner, Heidegger reverses the connection of everydayness and the 'between' with which he opened Part II, and instead of despairing at the prospect of the 'between,' now ties the 'between' to nothing less than authenticity itself: "Only that entity which is 'between' birth and death presents the whole which we have been seeking."²⁴ And so once again, and in a much less tentative manner than with the analysis of spatiality, Heidegger raises the 'between' to the status of a fundamental metaphor in his ontology.

It is in the realm of poetry, however, that the 'between' at last finds its ultimate development. By poetry we mean to refer not only to Heidegger's investigation of that particular branch of literature, but also to Heidegger's own work itself. For in his later writing, Heidegger abandons the rigorous analytical style of Being and Time in favor of a freer immersion in the poetic metaphor for its own sake. In the following example, taken from the essay "...Poetically Man Dwells..." (1951), the reader will immediately note the dramatic change in style and tone that permeates the writing:

Only in the realm of sheer toil does man toil for 'merits.' There he obtains them for himself in abundance. But at the same time, in this realm, man is allowed to look up, out of it, through it, toward the divinities. . . . The upward glance spans the between of sky and earth. This between is measured out for the dwelling of man. We now

call the span thus meted out the dimension. . . . The nature of the dimension is the meting out -- which is lightened and so can be spanned -- of the between. . . . Man spans the dimension by measuring himself against the heavenly. Man does not undertake this spanning just now and then; rather, man is man at all only in such spanning. . . . Measure-taking gauges the between, which brings the two, heaven and earth, to one another.²⁵

Despite the change in language, this passage represents a logical progression from the final formulation of the 'between' of Being and Time. In "...Poetically Man Dwells..." the 'between' is again tied to authenticity, but of a slightly different sort. As in Being and Time, the everyday state of man is defined as a dispersal of the Self in the world. This is "the realm of sheer toil"; it is earthbound and draws our gaze down (i.e. fallen). It is the realm of the ready-to-hand and of productivity. But man is also that animal who looks up from his work, who hears himself called to his true Self, a Self which like Nietzsche's finds itself reflected in the sky -- or what is the same thing in German -- in heaven.²⁶

This sky/heaven metaphor recalls the earlier discussion about truth, for it is a powerful symbol of the paradox of how revealing conceals. The sky is the most manifest sight we encounter upon lifting our gaze up from the earth, and heaven is the dwelling place of God. Hence the sky evokes grandeur, vision, and a measure by which man judges his achievements. Nevertheless, for Hölderlin, Heidegger tells us,

God, as the one who he is, is unknown and it is just as this Unknown One that he is the measure of the poet. [But] how can that which by its very nature remains unknown ever become a measure?²⁷

Despite the imminent presence of the sky, to which we look for guidance while on earth, the sky covers up that which we

seek:

What is the measure for human measuring? . . . The measure consists in the way in which the god who remains unknown, is revealed as such by the sky. . . . Thus the unknown god appears as the unknown by way of the sky's manifestness.

Thus, it is not only God, the unconscious, the thing in itself -- whatever you care to call it -- that remains mysterious. God's manifestness as well, the relation of the unconscious to consciousness, is just as problematical. For it is just those things that we are most conscious of and take most for granted that conceal a deeper, but unconscious truth: "What remains alien to the god, the sight of the sky -- that is what is familiar to man."

And this insight forms the basis of Jungian symbolism as well. It is precisely "in the familiar appearances" of conscious imagery that the patient's soul can concoct a metaphorical vessel, "fundamentally alien" to the unconscious content, "to which the invisible imparts itself in order to remain what it is -- unknown." To paraphrase Heidegger, the sole necessity of psychoanalysis is to think one's way soberly into what the patient's symbols say, in order to learn what is unspoken.²⁸

It is also via this metaphor of sky/heaven that we get to the interesting transformation of conscience. From that bodiless abstraction in Being and Time which calls the Self to its Self out of its dispersal in the world, Heidegger has created by way of personification a more immediate source for the Call: the divinities. After all, what is it that dwells in heaven? Clearly, the divinities function analogously to conscience, for as Heidegger tells us, "man spans the dimension by measuring himself against the heavenly." And what is such

measuring if not conscience?

Last of all, Heidegger continues in this passage to emphasize the synthetic, holistic and therefore authentic aspect of this poetic existence in the 'between': "man is man at all only in such spanning"-- again the strict demand for authenticity; "measure taking . . . brings the two . . . to one another" -- again the insistence on wholeness. Thus we see that much in his later, poeticized philosophy has its foundation in the dry and soberly argued text of Being and Time.

Why, then, the change of format? What else is Heidegger now saying that eluded the style of Being and Time? There seems to be something peculiar about this "spanning of the 'between'" which is not captured in the analytic mode. And that is because such "spanning" is nothing other than poetry. If "man is man" only in such poetry, then man is a poet. Ergo the title "...Poetically Man Dwells...".

What, then, does Heidegger mean by poetry? Already in 1936 Heidegger had crystalized his thinking on this point in "Hölderlin and Essence of Poetry." "In poetry," he tells us,

man is re-united on the foundation of his existence. . . . Poetry rouses the appearance of the unreal and of dream in the face of the palpable and clamorous reality, in which we believe ourselves at home. And yet in just the reverse manner, what the poet says and undertakes to be, is the real . . . [Poetry] is itself essentially establishment -- that is to say: an act of firm foundation.²⁹

Again we hear the strident emphasis on re-uniting that which is split apart from itself, a theme so familiar from Being and Time. But now Heidegger is more specific about what is split apart in man: man finds himself estranged from his gods -- and by way of interpretation -- from his unconscious:

It is the time of the gods that have fled and of the god that is coming. It is the time of need, because it lies under a double lack and a double Not: the No-more of the gods that have fled and the Not-yet of the god that is coming.³⁰

Man as the being that is caught in the chasm of this abysmal 'between' is truly fallen into it. But man as the being who spans this chasm and brings the voices of the gods to mankind, such a man is man. And this authentic man is a poet:

In this way the essence of poetry is joined on to the laws of the signs of the gods and of the voice of the people, laws which tend towards and away from each other. The poet himself stands between the former -- the gods, and the latter -- the people. He is one who has been cast out -- out into that Between, between gods and men. But only and for the first time in this Between is it decided, who man is and where he is settling his existence. 'Poetically, dwells man on this earth.' ³¹

How does the poet accomplish his task? Heidegger tells us, harkening back to Nietzsche's Tragic Artist, that "the writing of poetry is the fundamental naming of the gods."³² Now we recognize the significance of that seemingly arbitrary transformation of conscience to divinity. This is the poetic move if Heidegger is right: to personalize the unconscious that we may speak with it.

The poet is characterized by a radical shift of consciousness which makes such personalizations possible.

Poetry, Heidegger tells us,

concerns the inner recalling conversion of consciousness which turns our unshieldedness into the invisible of the world's inner space. [The poet's] saying, because it concerns the conversion, speaks not only from both realms but from the oneness of the two, insofar as that oneness has already come to be as the saving unification.³³

This shift in consciousness is most emphatically not some undisciplined Dionysian self-dissolution in the unconscious.

The proof of this is that the poet does not become a god, nor

even holds discourse with them. Instead, he converses with a living symbol, which spans the 'between' of consciousness and the unconscious. Such a symbol or archetype Heidegger calls, traditionally enough, an Angel:

This being, for whom borderlines and differences between the drawings [of inner and outer] hardly exist any longer, is the being who governs the unheard-of center of the widest orbit and causes it to appear.³⁴

The Angel, as the symbolic representative of the unconscious contents, has the specific function of consciousness making. Rilke, from whom Heidegger borrowed the word Angel, makes this point himself:

The Angel . . . is that creature in whom the transmutation of the visible into the invisible, which we achieve, seems already accomplished. The Angel . . . is that being who assures the recognition of a higher order of reality in the invisible.³⁵

Note Rilke's reversal of the usual order of the visible and the invisible. In so doing he emphasizes the concealing nature of even the Angel's revelation. For here, too, it is the very manifestness of the daemon which implies something yet more mysterious, more hidden. By showing himself in the mask of the Angel, the god does no more than fascinate us and capture our attention. The parallel with Nietzsche here is striking, and Heidegger explicitly acknowledges that the Angel is "metaphysically the same" as Nietzsche's Zarathustra.³⁶

But this personalization is not by itself enough. Even assuming a proper attitude toward the unconscious, the archetypes cannot be coerced: "the poetic word only acquires its power of naming when the gods themselves bring us to language."³⁷ The role of the poet is not to be a god, but to

await signs from the gods, and "intercepting" them, "to pass them on to his own people":

'In the first signs' the poet catches sight of the completed message and in his word boldly presents what he has glimpsed, so as to tell in advance of the not-yet-fulfilled.³⁸

Like the Tragic Artist, the poet catches a glimpse of the Dionysian unconscious, where everything is in its wholeness, ("the completed message"). To him falls the task of selecting the one form, the one possibility of many, to give expression, however incompletely ("not-yet-fulfilled") to what he has seen. And he does so by means of symbols, which as Jung says, stand for "a relatively unknown thing": relative, that is, to gods and men.

Finally, it also remains for Heidegger's poet to interpret a culture's collective symbols in order to assure a proper understanding of them. "Sayings are good," says Heidegger, quoting Hölderlin, "yet something is also needed to explain the holy sayings."³⁹ Sayings, those distilled wisdoms of a hundred generations "in which a people remembers that it belongs to the totality of all that exists,"⁴⁰ are pre-ontological manifestations of the collective unconscious. But like all pre-ontological expressions, they lack that degree of articulation which consciousness lends to true poetic symbols. So when a poet interprets a "Saying," Heidegger does not mean that he puts it into rational, analytical language. Poetic interpretation, like the Saying itself, is symbolic, but with this difference: whereas the Saying is unreflective, an unconscious production like a dream, poetry is self-conscious and broadens the interpretation to include the

poet's own consciousness as well. Thus, like Jung, Heidegger makes even the interpretation of symbols a symbolic process.

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We must take a moment and reflect on the overall impact of Heidegger's argument. We have demonstrated his indebtedness to Nietzsche and his kinship to Jung. Moreover, we have highlighted the continuous elements in his thinking, in contrast to the usual reading which stresses the turn (die Kehre) beginning with the Rektoratsrede. We need to consider now what relevance Heidegger's thesis has for depth psychology: what claim can we make for the truth -- in an everyday sense -- of his poeticizing?

If we return to Jung, we find that he, too, was deeply influenced by the temptation to speak metaphorically, even in clinical matters. But if the reader accepts Kuhn's proposition that all scientific description is metaphorical (whether or not it chooses to admit it), then we must go one step further and say that Jung spoke poetically. By this we mean to accentuate the self-conscious manner in which Jung employed poetic metaphors. He did not speak poetically for lack of some non-existent "precise" description, but because he intentionally wanted to include all the nuances of a metaphor which would fill out his description. Thus, for example, in explaining his choice of the name "shadow" to represent repressed unconscious contents, he said:

The essence . . . has been expressed so trenchantly and so plastically in poetic language . . . that it would be almost presumptuous not to avail oneself of this linguistic heritage.⁴¹

But Jung did not stop with a mere stylistic enrichment of his vocabulary. He took poetic language seriously, and followed this viewpoint to its logical conclusion: if poetry expressed psychic essences, then poets must be regarded as quasi-psychoanalysts. Poetic insight had a validity equal to clinical analysis. Thus, as early as 1908, the fledgling Jung was anticipating Heidegger's later line of thought:

Hitherto we psychiatrists were unable to suppress a smile when we read of a poet's attempts to describe a psychosis. . . . But if the poet has not actually set out to copy a case from a textbook of psychiatry, he usually knows better than the psychiatrist.⁴²

Despite this affinity to Heidegger, however, Jung failed to find anything attractive in the philosopher's work. Judging from hints in his Letters, Jung probably did not go beyond Being and Time, and it is unlikely that he finished even that. In addition, it would appear that much of what he knew of Heidegger was by way of direct conversations with Medard Boss,⁴³ a prominent member of the existential school of Daseinanalyse, which we have already noted as having modified Heidegger. Clearly, Jung was not sympathetic to the wordplays of Being and Time, relatively modest though they were compared to Heidegger's later work. Above all, he did not consider it poetry:

This credulity and entrapment in words is becoming more and more striking nowadays. Proof of this is the rise of such a comical philosophy as existentialism, which labors to help being become being through the magical power of the word. People still believe that they can posit or replace reality by words, or that something has happened when a thing is given a different name.⁴⁴

And there is certainly some validity to this criticism as it applies to Being and Time. For as we have made clear, Being

and Time tries to straddle two traditions, traditional transcendental philosophy and poetry, and the result leaves the reader with an unresolved tension which can be distracting. It is this tension, above all, which Jung found so unpalatable, because in it he thought he detected a symptom, rather than a philosophy:

Heidegger's modus philosophandi is neurotic through and through and it is ultimately rooted in his psychic crankiness. . . . For all its critical analysis, philosophy has not yet managed to root out its psychopaths. . . . Philosophy has still to learn that it is made by human beings and depends to an alarming degree on their psychic constitution. . . . Neurosis addles the brain of every philosopher because he is at odds with himself. His struggle is then nothing but a systemized struggle with his own uncertainty.⁴⁵

Jung was objecting to what he regarded as Heidegger's unself-consciousness. By couching his arguments in the formalism of 19th century transcendental philosophy, Heidegger was relying on the weight of a customarily accepted method and procedure to insure the collective validity of his assertions. But insofar as he indulged in personalistic word-interpretations, he was abandoning any claim for a universal theory. With the move to a poetic use of words, Heidegger began to write depth psychology, but under the misleading guise of traditional philosophy. As a depth psychologist, however, Heidegger was committing the worst sin, because by failing to admit the poetic nature of his enterprise, he was ignoring Jung's dictum that "every psychological theory should be criticized in the first instance as a subjective confession."⁴⁶

Moreover, Jung did not accept what he understood as Heidegger's ontology. In no way sympathetic to the Husserlian

tradition of phenomenology from which Heidegger sprang, Jung maintained that "in spite of all existential philosophy the opposition between ego and world, subject and object, is not annulled."⁴⁷ This certainly represents a misunderstanding on Jung's part, and it seems likely that Jung got this conception of Heidegger's ontology by way of Binswanger and his Dilthey-esque notion of "understanding," which does indeed suggest a radical interpenetration of subject and object. But from our foregoing discussion of the 'between,' especially in the section on *deseverance** and the gap which *Dasein* can never cross over, it should be clear that Heidegger in no way intended to imply the possibility of *Dasein* somehow "dissolving" itself into the world. Heidegger's conception was much more subtle than that. *Dasein* is a fundamentally different kind of being from the world. *Dasein* dwells alongside (bei) the world, *Dasein* is at home in the world, but *Dasein* is not the world. When we speak of Heidegger's collapse of subject and object, we refer to the phenomenological moment of the 'between,' which requires *Dasein*'s experience of itself as distinct from other being. And certainly Heidegger's doctrine of truth does not encourage any misconception about the world's transparency to man, either. But it is in his later works, with the unequivocal distinction of gods from men, and of sky from earth, that Heidegger most explicitly rules out a willful transcendence by the ego. He accepts neither the Indian project of self-dissolution nor the Western alternative of total ego-mastery as adequate to the true nature of *Dasein*. Of the latter possibility, which offers the prospect of a harmoniously tech-

nologized utopia, he says in particular:

The peace of this peacefulness is merely the undisturbed continuing restlessness of the fury of self-assertion which is resolutely self-reliant.⁴⁸

Both the traditional Western and Eastern attitudes foster what Nietzsche called so aptly the "Spirit of Revenge." Heidegger, on the contrary, elaborated a philosophy of the 'between' which was a statement of faith in man's ability to accept the tension of this middle ground. Understood in this way, then, it is hard to imagine that Jung would have found much to disagree with in the ontology of the later Heidegger.

More than that, however, the later Heidegger corrects the "errors" which Jung objected to. The significance of die Kehre was the adoption of real poetry, both as theme and form. And along with this turn to poetry came the personal "confession" which Jung had found so lacking. In speaking of the "untimeliness" of Hölderlin's poetry, Heidegger is tacitly acknowledging the unique nature of his own thought as well. When he regards his work as no longer the objective forefront of academic philosophy, the cutting edge of philosophical "progress," but rather as the revelation of one man's confrontation with Being, Heidegger has become a genuine depth psychologist.

In saying this, we mean to imply that depth psychology is no mere theoretical enterprise of the mind. Rather, as Freud's famous "self-analysis" and Jung's (ofttimes infamous) "descent into the unconscious" show, depth psychology is practised by the soul. As such, it is bindingly personal. And while depth psychology may be justified in making some general observations, it is only because of the collective, archetypal

nature of the soul's experience. Depth psychology, moreover, is poetry, whether it be the heroic epic of Freud's struggle to unravel the Sphinx's riddle, or the lyric inspiration of Jung's visions. Finally, to be a depth psychologist requires a commitment to the soul, over and above all conventional opinions, as all three men learned with some bitterness. Thus, to view Heidegger as a depth psychologist is not so much to misinterpret his work as psychology, as to locate the man himself in a very special undertaking.

A different criticism of Heidegger's thinking, more well-founded than that of Jung, is suggested by the writings of Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962). An improbable concatenation of first the philosophy of science, then phenomenology, and later depth psychology, this French thinker's work represents what is unquestionably the best synthesis of philosophy and psychoanalysis as yet accomplished. Unfortunately, working out of a French tradition as he did, Bachelard does not readily lend himself to an easy integration into our heavily Germanic cluster of thinkers. Nevertheless, as a student of Freud, Jung and Heidegger, he was fluently conversant with the debate which we have been describing.

Bachelard's principal objection to Heidegger would, we believe, have centered around Heidegger's failure to give explicit credit to the concrete ontogenetic aspect of Dasein: man develops from the child, and it is in the child that we must seek the "myth of origins" which so fascinated Heidegger. "Isn't that opening on the world of which philosophers avail themselves," asks Bachelard with implicit reference to Husserlian

and Heideggerian phenomenology,

a reopening upon the prestigious world of original contemplations? But put another way, is this intuition of the world, this *Weitanschauung*, anything other than a childhood which dares not speak its name?⁴⁹

Bachelard made the crucial move from phenomenology to psychology by tying a philosophical attitude to a real, historical stage of Dasein's past being. Taking as his cue this question of being, he observed:

Reverie teaches us that the essence of being is well-being, a well-being rooted in the archaic being. Without having been, how can a philosopher be sure of being? The archaic being teaches me to be the same as myself.⁵⁰

But note that Bachelard in no way reduced philosophy to a neurotic compensation for unresolved infantile conflicts, as Jung did in the passage above, and as many Freudians would do.⁵¹ "Childhood," Bachelard insisted, ". . . has a proper phenomenological meaning, a pure phenomenological meaning since it is under the sign of wonder."⁵² By recognizing the child in us who marvels at the world, Bachelard was making firm, establishing, and at the same time valorizing this very special consciousness. But one cannot experience the consciousness of the child as an adult unless one accepts it for what it is in its entirety. And such total acceptance is not easy. As Hans Loewald intimates, it is perhaps the sign of the most developed and mature ego that can actively embrace its childhood:

It would seem that people are more alive (though not necessarily more 'stable'), the broader their range of ego-reality levels is. Perhaps the so-called fully developed, the mature ego is not one that has become fixated at the presumably highest or latest stage of development, having left the others behind it, but is an ego that integrates its reality in such a way that the earlier and deeper levels of ego-reality integration remain alive as dynamic sources of higher organization.⁵³

We may conclude that Bachelard would dismiss Heidegger's etymologizing as forced and unnatural reveries. Bachelard felt that most philosophers were too unwilling to abandon themselves consciously to "the child within." But the adult who cannot freely admit his child, and yet insists on dwelling upon him, ends up distorting the child. As Bachelard notes, "grown-ups write children's stories too easily. Thus they make childish fables."⁵⁴

If such a critique hits the mark vis-à-vis the early Heidegger, nevertheless Bachelard agrees with the later Heidegger about the privileged status of poetry. It is in the crucial linking of poetry to childhood, however, that Bachelard advances Heidegger one step further:

By the poet's grace we have become the pure and simple subject of the [child's] verb, to marvel.⁵⁵

Poetry, as conceived by Bachelard, becomes analogous to the originary speech of Loewald's earlier ego-stages. As such it is not merely to be indulged, but eagerly turned to as a source of creativity. Speaking of "reverie" as the consciousness of "the child within us," Bachelard explains:

Poetic values make the reverie psychically beneficial. Through poetry, reverie becomes positive, becomes an activity which ought to interest the psychologist. . . [Such is] the working reverie, the reverie which prepares works.⁵⁶

Poetry, then, is the ego's refinement of the child's speech. It is that perplexing middle ground in which the unconscious, as the archetypal child, creates and renews in concert with the freely-willed cooperation of the ego. Far from the repressed child who torments us with symptoms, the poetic child, the disciplined child, brings new life. And it is partially the

object of psychoanalysis to accomplish this transformation of the child: "The ultimate cause of a neurosis," said Jung,

is something positive which needs to be safeguarded for the patient . . . The childhood experience of a neurotic is not, in itself, negative: far from it. It becomes negative only when it finds no suitable place in the life and outlook of the adult. The real task of analysis, it seems to me, is to bring about a synthesis between the two.⁵⁷

In his grounding of poetry in the archetypal child, Bachelard gives substance to Heidegger's poeticizing in a way which saves it from becoming empty rhetoric. He thus does Heidegger a great service, despite whatever other reservations he might have had about the rest of Heidegger's writings. Moreover, in such a ⁿgrounding, Bachelard gives us a clue as to how to meet the more fundamental charge of aestheticism which we raised in the earlier discussion of Nietzsche.

Aestheticism, the criticism that the poetic image is "mere illusion," haunts our argument like a spirit that flaunts all exorcism. Can we never be done with this lurking feeling that all these efforts are merely self-indulgent diletantism, lacking rigor? After all, if Heidegger or Nietzsche had really valued the poet, should they not have restricted themselves to writing poetry instead of contaminating their artistry with wordy philosophizing? We need to explain this unappealing mixture of forms.

We can begin by observing that many of the thinkers whom we have mentioned belong to what Philip Wheelwright calls the "empathic" trend in philosophy. They exhibit "the tendency to interpret the essence of outer things and activities in the light of characteristics that we inwardly discern as belonging

to ourselves."⁵⁸ This is an old tradition in philosophy and stems from philosophy's roots in ancient Greece itself, as both Wheelwright and Heidegger have pointed out. It is in the very ambivalence around, and indifference to, the substantive, verbal, and adjectival forms of a word that we find the first hints of the pre-ontological suppositions inherent in the ancient Greek language, which pervaded pre-Socratic thinking. To use an adjective as a noun, as Heraclitus does when he says, "The cool becomes the warm" (Fr. 22), has a precise ontological connotation, namely that "for Heraclitus a thing is nothing more than the complete set of all the qualities and powers that belong to and constitute it."⁵⁹ This dropping out of the intermediary third, the carrier of these qualities, shifts the weight of the experience onto the observer himself, while the objective element fades into the background. Knowledge is thereby inextricably tied to the body, for it and only it makes any qualities possible. Such an account is subjective, to be sure, because it not only requires that we experience reality, but also stipulates the way, limiting us to the immediacy of our own sensations. On the other hand, whether this account must be labeled as merely subjective is another matter altogether, and depends on how much in common one wishes to credit Dasein's experience of Being-in-the-world. But insofar as we all share the same body, "the images have roots," as Bachelard tells us, and "in following them we adhere to the world; we take root in the world."⁶⁰

Now the relevance of this empathic trend of philosophy for contemporary thinking stands or falls upon our evaluation

of Heidegger's doctrine of truth. If the subjective, bodily and phenomenological experience of Being-in-the-world is not to be minimized as a mere step along the way toward higher realities, then we must acknowledge that the Cartesian claim for objectivity is indeed founded upon a particular way of Being-in-the-world. That decision, of course, we must each make for ourselves.

If one grants Heidegger's thesis, however, and also acknowledges certain universal experiences in the lived body, then the conclusion seems inescapable that there are two kinds of truth: objective and subjective. Jung himself had intimated this already as early as Symbols of Transformation in the introductory chapter, "Two Kinds of Thinking." Let us take care to avoid any confusion on this distinction. No one who has responsibly reflected on the enormous progress of post-Cartesian science can seriously entertain doubts as to the power of objective truth. Of course. And none of the thinkers in our colloquy have succumbed to such obscurantism. But it seems equally hard to dismiss the urgency of the distress felt by an entire culture that has found itself so radically alienated from itself. The Cartesian disengagement takes its toll: objective truth denies the other truth, the truth of the body. And it is because this very bodily truth is ignored that we first of all and most of the time feel this other truth. We feel it as anxiety, as depression, as mania, and above all, as pain. It is no accident that Freud discovered the subjective truth of the unconscious in the bodily symptoms of his first hysterical patients. He rightly characterized such

symptoms as the body's mode of "mitsprechen," speaking back to a consciousness that would not otherwise listen. The instincts are our body, and insofar as they grab us and claim us though the body, we feel their truth. We may not like it, and we may seek to avoid it in all manner of ways. But the very frenzy with which we seek to escape it only proves how fundamental instinctual truth really is.

Subjective truth, encountered first of all and most of the time in our feelings, can be likened to the bodily experience of the archetype, or to be more traditional, of the daimon and god. This is to do no more than pursue Freud's metaphor and ask, "With whom do we join in conversation (mitsprechen) when we have our bodily symptoms?" It is not at all unhelpful, as Heidegger discovered with his Angels, to envision our affective experience in the world -- in the body -- as the tangible communication of an inescapable reality in ourselves. Again we must credit Jung with first identifying this connection of man to god as a personified instinctual complex. Complaining of the shortsighted pride with which post-Enlightenment thinkers claimed to have demythologized the world, he remarked:

But what we have left behind are only verbal spectres, not the psychic facts that were responsible for the birth of the gods. We are still as much possessed by autonomous psychic contents as if they were Olympians. Today they are called . . . neurotic symptoms. The gods have become diseases. Zeus no longer rules Olympus but rather the solar plexus.⁶¹

Oftentimes it may seem that subjective truth expresses an alien consciousness, especially if we choose to personify it in the above manner. That being so, then the task of ana-

lysis is to claim our particular gods as our own. Just as St. Paul was blinded (hysterically, to be sure) by his refusal to accept Christ as his own god and as a part of himself, (a fact which he could not bear to "see"), so cure came by integrating the split-off complex back into his ego. Instead of repressing it, so dramatically expressed by his persecution of the Christians, Paul accepted the complex as belonging to him. So we see that subjective truth is not necessarily an "obvious" truth. On the contrary, in demanding that we take responsibility for what we are conscious of, and more importantly, for what we are not, we are demanding a radically Heideggerian ontology, which has given many people no little difficulty! For when Heidegger says Dasein is its disclosedness, the emphasis should be on the "is": we are the world which we permit ourselves to see and feel. And recalling Nietzsche, we must remember that what happens to us is our own, for it is we who give it shape and meaning. To disavow hysterical paralysis or a psychogenic ulcer as somehow "really" due to extrinsic causes, is to give up any personal claim one might have to the uniqueness of one's life, and to its meaning. Ultimately, of course, the same argument can be extended to less transparent examples. A war or natural catastrophe is no less our responsibility, insofar as it is our consciousness which renders it, to invoke Churchill, triumph or tragedy.

Subjective truth is visceral: it happens to us as physical beings. We believe our eyes, we trust our senses, we know in the pits of our stomachs. The various gods and daimones inhabit different parts of the body. One especially

hallowed metaphor for a certain aspect of this subjective, feeling truth is the heart. Certainly the iconography of the heart in the Western Middle Ages defines it unmistakably as the center of eros, of love, passion and feeling. But the tradition is much older than even this. Moreover, in antiquity this locus of feeling was associated with consciousness. As Neumann has noted,

For the Greeks, the midriff was the seat of consciousness, for the Indians and Hebrews, the heart. In both cases thinking is emotional, bound up with affects and passions. The dissolution of emotional components is not yet complete. Only if a thought is a passion that grips the heart can it reach ego consciousness and be perceived.⁶²

So, too, does Kundalini Yoga identify the first glimmerings of consciousness in anahata, the chakra of the heart.⁶³

It is crucial to see here that the truth of feeling is not merely the facticity of our passions. We are not trying to valorize "the instinctual life." What is emphasized is that feeling, like thought, serves to bring contents to consciousness, and that of the two, it is the more primordial means of accomplishing this end. Understanding requires both knowledge and affect. Knowledge, the objective truth, permits the clear articulation and differentiation that communication with others requires. But as Jung has stressed,⁶⁴ affect, the subjective truth of the body, makes possible consciousness in the first place.

Now Heidegger also distinguished between these two realms of truth when he announced "the logic of the heart":

At nearly the same time as Descartes, Pascal discovers the logic of the heart as over against the logic of calculating reason. The inner and invisible domain of the heart is not only more inward than the interior that belongs to calculating representation, and therefore

more invisible: it also extends further than does the realm of merely producible objects.⁶⁵

And Bachelard, following the spirit of this dichotomizing, also found himself unable to harmonize these two truths:

Dreaming reveries and thinking thoughts are certainly two disciplines which are hard to reconcile. At the end of a jostled culture I believe more and more that they are disciplines of two different lives.⁶⁶

The poetical thinking which Heidegger unveils for us in What Is Called Thinking? is thinking guided by the logic of the heart. In his move away from Cartesian ontology, Heidegger sought to reground Dasein's thinking about Dasein in the immediacy of his feelings, which are experienced in the body: hence his emphasis on earth. Like Jung's old Pueblo friend,⁶⁷ Heidegger accused Western civilization of "thinking with its head," and reminded it that all original thinking is with the heart.

The truth of poetic thinking does not depend on rational verification, although it does not rule that out either. The truth of poetic thinking -- and of Jung's symbolic life -- is tested in the heart, where our feelings, those bodily experiences of the archetypes, will tell us whether or not what we imagine is true poetry. And Heidegger makes it quite clear that not just any poetry will do: there is authentic and inauthentic poetry. The judgment of authenticity is in no way arbitrary, however, simply because it is irrational. There is a standard for subjective truth:

Man is capable of poetry at any time only to the degree to which his being is appropriate to that which has a liking for man and therefore needs his presence. Poetry is authentic or inauthentic to the degree of this appropriation.⁶⁸

This appropriation, again stressing the question of attitude, distills the quintessential relationship of ego consciousness with the bodily, affective, instinctual realm of the unconscious, which, as we have said above,⁶⁹ does indeed need man's presence.

Authenticity constitutes the ethical bedrock of Heidegger's thought. To be sure, he disclaims ever so often that we should attribute to authenticity a normative function. Nonetheless, given that we accept a certain amount of existence as irredeemably -- and perhaps fortunately -- fallen, there still remains the question of how each man acts when he hears the call of conscience explicitly calling him. In this context it is hard not to give authenticity a pre-eminent status.

Now authenticity deals with that mode of human existence in which the whole of a man's life is brought into focus as the criterion of any judgment. The difficulty is that man is not God, and cannot assume the all-knowing perspective which medieval ontology attributed to God:

Any entity whose Essence is made up of existence
[i.e. Dasein] is essentially opposed to the possibility
of our getting it in our grasp as an entity which is
a whole.⁷⁰

Authentic man must therefore insure the whole by spanning the 'between' of the soul, and he does so with poetry. Authenticity, which derives from the German eigen meaning "one's own," is therefore tied to the soul's own aesthetics. As we have tried to suggest, however, such aesthetics are not "mere illusion," because of the special nature of the soul. The soul, which Nietzsche calls the "I" of the lyricist,

. . . sounds from the depths of his being: its 'subjectivity' in the sense of modern aestheticism is a fiction.⁷¹

Authenticity, founded on the true Self, finds its source in poetry because poetry, as the original speech of the soul, is the purest expression of the archetypal metaphors of the collective unconscious. In "the images of the lyricist," says Nietzsche,

are nothing but his very self, and, as it were, only different projections of himself, so he, as the moving center of this world, may say 'I': of course, this self is not the same as that of the waking, empirically real man, but the only true existent and eternal self resting at the basis of things, through whose images lyric genius sees this very basis.⁷²

Given Nietzsche's reading, the authentic Self becomes identical with Jung's Self.⁷³

It may be objected that authenticity is also characterized by potentiality-for-being-a-whole, the openness to the possibility of all possibilities. But here, too our analogy to the collective unconscious holds. For poetry is the originary giving of form to the unformed; but the unformed is, by definition, in potentia, all possibility. And what is the unconscious if not potentia, after all? Even so narrow a view of the unconscious as the locus of unfulfilled wishes approximates this view, for a wish is pure possibility.

By every criterion then, be it body, instinct, wholeness, or possibility, the concept of authentic poetry is rooted in the unconscious. It is precisely the unconscious which grounds authentic poetry and raises it from "mere" to "natural" illusion. In this context, therefore, it is but a short step to the concept of authentic symbolism, for every measure of authenticity by which Heidegger judges true poetry may be

equally applied to symbols in the psychological sense. The authentic symbol, like authentic poetry, spans but does not abolish, the gap of human existence.

Of course, the unconscious can mislead us, too: it is the source of all possibilities. Heidegger's flirtation with National Socialism is ample proof of the dangers inherent in inspired truth. Therefore, the ultimate test of authenticity cannot rest on its feeling connection to the unconscious alone. The authentic man must also constantly immerse himself in the reality of everyday living, the reality of Being-in-the-world. On this issue Jung commented wisely:

Life is the touchstone for the truth of the spirit. Spirit that drags a man away from life seeking fulfillment only in itself is a false [and therefore inauthentic] spirit -- though the man too is to blame since he can choose whether he will give himself up to this spirit or not.⁷⁴

This double requirement, that symbolic truth guarantee its authenticity both from its sources in the unconscious and from its praxis in life, makes a stringent demand upon whom-ever would seek it. It might in fact turn out to be much harder to secure than the everyday commonplaces of objective truth. And yet once won, does it not at long last re-found man's existence upon the very core of what he is?

CONCLUSION

All men by nature desire to know. . . . It is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize.

-- Aristotle's Metaphysics

The word "metaphysics" comes supposedly from the Alexandrian librarians who first gave a name to Aristotle's book on "first philosophy." They named it such, because it was the book which came after the books on physics, and was hence the next on the shelf . . .

Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind. . . . The arena of these endless contests is called Metaphysics.

- Kant

Quand on parle de ce qu'on ne comprend pas et que ceux qui entendent ne comprennent pas non plus, on fait de la métaphysique.

- Voltaire

Metaphysics means nothing but an unusually obstinate effort to think clearly.

- William James

Philosophy is the world stood on its head.

- Hegel

Metaphysics is an enquiry over and above what-is, with a view to winning it back again as such and in totality for our understanding.

- Heidegger

Though we do not possess a physics of the soul, and are not even able to observe it and judge it from some Archimedean point "outside" ourselves, and can therefore know nothing about it since all knowledge of the psyche is itself psychic, in spite of all this the soul is the only experient of life and existence. It is, in fact, the only immediate experience we can have and the sine qua non of the subjective reality of the world.

- Jung

CONCLUSION

In these closing pages, I would like to turn our attention to this paper itself. May one not ask with justification, toward what useful end this tenuous merger of philosophy and psychoanalysis is directed? To be sure, the boundaries of psychoanalysis have always been fluid, but the movement has heretofore usually involved the arrogant appropriation of another field by psychoanalysis, as in the pseudo-anthropology of Symbols of Transformation or Totem and Taboo. But even where psychoanalysis has so rudely imposed itself on unwilling subject matter, at least there were always very real and practical problems which it was trying to clarify. But in our synthesis of philosophy and psychoanalysis -- not an explanation of philosophy by psychoanalysis -- we seem to be addressing no concrete issue at all. Why then did I write this paper?

The impetus to attempt this synthesis derived from my fundamental conviction that psychoanalysis and philosophy are two sides of the same coin. Philosophy articulates the mind's commentary on life, and psychoanalysis elucidates life's reaction to the mind. The difference is a question of viewpoint. The "cubist" enchantment with multiple perspectives which this essay demonstrates, recognizes the limitations on knowledge that any one point of view must perforce confine us

to. It is based on the value judgment that, to quote Jung, it is a good thing to make occasional incursions into other territories and to look at our subject through different pairs of spectacles.¹

Nevertheless, we cannot too lightly dismiss the objection that by mixing fields, we vitiate in a crucial way the autonomous insights of each discipline. Kant was particularly alive to this danger when he argued that

we do not enlarge but disfigure the sciences when we lose sight of their respective limits and allow them to run into one another.²

We have a three-fold response to this justifiable reservation. First, we would argue that the self-conscious attitude that permeates this paper -- and of which this conclusion is an example -- ought precisely to preclude ever "losing sight" of the larger context of things. Interdisciplinary thinking need not be myopic. Second, we take refuge in history and note that the whole field of Philosophical Anthropology, taking its inspiration from Schopenhaer, represents nothing less than an extensively developed tradition of just the kind of synthesis we are attempting. Moreover, it takes its cue from Kant himself, who gave birth to this very field, despite his own reservations! So we are not really attempting anything new. It is only in America, where the level of philosophical sophistication among otherwise educated people is so comically low, that someone in his ignorance can even be surprised by such a synthesis. But it is no joke to willfully ignore the intellectual efforts directed by some of Europe's greatest minds at the same problems which we today couch in psychoanalytic jargon.

Thirdly, and most importantly, we must consider the specific content of philosophy and psychoanalysis. We are not randomly mixing two unrelated fields of endeavor. Even if we suspend judgment for the moment on the larger question of perspective, philosophy still speaks to the concerns of psychoanalysis insofar as the latter is a form of human knowledge, and like any branch of knowledge, is subject to epistemological criticism. Psychoanalysis occupies no privileged status vis-à-vis its theoretical foundations, and it would do well to take advantage of the philosophical insights which have so radically refined the theory of science in recent years. As a theoretical system, psychoanalysis is terribly amateurish and provincial, and its very claim to intellectual respectability is being undermined by this laxity. As Paul Ricoeur observes,

this epistemology of psychoanalysis is an urgent task: we can no longer content ourselves as we did twenty years ago by distinguishing method and theory; we know now that in the human sciences "theory" is not something contingent, just added on: it is constitutive of the object itself; it is 'constituting.'³

This summons to self-criticism, moreover, holds regardless of one's preference for analytic, linguistic investigations over phenomenology, or for Freud over Jung. The issue is not partisan: it is rather a matter of intellectual broadmindedness which values the insights of different perspectives, and admits the subjectivity of any point of view.

There is really very little choice in the matter. Of course, one may choose to ignore one's limitations, but that is a debased choice. If one confronts the challenge of

perspective squarely, however, the conclusion is inevitable that no deep criticism from within is possible. As Heidegger warns us,

No sphere can say by its own methods what it is. History will not tell what history is. The essence of the sphere is the domain of thinking.⁴

And Nietzsche, too, concluded that "the problem of science cannot be recognized in the context of science."⁵ With that in mind, we begin to see why it is that philosophy might provide the most relevant critique of psychoanalysis. Statisticians and pharmacologists may comfort themselves as much as they please with their "damning" evidence against psychoanalysis, but the only essential criticism comes from that discipline which seeks out the foundations of all forms of human knowledge.

Our only difficulty with this proposition is that such fundamental explanations are precisely what psychoanalysis thinks it has to offer in turn to philosophy! This psychologizing of philosophy would seem to discredit Heidegger's claim for the priority of "thinking." To quote Jung, in a passage reminiscent of Nietzsche:

Not only philosophers, but our own predilections in philosophy, and even what we are fond of calling our 'best' truths are affected, if not dangerously undermined, by this recognition of a personal premise. . . . Can it be possible that a man only thinks or says or does what he himself is?⁶

Such apparently irreconcilable claims to priority need not lead to barren estrangement, however. It seems to me that by regarding both psychoanalysis and philosophy as two different perspectives on the fundamental questions, we can find a way to enrich and strengthen each side with the insights

of the other. Remember: it is not the perspective of psycho-analysis or philosophy which is fundamental, but the experience of our existence as human beings. It is not the method which is prior, but the question which it addresses.

There is precedent for such an opinion. Nietzsche, for one, had no difficulty making room for two kinds of deep-thinkers, and afforded equal status to philosopher and dream-interpreter:

Thus the aesthetically sensitive man stands in the same relation to the reality of dreams as the philosopher does to the reality of existence; he is a close and willing observer, for these images afford him an interpretation of life, and by reflecting on these processes he trains himself for life.⁷

And the figure of Gaston Bachelard exemplifies how creative the synthesis of these two realms in one man can be! As Jung insisted, what is really needed are "philosophic doctors."⁸

The final charge which we must take up is a curiously deflating one. For it may be asked by someone outside of both psychoanalysis and philosophy, "Why worry about all this talk of fundamentals?" May we not wonder with G.J. Warnock whether this quest after foundations is not in fact misguided?⁹ Who cares, ask the "new" psychiatrists, about the obscure roots of a neurosis if we can drug-, modify-, or shock-away the symptoms?

I can only reply to this protestation by indulging momentarily in a grander view of human history. Since the time of Aristotle, Western culture has progressed on the basis of an unchanging ontology which has covered up the "fundamental wound of human existence." For the past 2000 years we have

not sought out our foundations, but have remained content to let culture evolve where it would, in whatever way it "happened." Western thought is already well versed in the superficial acceptance of the everyday: there is nothing new in Warnock's suggestion.

As science began to make its ravaging inroads into the sturdy edifice of the "common man," however, its damage to him was temporarily minimized by an uncritical reliance on supra-personal institutions to shore up his identity. The church, the state, society, and the family all were invoked as a kind of "natural" bulwark against the encroachments of this valueless Leviathan. But today the spectre of technology is upon us with vengeance; we can no longer take it for granted, or disclaim any responsibility for its course and future. There are no more accidents. Technology, as Heidegger says, is in the service of being, and with it our being can today realize almost any possibility. The problem of coming to terms with just what this being is can no longer be dismissed as the idle task of a few quaintly irrelevant Greeks. The decisions doctors and psychiatrists are making right now require the most thoroughgoing definitions of man, and these definitions are being made, whether we choose to be aware of it or not. Is it not therefore timely, and incumbent upon us, to reconsider consciously just what we human beings are, and what we want from our technology?

The challenge to psychiatry is a real one. And yet, we have been started off on the right track already with the initial insights of psychoanalysis. As Jung said in praise

of Freud,

It was Freud's momentous discovery that the neurosis is not a mere agglomeration of symptoms, but a wrong functioning which affects the whole psyche. The important thing is not the neurosis, but the man who has the neurosis. We have set to work on the human being, and we must be able to do him justice as a human being.¹⁰

The danger of the new psychotherapeutics is that it threatens to throw away this key insight in the rush to "correct malfunctioning systems." People are not machines, and the present-at-hand attitude which says they are, and which science fosters, may well be the most pernicious result of that uneasy wedding of psychology with medicine. Psychiatry must renew its commitment to the human psyche, even at the expense of temporary setbacks in "progress." Psychoanalysis has a higher responsibility than to the demands of an anxious public or a soulless mental health bureaucracy. Psychoanalysis has an obligation to authentic man, to guarantee his humanity in all its ramifications. Said Jung,

. . . one cannot treat the psyche without touching on man and life as a whole, including the ultimate and deepest issues, anymore than one can treat the sick body without regard to the totality of its functions, or rather . . . the totality of the sick man himself.¹¹

Insofar as philosophy spurs the psychoanalyst on to remembering his true task -- the patient's authenticity -- it becomes indispensable and integral to his own authentic functioning. In that spirit, I will be satisfied if this essay encourages even a single psychiatrist to reflect for a moment on the meaning of his work. At least I am content in knowing that it caused a psychiatrist-to-be, its author, to do so.

NOTES

ABBREVIATIONS

- CCU - "The Concept of the Collective Unconscious" (1936)
- CP - "The Content of the Psychoses" (1908)
- CW - The Collected Works of C.G.Jung
- F/J Letters - The Freud/Jung Letters
- FQP - "The Fundamental Questions of Psychotherapy" (1951)
- IU - "Instinct and the Unconscious" (1919)
- Letters - C.G.Jung Letters: Vol. I (1906-1950) & Vol. II (1951-1961)
- NP - "On the Nature of the Psyche" (1946)
- PE - "On Psychic Energy" (1928)
- PAMA - "Psychological Aspects of the Mother Archetype" (1938)
- PT - Psychological Types (1921)
- PDP - The Psychology of Dementia Praecox (1907)
- RPP - "Realities of Practical Psychotherapy" (1937)
- SL - "Spirit and Life" (1926)
- SE - Standard Edition of the Works of Sigmund Freud
- ST - Symbols of Transformation (1912-1913)
- TP - "Theory of Psychoanalysis" (1912-1913)

Introduction

¹Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 94.

Jung's Early Thoughts on Symbols

¹PDP, CW 3, para. 136.

²Ibid., para. 137.

³William James, Pragmatism (1907). Quoted by Jung in "A Contribution to Psychological Types" (1913), CW 6, para. 367.

⁴CP, CW 3, para. 385.

⁵Take, for example, a case discussed in "The Content of the Psychoses" (CW 3, para. 373): The patient proclaims, "I am the Lorelei." Jung analyzes it thus: "This refers to Heine's well known song, 'Ich weiss nicht, was soll es bedeuten.' Whenever she wants to speak about her affairs, people do not understand her, and say they don't know what it means; therefore she is the Lorelei." At this stage, Jung did not yet pursue the deeper, mythological implications of what it might mean to be the Lorelei.

⁶CP, CW 3, para. 383.

⁷ST, CW 5, p. xxiv.

⁸Aristotle, Metaphysics 1003^a: "Therefore it is of being as being that we also must grasp the first cause."

⁹Martin Heidegger, "What is Metaphysics?", in Existence and Being, p. 218.

¹⁰Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 41ff.

¹¹Letters I, p. 328.

¹²Letters II, p. 368.

¹³TP, CW 4, para. 317 (both quotes).

¹⁴PE, CW 8, para. 111. In the argument that follows, much will be taken from this essay "On Psychic Energy." While this

was only published in 1928, the original editors claim that it was first framed in 1912 as a response to criticism of Symbols of Transformation. We feel this to be accurate, as the internal evidence suggests a high degree of correlation between ideas in "On Psychic Energy" and Symbols of Transformation. We therefore shall use this essay as indicative of Jung's thinking during this crucial period of 1912-13 and assume that the fifteen year delay in publication only led to greater clarity of expression and not to basic changes in the argument.

¹⁵Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 1-9.

¹⁶PT, CW 6, para. 512: "We know, however, that the mind cannot be a tabula rasa, for epistemological criticism shows us that certain categories of thinking are given a priori; they are antecedent to all experience and appear with the first act of thought, of which they are its preformed determinants. What Kant demonstrated in respect of logical thinking is true of the whole range of the psyche."

¹⁷F/J Letters, 298 F, 18 February, 1912.

¹⁸ST, CW 5, para. 685 (*italics added*).

¹⁹F/J Letters, 282J, 14 November, 1911.

²⁰TP, CW 4, para. 371.

²¹Ibid., para. 322 (*italics added*).

²²Ibid., para. 334 (*italics added*).

²³ST, CW 5, para. 114.

²⁴Ibid., para. 180.

²⁵It seems clear from a careful reading of "The Theory of Psychoanalysis" that the sign/symbol distinction, as later developed in Psychological Types, derives from this period and was not essentially modified.

²⁶PT, CW 6, para. 815. (following quotes also).

²⁷Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, pp. 367-8.

²⁸This definition of symbol is pure Schopenhauer in its origins. See *infra*, p. 98ff and note 28.

²⁹PT, CW 6, para. 816. The German word used is "schwanger."

³⁰It should be observed that symbols may be signs as well. Even the most cursory skimming of Symbols of Transformation turns up innumerable images whose phallic or uterine intent

is unmistakable. But for these to be genuine symbols, we must go on to ask what the phallus or uterus means? These organs in turn point to something else, and that something else is what remains veiled.

³¹PE, CW 8, para. 3: "The idea of energy is not that of a substance moved in space; it is a concept abstracted from relations of movements. The concept, therefore, is founded not on the substances themselves but on their relations. . . ." And quoting Nicholas von Hartman, "Energy is relation." Energy most emphatically is not to be hypostasized to a force. See PT, CW 6, para. 778.

³²TP, CW 4, para. 282. This terminology of energy is probably at end an unhappy choice. It is a metaphor replete with concrete associations which hold our attention as such, in spite of Jung's constant disclaiming of all physical analogies. (See, for example, PE, CW 8, para. 32.) And as anyone who has struggled through the first part of the essay "On Psychic Energy" will attest to, the concept is not clearly and rigorously differentiated from the mechanistic metaphor of force, which has gotten Freud into so much trouble of late. (See, for example, Emmett Wilson, Jr., "The Structural Hypothesis and Psychoanalytic Metatheory," or Roy Schaffer's new book, The Language of Psychoanalysis.) Indeed, Jung maintains that they are just two different perspectives on the same problem. Moreover, in Symbols of Transformation Jung seems to occasionally hypostasize energy to instinct, Will, etc., thus vitiating his own meticulous distinctions. For example: "Libido is appetite in its natural state." (para. 194); or "Thus far our conception of libido coincides with Schopenhauer's Will." (para. 195).

³³ST, CW 5, para. 199.

³⁴Ibid., para. 195 & 197: "The concept of libido as desire or appetite is an interpretation [by] the ego of the process of psychic energy, which we experience [in consciousness] precisely in the form of an appetite . . . This view leads to a conception of libido which expands into a conception of intentionality in general."

³⁵Taking as the simplest case any two point charges separated in space, the potential energy between them is described as : $E_p = k \frac{q q'}{r}$ where k is a constant, q and q' are the charges, and r is the distance between them.

³⁶Which is not to deny that light and heat are still forms of the same energy, whose total sum has been conserved.

³⁷PE, CW 8, para. 88.

³⁸ST, CW 5, para. 344.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰PE, CW 8, para. 93.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Freud, The Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, pp. 336-41.

⁴³ST, CW 5, para. 507: "Projection, however, is never a cure; it prevents the conflict only on the surface, while deeper down it creates a neurosis which allows him to escape into illness. In that way the devil is cast out by Beelzebub."

⁴⁴Consider, for example, Fichte, or a literalistic reading of Schopenhauer. The latter, however, was quite explicitly referring to perception when he states that "the world is my representation" and should not be unjustly saddled with the charge of meaningless illusionism.

⁴⁵F/J Letters, 315J, 17 May, 1912.

⁴⁶ST, CW 5, para. 508.

⁴⁷Ibid., para. 329.

⁴⁸TP, CW 4, para. 317. Jung enunciated this principle again in 1935: ". . . the concept is always a symbol, even though it is an expression for something known." (Letters I, p. 202.)

⁴⁹Jung, "The Relation between the Ego and the Unconscious", CW 7, para. 353 [Gesammelte Werke VII, para. 353].

⁵⁰Although it is another matter with psychotics. It would seem from the theory as developed thus far that psychosis involves a defect of just this symbol forming capacity. The ego is weak, which means that it in some way is incapable of cathecting libido to the appropriate representations in phenomenal reality. Hence libido regresses, having no adequate counter-pole in consciousness. But because the ego is defective, neither can it deal with libido that is transformed into symbols. These threaten to consume the ego (e.g. paranoid fantasies) precisely because it has not provided its share in their formation. They are not the result of a collaborative effort at communication, but rather a one-sided invasion of unconscious contents. They are truly ego alien. So perhaps the reason why psychotics so often preoccupy themselves with God is that God is the one metaphor for a reality which is not represented in the everyday world of phenomena that is so ego syntonic.

⁵¹PE, CW 8, para. 93.

The Religious Question

¹Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, p. 621.

²Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, New Haven, 1970, p. 7.

³And indeed, in the case of the Miller fantasies, Jung had not even met and interviewed the young lady. It was entirely an exegesis.

⁴See note 50 in the preceding section.

⁵PE, CW 8, para. 91: "Symbols are the manifestation and expression of excess libido."

⁶ST, CW 5, para. 259.

⁷TP, CW 4, para. 350.

⁸ST, CW 5, para. 259.

⁹See Theodore Roszak, Where the Wasteland Ends for an intelligent historical account of this process of "objectification" as mediated by the Judeo-Christian religions in Western culture.

¹⁰ST, CW 5, para. 510.

¹¹TP, CE 4, para. 428.

¹²James Putnam, "A Plea for the Study of Philosophic Methods in Preparation for Psychoanalytic Work", p. 90.

¹³Putnam, "The Necessity of Metaphysics", p. 307.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵One gets the sense with this man that for all his "open-mindedness" in accepting as necessary the "dirt" brought out of the unconscious in psychoanalysis, he still felt he had to atone for this by making sure that the newly refurbished psyche was founded on more "wholesome" ground.

¹⁶Freud, "Preface" to Putnam, Addresses on Psychoanalysis, p. iv.

¹⁷PE, CW 8, para. 110-111.

¹⁸F/J Letters, 269J, p. 438.

¹⁹Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, Part II, Lecture I. The reader is assured that these vague intimations are merely preliminary, and that we will expound at much greater length upon the relationship between Jung and Heidegger, and that between psychiatry and philosophy in general in the second half of the paper.

Metapsychological Theory

¹It is well known that following Jung's break with Freud in 1913, Jung entered an extended period of introversion which in Memories, Dreams, Reflections he called his "Confrontation with the Unconscious." During this period he wrote very little in quantity, but outlined the fundamental direction that his later psychology would take in the Two Essays on Analytical Psychology. However, Psychological Types can still be regarded as heralding Jung's return to extroversion, for it was after its publication that Jung re-emerged on the European psychiatric scene with renewed vigor and vocalness.

²Binswanger quotes Freud saying to him in a private conversation: "Man has always known he possessed spirit: I had to show him there is such a thing as instinct." in Ludwig Binswanger, Being-in-the-world, New York, 1963, p. 1.

³Freud, The New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, pp. 559-575. (following quotes also).

⁴Speaking of William James, Jung remarked that his "psychological vision and pragmatic philosophy have one more than one occasion been my guides. It was his far-ranging mind which made me realize that the horizons of human psychology widen into the immeasurable." Quoted from "Psychological Factors in Human Behavior", CW 8, para. 262.

⁵William James, Principles of Psychology, p. 700.

⁶Ibid., p. 706.

⁷IU, CW 8, para. 273 (*italic added*).

⁸CCU, CW 9,i, para. 91.

⁹The example of the yucca moth is Jung's: IU, CW 8, para. 268.

¹⁰Karl Pribram, Languages of the Brain, p. 250.

¹¹CCU, CW 9,i, para. 91 (*emphasis on images added*).

¹²NP, CW 8, para. 417.

¹³Ibid., para. 437: "Of what lies beyond the phenomenal world we can have absolutely no idea, for there is no idea that could have any other source than the phenomenal world."

¹⁴Ibid., para. 440.

¹⁵PAMA, CW 9,i, para. 155.

¹⁶Imagine, if you will, a supersaturated solution standing in a beaker. It will soon crystalize, but how it does depends

on the circumstances. If I touch the beaker, minute crystals will form throughout and settle in a fine sand at the bottom. Should I choose to insert a stirring rod, however, the crystals will form a massive accretion on the rod that reveals the planes of cleavage, refractile properties, etc. The only difference between the two situations is the initiating circumstance.

¹⁷The word numen derives etymologically from neuo, which means, "I nod or bow my head." The Sanskrit root means, "to move oneself."

¹⁸But to go to the extreme of envisioning the phenomenal world as the Boolean projection of man's dialectical mind, as Lévi-Strauss does, reduces reality to meaninglessness. See Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind, p. 87.

¹⁹NP, CW 8, para. 407. Recall that instincts for Jung are distinguished both from energy and force. Energy in particular can only potentiate instincts. See supra, p. 20.

²⁰Ibid., para. 366. (following quote also).

²¹Ibid., paras. 367 & 417. This essay, written in 1946, stands along with "On Synchronicity" as the culmination of Jung's metapsychological theories. It is only here that Jung first uses the word psychoid, and one senses that it was a new formulation, not yet fully integrated into his thinking. It seems reasonable, given the foregoing explanation, to include psychic energy and the Self in this category of the "quasi-psychic" unknowables. As regards the latter, see below.

²²Freud, "The Unconscious," SE 14, p. 177. Note that Freud at times seemed willing to allow for distinctions between a personal and collective unconscious: "The content of the Ucs may be compared with an aboriginal population in the mind. If inherited mental formations exist in the human being -- something analogous to the instinct [Instinkt] in animals -- these constitute the nucleus of the Ucs. Later there is added to them what is discarded during childhood development as unserviceable, and this need not differ in its nature from what is inherited." (p. 195). Note also the mythologizing of unconscious contents into "an aboriginal population." At one point Freud even goes so far as to say, "The theory of instincts is, so to speak, our mythology." (New Introductory Lectures, p. 559.)

²³Erich Neumann, "The Psyche and the Transformation of the Reality Planes", Spring 1956, p. 103.

²⁴NP, CW 8, para. 367ff.

²⁵Letters I, p. 61.

²⁶NP, CW 8, para. 407.

²⁷PT, CW 6, para. 426.

²⁸This rendering of sich vorstellen is taken from a seminar given by Professor Karsten Harries at Yale College in the spring of 1971.

²⁹Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, p. 96.

³⁰PT, CW 6, para. 687. This clear articulation of the concept of attitude underscores our contention that Psychological Types represents the opening of a new phase of Jung's work. For although the roots of this idea can be traced back to Symbols of Transformation, the emphasis which it now receives correlates with the explicitly constructive point of view which characterizes his later thinking.

Compare also the notion of attitude in phenomenological psychiatry, as developed in Europe during the 1920's and 1930's. Van den Berg says "phenomenology is before everything a methodical adjustment, an attitude as it were." It is the "natural attitude" of Husserl somewhat liberally viewed; it is letting phenomena speak to us (phenomen - o - logy). See Henrik van den Berg, The Phenomenological Approach to Psychiatry, p. 62.

³¹PT, CW 6, para. 688.

³²Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, p. 124.

³³Ibid., p. 8.

³⁴Ibid., p. 46.

³⁵PT, CW 6, para. 425 (italics added).

³⁶Ibid., para. 819.

³⁷Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, p. 149. Spirit as Heidegger uses it is not to be confused with the spirit we have discussed earlier in reference to Jung. Spirit for Heidegger is rather more like Jung's Self.

³⁸James Hillman, Revisioning Psychology, p. 15. Hillman elaborates on the notion of soul by calling it a perspective rather than a substance. Soul, for Hillman, mediates events and gives meaning. It turns events into experiences. It is communicated in love and has a religious concern. It deepens our experience of life, but only by establishing a special relation to death. And it is the imaginative possibility, fantasy. These characterizations add to, but do not alter, what we have already said. From Revisioning Psychology, p. x.

³⁹Recall Jung's quote from "The Content of the Psychoses" (1908). See p. 7, supra.

⁴⁰Jung frequently used James' metaphors as well. But he does speak of horizon in this sense in NP, CW 8, para. 382.

⁴¹Friedrich Hölderlin, "Patmos", in Gedichte, p. 181.

Near
And yet hard to catch hold of is God.
But where there is Danger, arises
Salvation as well.
In Darkness
Dwell the eagles, and fearlessly
The sons of the alps cross the chasm
On fragile bridges.
Therefore, since all about are massed
The peaks of time, and the Beloved Ones
Dwell nearby, wearily
On most distant mountains,
So give us water in innocence,
Oh pinions give us, of that most faithful consciousness,
In order to cross over and return.

My translation uses words which correspond to the metaphors which we have been exploring. Jung called this first stanza of "Patmos" one of his favorite poems. (Letters II, p. 193n.) He gives an extensive hermeneutic of the entire poem in Symbols of Transformation, CW 5, para. 630ff.

The Role of Interpretation

¹Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 41.

²Letters I, pp. 31-32. It should be noted that Jung is not using the word mystery here in any careless or vague way. The roots of both mystery and mystic lead us to the Greek μυο, which means, "I close my mouth," hence, "I am silent."

³Ibid. The metaphor is Jung's.

⁴PE, CW 8, para. 402.

⁵Hölderlin, "Mnemosyne," in Sämtliche Werke, Vol. 4, p. 225.
The original is:

Ein Zeichen sind wir, deutungslos
Schmerzlos sind wir und haben fast
Die Sprache in der Fremde verloren.

The English translation is from What Is Called Thinking?, Part I, Lecture I.

⁶Heidegger, Being and Time, p. H176.

⁷PE, CW 8, para. 403.

⁸FQP, CW 16, para. 252.

⁹Rudolf Arnheim, Visual Thinking, p. 120 (italics added).

¹⁰Ibid., p. 254.

¹¹Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension, Lecture I.

¹²Thomas Kuhn, p. 198.

¹³Lawrence Kubie, "Unresolved Problems Concerning the Relation of Art to Psychotherapy," Am J Art Ther, 2:95, 1973.

¹⁴We follow Hillman here in stressing the universality and necessity of pathologizing. Pain is not always the result of illness, and in fact should be given the respect that is due a messenger of the soul. To call someone sick suggests that we try to get rid of his pain, instead of trying to understand its meaning. For a full account of this point of view, see Revisioning Psychology, Chapter II.

¹⁵Stefan Körner, Lectures delivered at Berkeley College (Yale University) in the fall of 1976.

¹⁶CP, CW 3, para. 320.

¹⁷Hillman, p. 192. Hillman notes that therapeutes meant in ancient Greek "one who attends to anything" and "one who attends to the sick." It is used by Socrates to denote "one who serves the Gods" (see Phaedrus, 252C; Laws, 740B). But to serve and to attend to also means to care for. And in this connection the reader is directed to Heidegger's analysis of the fable of cura in Being and Time, p. H 197-199.

Interlude

¹Freud, "The Antithetical Meaning of Primal Words", SE 11, pp. 153-161.

²Jung, "Spirit and Life", CW 8, para. 626. Jung began his etymological investigations as early as Symbols of Transformation, and even had his wife working on them (F/J Letters, 297J). For examples, see the discussion of "libido" in Symbols of Transformation, CW 5, paras. 186-189.

³Ernest Jones, "Theory of Symbolism", Papers on Psycho-Analysis, pp. 130ff.

⁴As in the Iliad, 4.453 or 5.774.

⁵All the following definitions are taken from Liddell and Scott's Greek-English Dictionary unless otherwise noted.

⁶Leopold Stein, "What is a Symbol Supposed to Be?", J Anal Psych, Vol. II, No. 1, Jan. 1957, p. 77.

⁷Jung, "A Psychological Approach to the Trinity", CW 9,i, para. 210.

⁸Stein, p. 74.

⁹Ibid., p. 77 (italics added).

¹⁰Heidegger, Being and Time, p. H 220.

¹¹Stein, p. 74.

¹²For example, in Fr. 81 Heraclitus says: "Men should speak with rational awareness (xuo no) and thereby hold on strongly to that which is shared in common (to xuno).\" Quoted from Philip Wheelwright, Heraclitus, p. 120.

Predecessors

¹Marie Louise von Franz, "The Library of C.G.Jung", Spring 1970, p. 190.

²Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, p. 14.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., p. 8.

⁵Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. H 318-321.

⁶Peter Gay, The Enlightenment, Vol. II, p. 534.

⁷". . . we must take up these arms again in order to seek in the mortal use of [practical] reason, and to base on this, the notions of God, freedom, and immortality, the possibility of which speculation [i.e. theoretical reason] cannot adequately prove." Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 292. Note that freedom occupies a special place, since Kant argues that of these three ideas, only freedom is such that we must know that it exists a priori. Yet we cannot give any content to this knowledge. See p. 291n.

⁸Kant, The Critique of Judgment, p. 528.

⁹Ibid., p. 530 (and the following quotes).

¹⁰Ibid., p. 534.

¹¹Ibid., Introduction to Section III.

¹²Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, Vol. II, p. 160.

¹³Ibid., Vol. I, p. 51 (second italics added).

¹⁴Ibid., Vol. II, p. 164.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 181.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 364.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 183. The similarity of this aspect of Schopenhauer's thinking to Heidegger is striking. Even the vocabulary is the same. For example: Metaphysics "discloses only the true understanding of the world lying before it in experience." (p. 183).

¹⁸Ibid., Vol. I., p. 51.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 52. One recalls in this context Jung's concept of attitude, especially as he elaborates it with respect to the feeling function in Psychological Types, paras. 687ff, especially para. 690.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Ibid., p. 58.

²²Ibid., p. 234.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid., Vol. II, p. 364.

²⁶Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logicophilosophicus, 6.32f (italics added).

²⁷Schopenhauer, Vol. II, p. 364.

²⁸One should also note at this point Schopenhauer's careful definitions of "allegory" and "symbol," as opposed to Idea. Allegory was a work of art signifying something different from what it depicts. It always signified a concept, not an Idea. A symbol, on the other hand, is an "allegory" in which there is no connexion between signifier and concept. Because it is based on a stipulated (but not on that account arbitrary!) agreement, the signifier can be forgotten over the course of time, and then the symbol becomes "dumb." (Vol. I, para. 50.)

Note that both allegory and symbol in Schopenhauer's sense are explicitly tied to concepts, that is, to a known, expressible thing. Hence they recall Piaget's definitions in Play, Dreams and Imitation in Childhood (pp. 168-170), where he defines, after de Saussure, a symbol (i.e. Schopenhauer's "allegory") as a motivated signifier in which there is a resemblance of some kind between it and the thing signified; and a sign (i.e. Schopenhauer's "symbol") as an arbitrary signifier, related to the signified by social or other convention. It is

precisely the unfathomable quality of Ideas, on the other hand, which would lead Piaget to classify them as "secondary" symbols, which distinguishes them from these other categories.

We include this observation to emphasize that Schopenhauer fully understood the subtleties of his definitions, and was not ignoring a whole additional set of refinements which has recently captured so much attention.

²⁹Karsten Harries, Lectures delivered on Schopenhauer and Nietzsche at Yale College in the fall of 1976. The following passage from Rilke, quoted by Heidegger, is an eloquent example of such an inversion:

However vast the 'outer space' may be, yet with all its sidereal distances it hardly bears comparison with the dimensions, with the depth dimensions of our inner being, which does not even need the spaciousness of the universe to be within itself unfathomable . . . To me it seems more and more as though our customary consciousness lives on the tip of a pyramid whose base within us (and in a certain way beneath us) widens out so fully that the farther we find ourselves able to descend into it, the more generally we appear to be merged into those things that independent of time and space, are given in our earthly, in the widest sense, worldly, existence. From "What are Poets for?", p. 128.

³⁰Schopenhauer, Vol. II, p. 407.

³¹Ibid., Vol. I, p. 235. One recalls here the Arnheim/Kubie debate on pp. 69-75 supra.

³²Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 24.

³³Ibid., p. 18.

³⁴See Ernst Cassirer's The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Vol. II, in this regard. We will have more to say about Cassirer below.

³⁵Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 38 (original italics).

³⁶Ibid., p. 73.

³⁷Ibid., p. 128.

³⁸Ibid. See Jung on the psychology of "as if" in "The Psychology of the Child Archetype", CW 9,1, para. 265.

³⁹Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 42. Cf. Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, p. 567: "Nothing but a wish can set our mental apparatus at work."

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 21.

⁴¹James Hillman, "Demonology: Jungian Self-Knowledge and the Pandemonium of Images", Lecture delivered under the auspices of the Kanzer Fund at Yale University on 8 November, 1976.

⁴²Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 46.

⁴³Ibid., p. 104.

⁴⁴"Den Gott verhüllt seine Schönheit: so verbirgst du deine Sterne." (translation mine). Also Sprach Zarathustra, "Vor Sonnen-Aufgang", p. 414.

⁴⁵This connection between Narcissism and Nietzsche's account of how consciousness is fascinated by the other who looks like oneself, is further developed in Edward Edinger's book, Ego and Archetype (Baltimore, 1973). He explains this fascination with one's self-image as one of the first driving forces towards an encounter with the unconscious. Naturally, as the Narcissus myth shows so well, from the point of view of the ego, initial immersion in the unconscious is experienced as a kind of death (drowning). But as the metamorphosis into a flower demonstrates, it is a symbolic death only. See Edinger, pp. 161-162.

⁴⁶Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 233.

⁴⁷Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 44.

⁴⁸Jung, Mysterium Conjunctionis, CW 15, para. 129.

⁴⁹Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 233. Note that Nietzsche uses similar imagery in Zarathustra ("Vor Sonnen-Aufgang"), when Zarathustra demands that the sky be purified of any clouds that would mar the immediacy of Zarathustra's relationship with the sky, "das ungeheure unbegrenzte Ja- und Amen-sagen." (p. 415).

⁵⁰Nietzsche, Also Sprach Zarathustra, p. 416.

⁵¹Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 86.

⁵²Ibid., p. 109.

⁵³Ibid., p. 88.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 93.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 34.

A Contemporary: Ernst Cassirer

¹Heidegger, "Die Selbstbehauptung der Deutschen Universität", p. 11. The examples of 20th century mythologizing in every

field of endeavor surpass documentation: Yeats' Irish fables, Pound's Cantos, Mann's Faustus and Zauberer, Chagall's visions, Stravinsky's Rite of Spring, even the very burgeoning of whole disciplines such as ethnography and anthropology.

²Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Vol. II, p. 3.

³Ibid., p. 4.

⁴It should be noted that this structuralist alternative is implicitly anticipated by Cassirer himself: "Even if a merely factual unity of the basic mythical configurations could be demonstrated beyond any doubt, this unity would still remain a puzzle unless it could be referred back to an underlying structural form. (p. 19).

⁵Schelling, quoted by Cassirer, p. 12.

⁶Schelling, ibid., p. 4 (italics added).

⁷Schelling, ibid., p. 8.

⁸Ibid., p. 8.

⁹Schelling, ibid., p. 37. Cf. Jung's famous quote on p.28, *supra*.

¹⁰Schelling, ibid., p. 6.

¹¹Schelling, ibid.

¹²Ibid., p. 36.

¹³Ibid., p. 24.

¹⁴Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, "Attempt at Self-Criticism", sections 6 - 9.

¹⁵Cassirer, p. 26 (italics added).

¹⁶Ibid., p. 203.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 239 (italics added). Cf. Jung's comment on pp. 34-36 *supra*.

¹⁸Friedrich Jacobi, quoted in Cassirer, p. 254 (italics added).

¹⁹Cf. Freud, "On Repression", SE 14, p. 152, where affect and idea become the representatives of the forever unconscious instinct.

²⁰See Erich Neumann's The Origins and History of Consciousness, p. 26, where he describes the necessity of emotional involvement in order to bring things to consciousness. See also

Jung, "Spirit and Life," CW 8, para. 634, where the affective motivation of an idea is emphasized. And of course the idea is implicit in the above-mentioned essay by Freud as well. The whole problem of feeling is explored further in our discussion of Heidegger, pp. 151ff.

²¹This is in contradistinction to Freud and Lacan, who place the word in the unconscious.

²²Cassirer, p. 78. Note that Cassirer is heavily indebted here to Rudolf Otto and his book, Das Heilige (1917). Also, it should be pointed out in this context that current thinking is no longer so anthropomorphically inclined to reserve all the credit for human beings. Lower animals, too, are capable of surprisingly sophisticated behavior that transcends mere negative stimulus-response modes. See Edward Wilson's Sociobiology in this regard.

²³Ibid., pp. 217-218 (italics added).

²⁴Heidegger, "A Review of Ernst Cassirer's Mythical Thought", in The Piety of Thinking, p. 45. Kant, too, would probably have classified Cassirer's work as "anthropology."

Heidegger and the New Ontology

¹Note the wary suggestion from one prominent ego-psychologist: "The interest of the psychoanalytic psychiatrist is now directed toward what motivates each patient to keep material in dissociation and toward the reactions of the patient in response to repressed material which mounts into awareness, rather than toward its contents per se. . . . As a result, the attention of the psychiatrist has recently been focused more upon the investigation of the ego-defenses. . . . than upon the scrutiny of the contents. . . ." From Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, Principles of Intensive Psychotherapy, p. 73 (italics added).

²"Ein wenig Gift ab und zu: das macht angenehme Träume. Und viel Gift zuletzt, zu einem angenehmen Sterben." From Friedrich Nietzsche, Also Sprach Zarathustra, p. 284 (translation mine).

³Heidegger, Being and Time, p. H 98-101. Heidegger examines here the Cartesian conception of man. It will be recalled that it was in Descartes' century that the idea of man as machine took the world by storm.

⁴"Die Zeit ist abgeflossen, wo mir noch Zufälle begegnen durften; und was könnte jetzt noch zu mir fallen, was nicht schon mein Eigen wäre!", Also Sprach Zarathustra, p. 403 (translation mine).

⁵Heidegger, Being and Time, p. H 133.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid., p. H 227.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p. 326.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 279.

¹¹Heidegger, Being and Time, p. H 219. It is interesting to note that despite initial objections among philosophers to Heidegger's etymology of aletheia, recent studies tend to confirm his interpretation, at least for the Pre-Socratic use of the term. See Paul Friedlander's Plato, pp. 221-22, in this regard.

¹²Kuhn, p. 111.

¹³Although it would seem that someone as intelligent as Wittgenstein was nevertheless not so open to this wonder. See his peculiarly misleading discussion of this same rabbit-duck figure in Philosophical Investigations, pp. 194ff, in which the phenomenon gets lost in his account of "seeing-as."

¹⁴Heidegger, Being and Time, p. H 215. One thinks again of "Mnemosyne" in this regard.

¹⁵Ibid., p. H 222.

¹⁶Ibid., p. H 226.

¹⁷Ibid., p. H 108. (and all other quotations in this paragraph).

¹⁸Ibid., p. H 132. (original italics).

¹⁹Ibid. (italics added).

²⁰Ibid., p. H 233.

²¹Ibid.

²²Ibid., p. H 373. Heidegger borrowed the expression "the connectedness of life" (Die Zusammenhang des Lebens) from Dilthey.

²³Ibid., p. H 374. (and all following quotations up to the next notation.)

²⁴Ibid., p. H 373.

²⁵Heidegger, "...Poetically Man Dwells...", in Poetry, Language, Thought, pp. 220-221 (italics added).

²⁶See Nietzsche's comments about the sky on p. 104 & 106, *supra*.

²⁷Heidegger, "...Poetically Man Dwells...", pp. 222-225 (and all further quotations in this paragraph; italics added).

²⁸The quotation originally ran: "...the sole necessity, by thinking our way soberly into what his poetry says, to come to learn what is unspoken." "What are Poets for?" in Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 96.

²⁹Heidegger, "Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry", in Existence and Being, p. 286 (italics added).

³⁰Ibid., p. 289.

³¹Ibid., p. 288.

³²Ibid., p. 287.

³³Heidegger, "What are Poets for?", p. 133.

³⁴Ibid., p. 134.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Ibid. See pp. 104-106 *supra* for Nietzsche's discussion of masks.

³⁷Heidegger, "Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry," p. 287.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Ibid., p. 288.

⁴⁰Ibid., (italics added).

⁴¹NP, CW 8, para. 409.

⁴²CP, CW 3, para. 354. Note that it was in this spirit that the early psychoanalytic journal Imago was named after the title of Carl Spitteler's novel.

⁴³Jung had been instrumental in founding an interdisciplinary curatorium in Zürich for the exchange of ideas on psychotherapy. He had direct contact therefore with several Swiss existential psychiatrists. See Letters, Vol. II, pp. xl-xlv.

⁴⁴Letters, Vol. II, p. 261. Jung is clearly referring to Heidegger in this passage.

⁴⁵Letters, Vol. I, p. 331-2.

⁴⁶Jung, "A Rejoinder to Dr. Bally", CW 10, para. 1025. In another passage, Jung expounded on this theme: "We are still

far from Nietzsche's view of philosophy and indeed of theology, as an 'ancilla psychologiae', for not even the psychologist is prepared to regard his statements, at least in part, as a subjectively conditioned confession." in NP, CW 8, para. 344. Nietzsche's comments in this regard are as follows: "Gradually I have come to realize what every great philosophy up to now has been: the personal confession of its originator, a type of involuntary and unaware memoirs. . . . There is nothing impersonal whatever in the philosopher. And particularly his morality testifies decidedly and decisively as to who he is -- that is, in what order of rank the innermost desires of his nature occupy." from Beyond Good and Evil, p. 6.

⁴⁷Letters, Vol. II, p. xlii.

⁴⁸Heidegger, "What are Poets for?", p. 116.

⁴⁹Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Reverie, p. 103.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 193.

⁵¹The classic example being Ernest Jones' comment on James Putnam's philosophizing, which he assumed was "placed in the service of some or other unconscious resistance." See Putnam, p. 464.

⁵²Bachelard, p. 127.

⁵³Hans Loewald, "Ego and Reality", Int J Psychoanalysis, 1951, 32:10-18.

⁵⁴Bachelard, p. 118. And perhaps this best explains Jung's cantankerous put-down of Heidegger, since Jung was not hostile to philosophy on principle.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 127.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 182.

⁵⁷RPP, CW 16, para. 564.

⁵⁸Wheelwright, p. 49. Jung clearly belongs to this family of empathic thinkers. For example: "We must never forget that the world is, in the first place, a subjective phenomenon. The impressions we receive from these accidental happenings are also our own doing." from TP, CW 4, para. 400. (original italics).

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 31

⁶⁰Bachelard, p. 196.

⁶¹Jung, "Commentary on 'The Secret of the Golden Flower'", (1929), CW 13, para. 54.

⁶²Neumann, The Origins and History of Consciousness, p. 26. This recalls the "little metapsychology" of Jacobi on p. 117 supra.

⁶³Jung, "Psychological Commentary on Kundalini Yoga", Spring 1975, p. 30ff.

⁶⁴Jung, "A Study in the Process of Individuation", CW 9,i, para. 621.

⁶⁵Heidegger, "What are Poets for?", p. 127.

⁶⁶Bachelard, p. 177.

⁶⁷Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p. 248.

⁶⁸Heidegger, "...Poetically Man Dwells...", p. 228.

⁶⁹See page 120, supra.

⁷⁰Heidegger, Being and Time, p. H 233.

⁷¹Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 49.

⁷²Ibid., p. 50

⁷³Note that Jung himself used the word "authentic" in just this sense of distinguishing between the collective, everyday (and super-ego) morality of the they-self, and the truly individual morality involved in a decision which transcends the confines of conventional conduct. See "A Psychological View of Conscience" (1958), CW 10, para. 838.

⁷⁴SL, CW 8, para. 647.

Conclusion

¹F/J Letters, 287J, p. 471.

²Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 5.

³Paul Ricoeur, Conflit des Interprétations, p. 107 (translation mine).

⁴Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, p. 33.

⁵Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 18.

⁶PAMA, CW 9,i, para. 150.

⁷Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 34.

⁸Jung, "Psychotherapy and a Philosophy of Life", CW 16, para. 179.

⁹G.J.Warnock, The Philosophy of Perception, pp. 1ff. We can cite Warnock as someone outside of philosophy if we recall with Heidegger that philosophy is metaphysics. And Warnock does not do metaphysics. . .

¹⁰Jung, "Psychotherapy and a Philosophy of Life", CW 16, para. 190.

¹¹Ibid., para. 175.

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SE: Freud, Sigmund. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis.

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